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CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

We greet the reader on the occassion of the publication of the ninth issue of the Central European Papers (C.E.P.). This number of our scientical journal is dedicated to the history and current politics of Ukraine. The Ukrainian crisis, which started in 2014, represents one of the biggest challanges for the stability of the international order and for the peace in Eastern Europe. This crisis is continuing today and nobody knows its real longtime consequencies.

The present issue of the Central European Papers (C.E.P.) reflects different aspects of Ukrainian history, and also of the current crisis. An important aspect of these processes is the memory-policy and the language-policy. A number of articles are dedicated to these problems. One paper focuses on the history of those Czechs and Slovaks who were executed and repressed in Ukraine during stalinism. Another Czech-related article deals with the problem of Subcarpathia in the Czech thinking. The authors of the current volume are respected scholars from Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine. Readers can find among them scientific researchers, lecturers and professors.

We hope that this issue of Central European Papers (C.E.P.) will be useful not only for scholars but also for graduate and undergraduate students as well as for non-professional readers. The development of Ukraine, which is territorially the second biggest country in Europe, is very important for Europe. Deep, current and neutral knowledge about this country is our elementary interest.

We also have to inform the Reader of tragic news. One of the authors of our current issue, Prof. PhDr, Mečislav Borák CSc, one of the most well-known and respected researchers of Silesian University in Opava, died. It was not long ago that we celebrated his birthday. We dedicate this issue to his memory.

Editors

ARTICLES

Persecution of the Czech Minority in Ukraine at the Time of the Great Purge[1]

prof. Mečislav BORÁK

Abstract

In its introduction, the study recalls the course of Czech emigration to Ukraine and the formation of the local Czech minority from the mid-19th century until the end of 1930s. Afterwards, it depicts the course of political persecution of the Czechs from the civil war to the mid-1930s and mentions the changes in Soviet national policy. It characterizes the course of the Great Purge in the years 1937–1938 on a national scale and its particularities in Ukraine, describes the genesis of the repressive mechanisms and their activities. In this context, it is focused on the NKVD's national operations and the repression of the Czechs assigned to the Polish NKVD operation in the early spring of 1938. It analyses the illegal executions of more than 660 victims, which was roughly half of all Czechs and Czechoslovak citizens executed for political reasons in the former Soviet Union, both from time and territorial point of view, including the national or social-professional structure of the executed, roughly compared to Moscow. The general conclusions are illustrated on examples of repressive actions and their victims from the Kiev region, especially from Kiev, and Mykolajivka community, not far from the centre of the Vinnycko area, the most famous centre of Czech colonization in eastern Podolia. In detail, it analyses the most repressive action against the Czechs in Ukraine which took place in Zhytomyr where on 28 September 1938, eighty alleged conspirators were shot dead, including seventy-eight Czechs. In this case, fabricated and produced directly in the Zhytomyr Oblast Administration Office of the NKVD, there are clarified the terrorist methods of interrogation and torture of victims, arranged false accusation, which could not been got away, as well as the systematic lying of the authorities on the fate of the victims, which continued after their rehabilitation in 1958, and ended half a century after the executions took place.

Keywords

Czechs and Czechoslovak citizens, Ukraine, political repression, Great Purge

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Czech Emigration to the Territory of Today's Ukraine

Czech emigration to Ukraine has a rich tradition from the days when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire. The first Czech contacts were rather sporadic and at first associated with the German colonization wave which aimed to the Volga region, mainly due to religious reasons. Mass emigration only started in the second half of the 19th century, mainly due to socio-economic reasons. The offer of Czarist Russia to acquire land and colonize some border territories of the Empire was enticing: the settlers could purchase the land from the owner of a landed estate, or obtain a state land as a hereditary family usance allocation which would become property of the colony. In addition to this agricultural emigration, Czech educators and teachers, shopkeepers, musicians, brewers, millers, gardeners and others went to larger towns. At the end of the 19th century, over fifty thousand people registered under Czech and Slovak nationalities in the census while the vast majority of Czechs had settled mainly in Ukraine.[2]

