Defensive Measures Adopted by Czechoslovak Authorities in Reaction to Danger Posed by Nazi Germany during Years 1935-1937

Submitted paper is mapping measures enacted by Czechoslovak government during period of years 1934–1937 as a reaction to aggressive policy of Nazi Germany. Attention is given to proceedings aimed at increase of fighting ability of Czechoslovak Army such as field military exercises improvement of organization structure and elaboration of defensive operations in response to possible German attack. Focus is placed on defense construction works protecting boundaries, namely along western region of state. The paper is endeavoring to provide, in a concise fashion, a picture of struggle of Czechoslovak political leaders and military to prepare CSR to be able to cope with threat of German aggression and role of Czech and Slovak periodical press to inform public about dramatic political development during years 1935–1937. Attention is given to endeavors of periodical press in creation of confidence in Czechoslovak Republic ability to withstand danger of aggression from Nazi Germany.


introduction
The aim of the paper is to trace Czechoslovak-German relations during years 1935-1937 as they were depicted in commentaries of Czech and Slovak periodicals. The factual description of events of a substantial significance, which were already elaborated in numerous periodicals and monographs, was described only in a concise fashion. The attention is given mainly to influence of newspapers upon formation of public awareness in regard to political changes in Europe, which could threated security of Czechoslovakia. Since establishment of Czechoslovakia periodicals were an important tool of shaping-up public opinion. Their significance increased during second half of thirties, in time when Nazi Germany was threatening very existence of the Republic. Therefore, government authorities devoted a great attention to content of articles published and were limiting publishing articles which would in any way instill defeatism in society. In that sense, namely and Germany will be easily solved. 2 Daily Venkov, a periodical of the Republican Party, reported that on 17 January 1935 the Council of the League of Nations decided that on 1 March 1935 the Saar region will be unified with Germany. 3 However, not every resident of the Saar region was happy with results of plebiscite. A Slovak regional daily Slovenský Východ, repoted that approximately 8,000 persons fled to France. 4 Hopes that after annexation of the Saar region Germany will pursue a peaceful foreign policy, proven to be futile. On 16 March 1935 German government adopted a law, according to which universal military service was implemented. It was another violation of the Versailles Peace Treaty. 5 Great Britain, France and Italy criticized Germany during conference at Italian city of Stresa, on 11 April 1935. 6 Bi-weekly Politika, a newspaper commenting upon domestic and foreign events, expressed opinion that main goal of conference at Stresa was enforce the status quo in the Central Europe. 7 The member states of the League of Nations condemned Germany and a majority of members, including Czechoslovakia, adopted a resolution, in which denounced Germany's policy. Slovák denník, one of newspapers representing views of Republican Party in Slovakia wrote that, "This resolution is categorically disapproving implementation of general military service in Germany and this way violation of the Peace Agreement." 8 Despite sternly worded disapproval voiced by members of the League of Nations, the European Powers abstained from any further action. This deepen scepticism of the Central European countries in ability of the League of Nations to protect peace in Europe. France, which awoken to threat posed by Germany, signet the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Soviet Union. As was expected, Czechoslovakia, a loyal ally of France, followed shortly after. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics (the Treaty) was signed on 16 May 1935 and ratified on 16 June 1935. But, there was a glitch, which could have a negative impact upon security of CSRthe Treaty included a condition, which bound the Soviet Union to fulfil its obligation toward Czechoslovakia only when CSR, in case of a hostile attack, would be helped by France. This way, if France for any reason abstained from helping Czechoslovakia, also the Soviet Union was not obliged to help CSR. 9 Nevertheless, the Treaty evoked a positive reaction in Czechoslovakia, namely from representatives of left political spectrum. Even prominent non-communist publicists like Ferdinand Peroutka and writer Karel Čapek, praised Beneš, 2 České slovo, 1935, Year 27, No. 13, 16 January. 3 Venkov, 1935, Year 138, No. 15, 18 January. 4 Slovenský východ, 1935 With headline openly critical to Germany -"The enemy of peace throw away its mask", an official periodical of Slovak branch of the Social Democratic Party -Robotnícke noviny, informed, that "On Saturday afternoon (16 March 1935) Reich Minister of Propaganda invited foreign media representatives and announced that Germany is establishing a general military service". Robotnícke noviny, 1935, Year 35, No. 92, 19 March. 