The first group of exiles from Eastern Bohemia went to the Poltava and Taurid governorate which included Crimea where they established several Czech settlements – Bohemka (now Lohanovo), Tábor (Makarivka), Carekvič (Pushkino) and Alexandrovka; a known settlement outside of Crimea was Čechohrad (Novhorodkivka). Descendants of the Czech religious exiles from Prussian Silesia (around Zelowa) came to the Kherson governorate, and many settled in Odessa. The largest group of emigrants, however, came to the Volhynia governorate which bordered on the Austrian Halič. They proved themselves there as good farmers – they introduced more modern methods of tillage and cultivation of better varieties of cereals, potatoes, fruit and hops, which allowed the emergence of food making and processing businesses, particularly breweries and mills but also agricultural machinery factories. By the end of the 19th century, twenty-seven thousand Czechs lived in Volhynia, and over seven and a half thousand of Czechs had settled in the near Kiev governorate (e.g. in the village Zubovština). Kiev became the centre of Czech social life for the Kiev, Volhynia and Podolia governorates where many Czech entrepreneurs and traders had settled, but also representatives of the intelligentsia and skilled workers. They founded the Czech-Slavic Meeting, the J. A. Comenius Czech Educational Association, and published the magazines *Ruský Čech* (*Russian Bohemia*) and *Čechoslovan* (*Czech-Slav*).[3]

The tsarist authorities provided good existential conditions but they also suddenly started forcing them to accept Orthodoxy and the Russian Empire nationality. At the beginning of the First World War, the majority of Czechs had accepted both the Russian nationality and Orthodoxy, which especially applies to the community of Volhynian Czechs. The Czechs who had come here not long before the war were considered as Austrian citizens, nationals of an enemy state; the tsarist regulations on deportation and seizure of property released in the first days of the war applied to them. Therefore, they sought to obtain Russian citizenship and sometimes accepted orthodoxy as well.[4] The tsarist imperial authorities

2 VALÁŠKOVÁ, Naďa: Češi v Rusku [Czechs in Russia.], in: *Češi v cizině* [*Czechs Abroad*], 9, 1996, 33.

3 VACULÍK, Jaroslav: *České menšiny v Evropě a ve světě* [*Czech Minorities in Europe and in the World*], Prague 2009, 218–220.

4 VACULÍK, Jaroslav: *Dějiny volyňských Čechů Díl II. (1914–1945) [History of Volhynian Czechs Part II. (1914–1945)]*, Prague 1998, 5–6.

approved a proposal from the Czech community on the creation of the Czech Company, the voluntary military units within the Russian army, driven also by the effort to support the Austrian-Hungarian Czechs and Slovaks' hopes of statehood. Later, Czech and Slovak prisoners of war joined the local Czechs, gradually forming another large group of our compatriots in Russia who supported the leadership of Czechoslovak exile in the West. After the battle of Zborov, Russian authorities agreed with the prisoners entering the Czechoslovak army. They were to fight on the side of the Entente on the Western front, but due to the evolution of the war and the post-war circumstances, they were transported to their homeland via Siberia and Vladivostok.

Many prisoners were involved in the life of Czech colonies and settled in them, others stayed here for various reasons (due to illness, marriage, job opportunities, the opportunity to acquire property, the desire for adventure, political aspirations, etc.), and they became members of the Czech minority. Some retained Austrian citizenship, others acquired the Czechoslovak citizenship and later mostly accepted the Soviet citizenship, as they were forced to it at the end of the 1930s. In contrast, about ten thousand Czech countrymen returned back to their homeland, mostly in fear of civil war, famine and the Bolshevik regime. The compatriots who had stayed were provided material assistance and a credit program worth of fifteen million Czechoslovak Crowns which allowed the Czech colonists a five-year interest-free loan for the purchase of farm machinery and seed. This help was taken advantage of by Czech farmers especially in Ukraine, and by introducing agricultural machinery, they increased the prosperity of their farms.[5] Later, however, the credit assistance paradoxically contributed to the harsh persecution of Czech settlers, because they were marked as kulaks precisely due to their farming.

After the First World War, Russia lost its western provinces, mainly in favour of Poland and Romania where there were allegedly about thirty thousand Czechs and Slovaks. At the first census in the Soviet Union in 1926, it was established that over twenty-seven thousand Czechs and Slovaks lived there, and the same number of them stayed here during the census in 1939. Most of them lived on the territory of Soviet Ukraine – over sixteen thousand, about seven thousand of whom in Volhynia; according to the Census of 1921, about twenty-five thousand Czechs lived in the Polish part of Volhynia.[6] The Division of the Volhynia governorate by the Riga peace of 18 March 1921 between the USSR and Poland made the Czechs in eastern Volhynia strictly separated from their neighbours in Poland, which affected many families, and throughout the inter-war period, they shared a common destiny together with the other inhabitants of the land of the Soviets, including political repression. Their position after the breakdown of the world war and of the civil war temporarily changed for the better when the so-called New economic policy was introduced, allowing farmers private farming and the sale of surpluses. Also, the aforementioned credit program helped them so the Czech settlements belonged to the richest ones in Ukraine. There was an extension of the rights of national minorities and by the end of the 1920s,

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5 ŠEDIVÝ, Ivan: Sdružení Čechů a Slováků z Ruska a československá vláda 1919–1929 (Podpory, subvence, dotace, odškodnění) [Association of Czechs and Slovaks from Russia and the Czechoslovak Government 1919–1929 (Aids, Grants, Subsidies, Compensation)], in: *Československý časopis historický* [*Czechoslovak Historical Magazine*], 36, 1988, 2, 212–237.

6 VACULÍK, *Dějiny volyňských …*, 32, 81, 82.

the Czechs already had their national councils in thirteen municipalities, organized cultural and awareness-raising activities, including amateur theatres, and they had nineteen Czech schools.[7]

In the early 1920s, it was assumed that after the settlement of political relations, it would be possible to build on the earlier Czech commercial and entrepreneurial activities.[8] The economic difficulties had forced the Soviet Government to find ways to bring qualified professionals of various industries into the country. Soviet authorities tried to attract also agricultural and industrial immigrants to the USSR, promising them advantageous working conditions. The newly-established agricultural and industrial enterprises had to submit to Soviet laws and comply with the collective form of management. However, the idea of building cooperative farms did not result in lack of confidence as it followed European tradition, which is why many volunteers streamed into communes and immigrant cooperatives from Western countries, including Czechoslovakia. Ukraine, however, was not directly affected by the creation of Czechoslovak communes and cooperatives as transports with the colonists continued deeper into the inland. In contrast, however, in the Donbass industrial area, many Czechoslovak experts and skilled workers had settled whose experience was demanded extraordinarily. Also, many former members of the Czechoslovak communes which were no longer in existence found work here.

Successful Czech entrepreneurs and farmers soon had to pay for their success and for their illusions heavily, as they were labelled as exploiters and kulaks, and in addition, as suspicious foreigners or former legionaries, they were considered as clear opponents of the Soviet regime and they did not have any escape from the repression campaigns. Since the 1930s, violent, forced collectivization had been destroying relations in the countryside, causing the demise of individual farming and turning prosperous farmers into class enemies who were subject to harsh repression. In minority politics, a combat against the alleged bourgeois nationalism of non-Russian nationalities started, which eventually led to the demise of minor nationality education. The political persecution of all persons and groups the regime arbitrarily declared as anti-Soviet elements was becoming severer. It particularly heavily affected also the Czech community during the period of the Great Purge of 1936–1938.

After the fall of the Czechoslovak Republic and the war division of Poland in 1939 there was a fundamental change in both the nature and extent of the Czechoslovak emigration to the USSR. Economic emigration had ceased almost entirely and political emigration only consisted of a marginal portion of Communists while refugees fleeing the terror of German and Hungarian invaders (from the Czech lands and Carpathian Ruthenia) prevailed. Some Czech groups did not find themselves in the USSR of their own will but due to Soviet expansion westward, as members of the traditional Czech minorities on the territory of Poland and Romania (which included in particularly numerous Czechs in Volhynia and lesser communities in Bukovina and Bessarabia), the soldiers of the Svoboda legion captured while retreating from Poland, or Jews driven out by the Nazis from the camp of Nisko over San and Bug to the USSR.[9]

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7 Ibidem, 85, 90, 93.