6 Slovak regional periodical Slovenský východ, informed that "Participants regretfully acknowledged violation of the Versailles Treaty and expressed their determination to oppose any violation of treaties which would endanger European peace." Slovenský východ, 1935, Year 16, No. 89, 16 April. 7 Politika, 1935, Year 5, No. 7, 15 April. 8 Slovenský denník, 1935: Dokumenty moderní doby, Praha 1978, 271-275. for pressing hesitant France toward closer relation with Soviet Union. 10 A communist historian Jaroslav Cesar asserted that the Treaty was positively valued by a large segment of general public. 11 Venkov, an official newspaper of Republican Party, wrote that it was a significant diplomatic achievement, which enhanced security of Czechoslovakia. Venkov valued the Treaty as a "positive factor", because it would be for Czech Communist Party hardly possible criticized Czechoslovak military built-up after Soviet government proclaimed that increase of strength of Czechoslovak armed forces is in interest of Soviet Union. 12 Contrary to positive reaction of large segment of general public in CSR, the Treaty with Soviet Union brought a sharply negative reactions in neighbouring countries, especially in Germany. 13 German government pronounced triple alliance of France, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia as being incompatible with Locarno Treaties. 14 Signing of French and Czechoslovak Alliances with Soviet Union gave Hitler excuse to carry over the most provocative violation of the Versailles Peace Treaty -an incursion into demilitarized zone in Rhineland. On 7 March 1936, a small unit of the German Army entered Rhineland, which served as a buffer zone, shielding France from German attack. Considering an overwhelming French military superiority, it was a daring act of aggression, bordering on irresponsibility and German soldiers were instructed to retreat immediately, if French Army would attack advancing units. 15 Surprisingly, though France could easily expel miniscule German force, France remained passive. Even assurance expressed by President Beneš that France can count on Czechoslovak full and active support in repelling German incursion, France did not interferred. 16 France abstained from military intervention, despite her right to attack German forces, if they enter demilitarized zone. French Ambassador 10 KLIMEK, Antonín: Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české. Svazek XIV. 1929, Praha 2002 11 "Signing of Czechoslovak-Russian Treaty resulted in a significant turn-over of the whole concept of Czechoslovak foreign policy. This event evoked a great interest and became a topic of considerations of representatives of all political orientations. (...) Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement was welcomed also by leadership of the Czechoslovak Army, because it was opening new possibilities to secure defense of the Republic." CESAR, Jaroslav: Mnichov 1938, Praha 1978, 14-15. 12 Venkov, 1935 13 According to A. Klimek "The Treaty aroused critical response from all neighbors of Czechoslovakia. Berlin added the Republic among enemy states, the propaganda of Goebbels asserted that CSR fell under command of Soviet Union and allegedly existed a secret addition to the Treaty, which allowed establishment of Soviet military bases on Czechoslovak territory. Warsaw characterized the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty as threat to Poland. Budapest spoke about "a threat of new Panslavism" and similarly as Vienna, blamed Prague for opening a doors of Bolshevism to Europe." KLIMEK, 297.
14 "Nazi government dispatched to all signatories of the Locarno Treaties a special memorandum in which declared that French-Soviet Treaty was irreconcilable with principles of diplomatic agreements concluded at Locarno. Therefore, Germany in its part in March 1936 terminated the Locarno Treaty." JOHN, Miloslav: Září 1938. I. Díl, Přípravy nacistického Německa na přepadení Československa v roce 1938, Brno 1997 15 "Germans themselves were not sure what will be a reaction to their crass violation of the Versailles treaty. Three front battalions which were crossing bridges (…) had strict orders to immediately retreat if they encounter units of the French Army. Also German diplomats had prepared new notes placing all responsibility on excessive zeal of several officers, who shall for their quickness brought before court". JOHN. I. Díl,[224][225] 16 "President of the Republic dr. Edward Beneš adroitly and in a clear form assured already on 7 March 1936 French Ambassador Louis de Monicault, that Czechoslovak Republic will follow France, if arbitrary behavior of Nazis will result in disadvantage against Germany." STRAKA, Karel: Československá armáda, pilíř obrany státu z let 1932-1939, Praha 2007 in Germany, Francois Poncet described course of deliberation of French government, which resulted in decision, to abstain from military strike. 