8 VALÁŠKOVÁ, 38, 45.

9 See also e.g. BORÁK, Mečislav: *České stopy v Gulagu. Z výzkumu perzekuce Čechů a občanů ČR v Sovětském*

First Political Persecution of the Czechs

The fate of the Czechs in Ukraine was tragically affected by the civil war years, especially the white and the red terror sprees in the first years after the Great War, when Ukraine became the battlefield of absolutely conflicting political interests. The arrival of the Bolsheviks to Volhynia in May 1919 led the countrymen to even apply for protection by the Czechoslovak Government, while the well-to-do fled to Poland and the Czech Republic. Repression against the inhabitants who were considered as opposition to the Bolsheviks was organized by the Special All-Ukrainian Commission for the Fight Against Contrarevolution and Sabotage (*Vseukrajinskaja črezvyčajnaja komissija*, VČK, also abbreviated as *Cheka*, ČK). Several Czech leaders were shot dead in the red terror (e.g. J. A. Somol from Mirohoště, Šneidr from Dubno), seventeen Czechs were executed by decision of the Kiev Cheka for alleged counter-revolutionary activities and sabotage.[10] These included for example Joseph Ma ek from Kiev, the secretary of the administration of the Union of Czechoslovak Associations in Ruthenia, Jan Volf, the accountant Jan Kratochvíl, the clerk Jan Protiva, the doctor Oldřich Dvořák and the telegraph operator Řehoř Chorvat. The threat of persecution also loomed over the members of the Czechoslovak legions, whether they came from the ranks of the local Czechs, or they were prisoners of war who had settled in Ukraine after the war (for example, Jiří Komárek was executed for "voluntary service in the Czechoslovak Corps" in 1920). Even in the early 1920s, the brewer Boleslav Homolka from Odessa, miller technician Jindřich Hřibský from Lviv, and fire technician František Rohlena from Zhytomyr were shot dead for political reasons.[11]

The first cases of mass persecution appeared in Volhynia already in 1925 in the process with Czech long-time residents in Kiev which were followed by the process against two Czech teachers from Alexandrovka and Bohemka in 1927. The repression in the late 1920s were directed against farmers who refused to enter into collective farms which was considered as anti-Soviet campaigning. Any pretext could serve retaliation, including fabricated membership in counter-revolutionary organizations. In February 1928, eleven members of the Czech agricultural association "Cooperative" ("Družstvo"), founded at the end of 1923 to provide assistance to Czech colonists living in the USSR, were arrested. The members of the association middled agricultural machines which were delivered from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union. In Volhynia, the "Cooperative" worked in the Czech colonies of Czech Kroshnia in the Zhytomyr district, and in Okilok, Czech Vysoko and Churanda-Vynohrady in the Cherniachivsk district and in the town of Cherniachiv. The arrested were accused of conducting anti-Soviet campaign under the veil of commercial activity, maintaining contacts with the Czech Consulate and handing over messages of economic character to V. J. Čermák, the envoy for agricultural loans at the Czechoslovak diplomatic seat in Moscow, and to professor E. A. Rychlík, the well-known scientists in the field of ethnography, who was

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svazu [Tracing Czechs in the Gulag. From the Research on the Persecution of Czechoslovak Citizens in the Soviet Union], Opava 2003, 58–101.

10 VACULÍK, *Dějiny volyňských …*, 9.

11 BORÁK, Mečislav: *Zatajené popravy. Češi a českoslovenští občané popravení na sovětské Ukrajině: z historie Velkého teroru na Volyni a v Podolí.* [*Secret Executions. The Czechs and the Czechoslovak Citizens Executed in the Soviet Ukraine: a History of the Great Purge in Volhynia and Podolia*], Opava 2014, 37–39.

labelled as an agent of the Czechoslovak foreign intelligence. Because the accusation did not provide compelling evidence in order for trial to be held, the then-security-apparatus decided within the bounds of its powers: The Special Council of the College of the State Political Directorate (GPU) of the USSR exiled most of the accused "socially hazardous kulak elements" to Siberia for three years and rid them of the right of residence in some areas of the USSR.[12]

Probably most tragically, the the Czech minority was affected by the campaign against kulaks, accompanied by violence and repression. For the Czech farmers, collectivization meant destruction of the results of their lifetime and sometimes multi-generational efforts to create and bring to prosperity their estates for which they left their home country for abroad. Collectivization did not correspond with the traditional practices of Czech farmers which is why it inflicted extraordinary suffering on them. It rid them all property and economic superiority that ensured their safety from their environment and protected them from the threat of assimilation. Collectivization was accompanied by foreclosures, displacement of rich farmers along with their families to neighbouring counties as well as to remote northern and eastern areas of the USSR; some of the kulaks were shot. The "dekulakized" property of the displaced persons was officially awarded to Russian re-settlers. Some of the Czech residents attempted to escape the persecution by leaving for Czechoslovakia, others preferred going into the Russian inland to work in the industry. Applications of Czech colonists for the issue of Czechoslovak passport and for permits to travel outside the USSR, which the Soviet authorities considered as manifestation of hostility.[13] In 1930, for example, the families of Czech farmers from Krushinetz, Ivanovich, Okolek, Kroshna and other villages were deported to Siberia for forced labour. Report from the Czechoslovak Ambassy in Moscow from February 1931 mentions mass displacement of Czech colonists from the Ukraine, especially from the area of Volhynia, to the vicinity of Arkhangelsk and central Siberia, where they are forced to hard forest and wood-processing labour.[14] According to the estimate of Vladimír Hostička, over two thousand Volhynian Czechs were affected by the repression.[15] The Czech minority in Ukraine was also hit hard by the events associated with the famine caused by the forced collectivization which decimated the local population.

The persecution, however, did not only involve farmers at that time. In 1928, for example, the whole Czech theatrical club in Kroshno were arrested and most of its members did not return from the camps. In 1930, sixteen members of an amateur theatrical club in Selenchina were sentenced.[16] After the Congress of Czech teachers in Zhytomyr in the summer of 1930, a number of them were arrested and accused of spying for Czechoslovakia and France, of anti-Soviet activity, campaigning against the Soviet Government and of religious

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12 Ibidem, 39–40.

13 VALÁŠKOVÁ, 45; VACULÍK, *České menšiny …*, 221–222.

14 URBAN, Rudolf: *Na Sibiř? Zkušenosti českých osadníků v zemi sovětů* [*To Siberia? Experience of Czech Settlers in the Land of the Soviets*], Prague 1943, 32–36.

15 HOSTIČKA, Vladimír: Volyňští Češi a jejich perzekuce v SSSR [Volhynian Czechs and their persecution in the Soviet Union], in: *Střední a východní Evropa v krizi XX. století* [*Central and Eastern Europe in the crisis of the twentieth century*], Prague 1998, 50.

16 VACULÍK, *Dějiny volyňských …*, 95–96.

campaigning. Other representatives of the Czech community in Ukraine joined them from August to December 1930. The personnel of the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) then selected a total of thirty-seven people from among them who were suitable for further use in artificial creation of anti-state groups. Thus, the never-existent "espionage-diversionary and counter-revolutionary organization of the Czech General Staff" was fabricated. The final charge of this group was even printed in a special booklet which was used by the NKVD investigators in the whole of Ukraine as a model for creating similar enemy groups.[17] The persons referred to in the file were tried as part of the Kharkiv "teacher trial", and the alleged head of the organization, Jaroslav Štrombach, as a high-ranking officer (commander of the 44th firing division of the Zhytomyr company) was used by investigators for all-Ukrainian plans of conspiracy as part of operation "Vesna" and sentenced to death penalty by the College of the GPU in Kharkiv in May 1931. The process before the Supreme Court in Kharkiv, held on 12–14 June 1931 in the building of the OGPU, eventually covered only twenty-one people, when the twelve Czech teachers were supplemented by nine other Czechs, officials of the Bohemian movement. Without the possibility of defence or of getting acquainted with the accusation, they were charged as a group of spies and diversionists, preparing the break-up of the USSR, diversion, assassinations and counter-revolutionary youth groups, which should prevent collectivization. The court pronounced ten death sentences and eleven sentences of heavy imprisonment. The convicts were eventually dispatched to the infamous Gulag at Solovetsky Islands where in 1935, all the death-row prisoners' sentences were amnestied in the form of change to ten years of imprisonment in the Gulag.[18] Some of them were later released, but at the time of the Great Purge, they were arrested again and shot. Another example of repression was the shooting of three members of the leadership of the kolkhoz Pioneer in Čechohrad in the Melitopol district (including the chair of the kolkhoz, František Laurel) in 1933, who were accused of mismanagement of the kolkhoz and errors in implementing collectivization.[19]