17 With scathing criticism valuated French weakness E. Beneš: "Hitler (…) by occupation of left bank of Rhine (…) struck to the European peace one of the last and decisive blows. (…) We declared clearly to French ambassador in Prague, that we will follow France, if consequences from Hitler's deed will be enacted. (…) However, nothing happen. France committed the most fateful mistake, damaging Europe. (…) West democracies acted with inexplicable weakness, hesitancy and carefree recklessness." 18 However, it is necessary to note that French would most likely act more decisively if Great Britain would agree to support France against Germany. 19 Great Britain, however, dodged promise of support and this, in judgement of military historian M. John, annulled determination of France to wage offensive war against Germany. 20 French failure to stop German insurgency had fatal consequences. A. Hitler came to conclusion that French will do anything to avoid military conflict with Germany. However, despite danger posed to Czechoslovakia by German incursion, commentaries of government press characterized occupation Rhineland by German Army as having negligible impact upon security of Czechoslovakia and emphasized firmness of alliance with France. Also French political representatives on several occasions proclaimed friendship between both countries as lasting and unbreakable. Despite all this propaganda, which was aimed to assuage Czechoslovak public, it was clear that position of France as guarantor of peace weakend. As a consequence of French passivity, also British government grew sceptical about French determination to take a firm stand against Germany. 21 France as reliable ally was in commentaries of periodical press to a large extent replaced by Soviet Union. Abounding were positive news depicting Soviet achievements, high pace of industrial build-up and namely excellence of the Soviet Army. E. Beneš himself characterized 17 F. A. Poncet wrote that "Government was accused of weakness. It was blamed that missed opportunity to strike blow to Nazism, which possibly could be its end. However, later came to light that there were seriously considered possibilities of military interference. (...) But general Gamelin was convinced that even limited military operation is connected with unpredictable danger and therefore it can´t be enacted without general mobilization. Government refused such eventuality". PONCET, Francois, A.: Berlín 1931. Vzpomínky diplomata, Praha 1947 18 BENEŠ, Edvard: Paměti. Od Mníchova k nové válce a k novému vítězství, Praha 1948, 21-22. 19 "The French Foreign Minister, Pierre Etienne Flandin, flew to London on 11 March and begged the British government to back France in a military counteraction in the Rhineland. His pleas were unavailing. Britain would not risk was even though Allied superiority over the Germans was overwhelming." SHIRER, William, L.: The Rise of fall of the Third Reich, New York 1960, 293. 20 "After occupation of Rhineland in year 1936. (…) Czechoslovak strategic situation acutely worsened. By seizure of demilitarized zone at Rhine the distance of French boundary line to Czechoslovak projection at city of Aš increased to 350 km and what was even more important, French Army must before unfolding offensive cross Rhine and proceed with this river behind its back." JOHN, Miloslav: Září 1938II. Díl, Možnosti obrany Československa, Brno 1997 21 Bořivoj Čelovský, with hint of irony, wrote that "French proclamations about solidarity sounded quite convincing -to Czechoslovak public. (…) But British Government did not trust to French preparedness to war. Even less trusted Germany to French determination. (…) Already at the end of year 1937 it was clear, that in case of finding itself in crisis, the key to solving situation holds Great Britain." ČELOVSKÝ, Bořivoj: Mnichovská dohoda, Tilia 1999, 61.  But the most worrisome was deterioration of relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany. German propaganda, orchestrated by Josef Goebbels, was accusing Czechoslovakia of anti-German policy, of supressing minority rights of Sudeten Germans and offering political asylum to German emigrants. After usurpation of power in Germany by Nazi Party, mass purges of communists, social democrats and all left oriented persons who resisted Nazi regime ensued. 37 Scores of these persons escaped to democratic European countries, including Czechoslovakia. German emigrants were receiving help from Czechoslovak left political parties and organizations, which aroused wrath of German official places. 38 With aim to supress growing tensions with Germany, Czechoslovak government authorities curtailed anti-Nazi propaganda waged by German political emigration. Emigrants were also excluded from large cities and from frontier region in Western Czechoslovakia. But, because support of Czechoslovak leftist political organisations to German emigrants, this practice was eventually terminated. Tensions between Germany and Czechoslovakia were further increased by policy of the Ministry of Interior, which tried to stop flow of German newspapers coming to Czechoslovakia. 39 As a hostile act was judged by Germany prohibition of shipments and distribution of propagandistic materials and non-periodic press. 