The relationship of the Soviet authorities to national minorities, originally quite amiable, began to gradually change and suspicion of the minorities as foreign elements in society outweigh in it. The former policy of "rooting" (*korenizacija*), the appointment of core groups from local resources, was very helpful to minorities, because they supported their ethnic, cultural, and economic development. They were to get ethnic minorities to support the Soviet regime, however, the promotion of national languages to the detriment of the Russian language was met with lack of understanding and even open resistance by the Russian speaking population, and later also in the ranks of the Communist Party. At the

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17 ŠEVČUK, Jurij: Polityčni represiji proty českoji intelihenciji Žytomyrščyny v dobu "Velykoho teroru", in: *Istoryko-heohrafični doslidžennja v Ukrajini*, Instytut istoriji Ukraine 2009, 11, 241–247; Haluzevyj deržavnyj Archive Services bezpeky Ukraine [Departmental State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine; hereinafter referred to as HDA SBU], f. 6, spr. 57288-fp., T. 2, Obvinitělnoje zaključenije po dělu špionsko-diversijnoj i kontr-revoljucionnoj organizacii razvedki češskogo generalnogo štaba. Po obviněniju: Štrombacha Ja. A., Vodsedaleka A. A., Jakovleva V. Z., Bezděka Ju. I.. Rychlika Je. A. i dr. Kharkov, GPU, 1931.

18 The best description of the process was given by DVOŘÁK, Jan: Antonín Vodseďálek a proces s českými učiteli na Ukrajině [Antonín Vodseďálek and the Process with Czech Teachers in Ukraine], in: *Paměť a dějiny, Revue pro studium totalitních režimů* [*Memory and history. Revue for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes*], 7, 2013, 4, 97–108.

19 BORÁK, *Zatajené popravy*, 43, 46.

beginning of 1930s, this process was completely stopped and its followers were subject to repression. Moving away from the political course of the country focused on the revival of the national and cultural specificities was then met with manifestations of espionage mania and search for internal and external enemies. It significantly affected especially the border area, populated by different nationalities.[20]

The Great Purge in 1937–1938 and Its Czech Specificities

Repression of the period of the Great Purge differed significantly from the repression of the previous years: while previously, the criminal authorities dealt mainly with "non-proletarian elements" (kulaks, businessmen of the time of the NEP, members of the "old" intelligentsia), the spear of repressions now turned against the representatives of other social groups. The main objectives now were the annihilation of the rest of the political opposition, a purge of the party and state apparatus (and the creation of a new, absolutely devote Stalinist leadership), the total destruction of the remnants of the exploiting class (landowners, kulaks, the bourgeoisie, the participants in the armed struggle against the Soviet power), and the suppression of even the slightest signs of free thought in all layers of society. The Stalinist regime also referred to the threat of war, and the need to annihilate the "fifth column" of the enemies within the country. Also, culprits of the economic difficulties in the development of socialism were sought so that they could be blamed. In Ukraine, mass repression bore its specific nature, as here, there was a clear national focus. Allegations of Ukrainian nationalism, chauvinism, of the nationalist deviations, of membership in nationalist counter-revolutionary organizations, these were very common "crimes" in the falsified and fabricated investigative files of the accused persons.[21]

Some kinds of repression in Ukraine preceded the later mass nationality-based operations of the NKVD. For example, in October 1935, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and in November also the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party approved the proposal of the Vinnytsya Oblast Committe of the party for the displacement of 1,500 Polish families from the "frontier districts" on the grounds that the Polish population is "unreliable", suspected of spying and mostly belongs to "actively religious and other contra-revolutionary elements".[22]

A later implementation of this measure included in many cases also the families of Czech colonists. At the turn of the years 1936 and 1937, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks) were accused of Trotskyism, Ukrainian nationalism and the "right deviation" and the entire leadership of the party was exchanged. New officials then launched a purging campaign and prepared repression even in the managing structures.[23]

A major impulse for the systematic development of the elimination operations of the Great Purge was given by the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of 2 July 1937 "On Anti-Soviet Elements". This telegram to the

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20 Ibidem, 44.

21 Polityčni represiji na Vinnyččyni. 1918–1980-ti roky, in: *Reabilitovani istorijeju. Vinnycka oblast*, 1, Vinnycja 2006, 43.

22 Ibidem, 43.

23 Ibidem, 44.

the party leadership of the republics, regions and oblasts ordered to focus the repression on the kulaks who had returned home after years of imprisonment in the Gulag and from exile, and "immediately shoot" those of them who display animosity. For the administrative execution of the command, the so-called "troikas" ("threes") of the NKVD were to be summoned again and the number of persons intended to be shot or deported to Gulag was to be established in each administrative unit. On the same day, a telegram containing the instructions on the execution of the operation came from the people's Commissioner of the Interior of the USSR, M. Yezhov. The chiefs of the NKVD, the state police and militia had two days to examine all of its investigative and agency material on criminal and kulak elements and determine the persons intended for execution or imprisonment in the Gulag. The produced supporting documents contained the details of the place of residence of persons intended to arrest, on the composition of their families, the personal characteristics of the Municipal Council and of the cooperative, on social status and financial circumstances, confirmation of judicial and administrative organs of the state of health and the registration of personal residence, the witness testimony protocols and the communication of Agency authorities, and the consent of the Prosecutor to arrest.[24]

The main role in organizing the mass arrests was carried out by inter-district operative groups of the police, formed in the former sightseeing centres and large resorts. On the territory of the Republic, forty-five such inter-district operational GUGB NKVD groups were formed in Ukraine. Officials of Oblast Administrations and District Departments of the NKVD were appointed as their heads. They took the arrested to prisons or kept them in custody on the premises of the NKVD, the arrests had to be confirmed by the Group's Chief and the District Attorney. Also active members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine took part in the operation. To prevent evasions of Ukraine, the degree of border protection was increased before the beginning of the operation.[25]

The repressive activities of extra-judicial "threes" ("troika") and "twos" ("dvoika"), which had largely been kept secret before the public, were in part complemented by the judicial authorities, who on the contrary were completely directed to the public, even holding public trials. Their aim was to cover up the true cause of the economic problems and channel public anger at the alleged specific culprits, labelled as enemies and saboteurs. In Ukraine only in the period from 1 June 1937 to 10 January 1938, seventy-two public trials were held during which a total of 238 of the 399 convicts were sentenced to execution by shooting.[26]

A meeting of the heads of NKVD in January 1938 summarised the hitherto performance of the "mass operations" and expressed itself for an extension of the activities of "troikas" and of the mass operations. In February 1938, Yezhov, asked the President of the Council of People's Commissioners, Molotov, to increase the already allocated subsidy of twenty-two million rubles on the implementation of the operations to seventy million rubles, especially due to deportation of kulaks and anti-Soviet elements. Thus, the planned costs

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24 PODKUR, Roman: "Velykyj teror" na Vinnyččyni (1937–1938 rr.): dijalnisť terytorialnogo aparatu organiv deržavnoji bezpeky, stereotypy svitogljadu čekistiv, in: *Zločyny totalitarnych režimiv v Ukrajini: naukovyj ta osvitnij pogljad*, Kiev 2012, 61–63; Polityčni represiji na Vinnyččyni, 45–46.

25 PODKUR, 63.

26 Polityčni represiji na Vinnyččyni, 54.

for the execution of repressions increased more than threefold.[27] The evaluation showed that Ukraine fulfils the limits of repression too sluggishly and Stalin decided to send Nikita Khrushchev as first Secretary of the new party to Kiev. At the same time, Moscow approved an additional limit on shooting down another six thousand people for Ukraine, and the operation of "troikas" was extended.[28]

In mid-February, 1938, Nikolai Yezhov arrived in Kiev on a special mission to impart that the repression not only will continue, but also that it must intensify. The local representatives were to submit supplementary requests for additional limits (by 16 February, these requisitions to the limits for the oblast "troikas" that came from the regional administrations of the NKVD suggested repression of 46,150 people, of which category I. designated for shooting counted "only" 23,650 people). However, at an operational meeting on 17 February, Yezhov said, there is a need in Ukraine to shoot another thirty thousand enemies, and this was confirmed by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party the same day. Yezhov expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the repressions in Ukraine. He in particular criticized the fact that Ukraine had not kept records of the enemies of the regime properly so the repressive operations were inefficiently effective. Therefore, the next phase of the operation was to take place on a completely new basis.[29]