40 Facing ominous situation, Czechoslovak government adopted during second half of third decade a number measures to increase military strength of CSR. Shortly after A. Hitler's coming to power, military service in Czechoslovakia was extended from fourteen months to two years. 44 Slovak regional periodical Slovenský východ published address in which Beneš asked public not to believe that CSR will be attacked. Slovenský východ, 1936, Year 20, No. 192, 20 August. In similarly optimistic tone Beneš's described status of German minority in rose colors and expressed conviction that relations between Czechs and Germans will be solved peacefully. České slovo, 1936, Year 28, No. 192, 20 August. 45 Ľudový chýrnik, 1937 46 KÁRNÍK, Zdeněk: České země v éře První republiky . Díl třetí. O přežití a o život (1936)(1937)(1938) 50 Periodical Venkov characterized series of manoeuvers initiated on 20 August 1936 in Czech part of CSR as "The largest form of all, till then, organized military exercises". According to Venkov, military, but also political and social importance of manoeuvers was enhanced by presence of President, Premier and Chairmen of both chambers of the National Assembly. In his public speech Beneš asserted that it was done everything to increase ability of army to fend-off hostile attack. He expressed his firm belief, that peace will be preserved: "By all this what I just said, I do not want to awake an impression in you that a war threatens. (…) According to my conviction and firm hope, Europe will succeed to preserve peace. (…) We with all our energy are working and will work to maintain peace. " Venkov, 1936, Year 31, No. 194, 21 August. České slovo depicted military exercises, which were attended by hundred thousand soldiers, as celebration which deepen morale soldiers as well as civilians. České slovo, 1936, Year 28, No. 194, 21 August. Approximately year later, on 17 August 1937 also in South-Western Slovakia were executed manoeuvers, which employed military units adjusted to this region. Venkov, 1937, Year 31, No. 193, 17 August. 51 "The decision to build-up a complex system of fortified objects along the Czechoslovak border and defensive lines within the country was taken in the fall of 1934 and construction began early in the following year. (...) The whole project was divided into several phases, of which the fist was to be completed in 1942, the last in 1946." LUKES, 120.
52 "In regard to value of light fortification the General Staff had no illusions. Theses fortifications theoretically should be capable held enemy for limited time on the assumption that attack will be not supported by heavy weaponry." STRAKA, 78.
of fortification had heavy fortresses, which were capable offer to defending personnel a long-lasting protection without support from outside. HF could withstand attack of heavy weaponry, but construction was complex, lasted long time and was substantially more expensive in comparison to light fortifications. 53 Therefore, construction of fortifications placed an enormously heavy burden on state finances. 54 The total cost was estimated at more than 10 billion Crowns. 55  Difficulties affected also process of supplying arms to the Army. Especially conflicting relations existed between the Ministry of National Defensive and corporation Škoda Works, which was a monopoly manufacturer of artillery. Škoda Works was far more interested to export less advanced artillery to customers in South America, than to fulfil requirements of MND for modern weapons. Export of advanced weapons to private customers, which would be profitable and cover expenses spent for research and production of new and advanced weapons, was restricted. Another problem, which led to conflicts between management of Škoda Works and government authorities, was reluctance of company to supply armament to Yugoslavia and Romania because these countries were slow payers. 57 Therefore, management of companies producing weapons was reluctant to comply with military leadership. For example, requirement to implement multi-shift production was flatly refused. Also detrimental to supply of arms for the Army was interest of companies to maintain their export obligations. 58 Czechoslovak Republic, besides Czechs and Slovaks, was composed of several ethnic minorities. Germans and Hungarians were most numerous and politically relevant. A majority of Germans and Hungarians became constituents of Czechoslovakia involuntarily. As was mentioned, potential danger to integrity of Czechoslovakia stemming from Hungary ambitions to occupy region of South Slovakia, where a majority of ethnic Hungarians lived, was effectively neutralized by the Little Entente, whose combined economic and military power was far greater than that of Hungary. Though political representatives of Hungarian minority parties were critical of allegedly insufficient minority rights, they enjoyed their 53 "HF, which demanded longer time to construct, could be build-up only at localities of the most strategic importance." JOHN, II. Díl, 236. 57 "These unnatural relations led to frequent conflicts, which must be solved by dubious arrangements on individual basis and mostly were damaging export as well as interest of the Army." JOHN, II. Díl, 172-173.
58 "Urgent needs of defense of the Republic collided with export interest of weapon producers. Orders placed by foreign customers covered from one third up to half of production capacity of manufacturers." STRAKA, 67. legal status and actively participated on political life in the CSR. Similarly, members of German community enjoyed political rights and established a number of political parties. Though the relations between Czechs and Germans were never ideal, coexistence was peaceful. This, however, changed after A. Hitler's ascent to power in Germany. Chauvinistic frenzy engulfed a majority of Sudeten Germans and grew into hatred between Czechs and Germans. This rift was exacerbated by a policy of Nazi Germany, using German minority as a tool of its aggressive aims. Therefore, political and military representatives must take into consideration that inclusion of large numbers of German and Hungarian conscripts will have a negative impact on loyalty of the Czechoslovak Army. 59 Security authorities must face potential hostilities on part of Germans and Hungarians. With the aim to prevent leaking sensitive information, the Ministry of Interior issued promulgation which informed press what constitute subject-matter of prohibited news. Primarily targeted were information dealing with military issues, such as construction of defences, description of manoeuvers, localities where military units were situated etc. Because it was impossible in detail define all types of information, which could be inimical to security of state, in case when authority empowered by control of press were not sure which concrete bit of information is not allowed to be published, were obliged to request decision by the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of National Defense. 60 Growing danger that Czechoslovakia could become a target of hostile attack, initiated measures focused upon preparation of civilian population on defense. The main task to enact these preparations was in competence of institutions of compulsory education. During years 1934 and 1935 the School Administration issued ordinance in regard to defense education, which was obligatory to pupils of elementary schools and high schools students. 61 Important measure initiated by government, which intendent engage civilian population into defensive activity was establishment of so called the National Defense Education (NDE). 62 According to cited Law No. 184 -the Law in Regard to Defense of State, the aim of the NDE was "Nurture in population of Czechoslovak Republic, in dependence to its age, to acquire professional, moral qualities, physical endurance, knowledge and skills, which are needed to defense of state ( § 1 of Law in Regard to Defense of State)." Czechoslovak citizens of both genders were obliged to participate on NDE.
If it was no in breach of international agreements, cited obligation was mandatory also for foreigners who had permanent residence in CSR. As compulsory topic was National Defense Education implemented to all types of schools. Via several government measures implemented during years 1935-1937 was set-up so called the Civil Air Defense. On 15 April 1937 the Ministry of Interior issued Guidance for training civil air defense. The goal of training was to test readiness of executive authorities, gain experience in preparations for air defense and to assure population that public security is safeguarded. 63 Magnitude of defensive measures, which accelerated in dependence on worsening political situation in Europe, demanded constantly increasing amount of finances. To provide needed money, on 26 May 1936 government representatives submitted to the National Assembly a draft bill to issue the Loan on Defense of State. 64 Necessity to raise additional funds to cover defense expenses was generally accepted. Even Slovák -an official periodical of opposition Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party (HSPP), acknowledged justification of the loan: "It is necessary to admit, that state unconditionally needs a fairly trained army and all defensive means of modern age, because insufficient armament could be very costly." 65 However, members of the National Assembly representing HSPP abstained during voting and left Parliament. Also members of the National Assembly representing the Czechoslovak Communist Party abstained from voting. Communist periodical Slovenské zvesti justified refusal to vote by argument the cited Law is favoring rich at the expense of ordinary citizens. 66 The Loan on Defense of State (the Loan) was approved on 27 May 1936 by a large majority of deputies. According to České slovo voting was "a great manifestation of firmness of the Republic and acknowledgment of its strength and unshakable existence." 67 During following months Czechoslovak press presented the Loan as great success and gesture of staunch patriotism on part of citizens. 68 As threat posed by Germany during period years 1934-1937 was gradually increasing, it became necessary to mobilize al human and economic resources to prepare for defense of the Republic. Unfortunately, mainly due to failure of allied states to stay firm by Czechoslovakia, A. Hitler succeeded in destruction CSR.

Conclusion
The aim of the submitted paper is map commentaries of Czech and Slovak periodicals tracing the political development of Czechoslovak Republic during years 1935-1937, which was a period of growing instability in Central Europe resulting from aggressive policy of Nazi Germany. Attention was also given to measures enacted by political leadership and military as informed by press and to endeavors of newspapers to create an atmosphere of optimism