After Yezhov's departure, the inspection of the operational brigade of the Main Administration of State security of the NKVD of the USSR started working in Kiev. The audit was officially to summarise the results of the work in the detection of "espionage-Trockyist, right-wing, military-fascist, nationalist and other anti-Soviet forces" in Ukraine. The inspectors criticised the disorderly registers, low level of investigation, intermittent arrest campaigns (such as the inclusion of all ten thousand people recently excluded from the Communist Party of Ukraine) among the persons intended for repression. Operation possibilities were not used in the search for enemies, attention should be rather paid to transportation and the specificities of the border region. Operational groups were to be deployed to the Oblast Administrations of the NKVD and immediately begin searching enemies of the regime.[30]

That's when performing a special operation focused on the Czech minority in Ukraine was to be first considered. The hitherto national operations of the NKVD primarily hit Germans, Poles, Latvians, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Romanians and many Asian Nations, according to the specific national situation in individual regions of the USSR. Many Czechs were persecuted in these operations, especially in connection with the Germans and the Poles, but a separate operation against them had not been officially announced because with the exception of a few Ukrainian districts, their communities were not numerous. However, a proposal of the people's Commissioner of the Interior, M. U. Yezhov from the turn of

27 RAFALSKA, Tetjana L.: *"Velykyj teror" na Žytomyrščyni (lipec 1937 r. – listopad 1938 r.)*, Disertacija, Kiev, Nacionalnyj pedagogičnyj universytet M. P, Dragomanova 2010, 129.

28 ŠAPOVAL, Yuri I.: "Ukrainskije nacionalisty" v ramkach prikaza na primere Kijevskoj oblasti, in: *Stalinizm v sovetskoj provincii. 1937–1938 gg. Massovaja operacija na osnove prikaza*, 00447, Moscow 2009, 392; ŠAPOVAL, Yuri I. – PRYSTAJKO, Volodymyr I. – ZOLOTAROV, Vadym A.: *ČK–DPU–NKVS na Ukrajini. Osoby, fakty, dokumenty*, Kiev 1997, 501–502.

29 ŠAPOVAL: *"Ukrainskije nacionalisty"*, 393; RAFALSKA: *"Velykyj teror"*, 132–133.

30 ŠAPOVAL: *"Ukrainskije nacionalisty"*, 393; RAFALSKA: *"Velykyj teror"*, 134–136.

February and March, 1938 has been preserved, "On the shortcomings of the preparation and implementation of mass operations in Ukraine" where the necessary measures to remedy included:

"3. Perform in a sufficient manner a special operation against the Czechs in the USSR, with discussion of cases within the command no 00485. The arrest shall be subject to the following categories: a) persons associated with the Czech diplomatic offices, situated in the territory of Ukraine; b) former Czech Legionnaires; c), anti-Soviet, Czech nationalist activists in Czech colonies connected with foreign countries; d) kulaks and the clergy of the Czech colonies; e) political emigrants from Czechoslovakia, except for people proven and trusted."[31]

Thus, the command assigned to add the Czechs to the national operation of the NKVD against the Poles, declared already in August 1937. This soon became manifest through the increase of accusations of Czech settlers of the membership in the underground Polish military organization (*Polska Organizacja Wojskowa*, POW) or of espionage in favour of Poland. At the same time, however, there were more and more often own-initiative attempts by the investigators of the NKVD to construct purely Czech espionage, sabotage, and other diversionary counter-revolutionary organizations according to specific conditions in each of the centres of the Czech minority in Ukraine. It meant a significant intensification of the repression against the Czechs which only came at a time when the intensity of the Great Purge was already weakening. While elsewhere in the USSR terror was at its height in 1937, in the Ukraine, it was on the contrary and it only intensified after the aforementioned criticism of Moscow Headquarters. According to the findings, at least 181 Czechs were shot in 1937 in Ukraine and in 1938 at least 352 of Czechs, twice as many as in the first period of terror. It testifies well of the true nature of the "executions", hastily performed on political order. Many of them were carried out in the autumn of 1938, when the terror was about to be stopped and the search for culprits who would be blamed for the responsibility for the illegal "mistakes" was starting.

Researches have so far proved over 660 Czechs executed by the Soviet regime in Ukraine due to political reasons which is roughly half of all Czechs and Czechoslovak citizens executed in the former Soviet Union. For the Czechs, Ukraine was clearly the worst scene of political repression. Compared to Moscow which was the centre of the whole State, and thus quite a significant number of the executed Czechs and Czechoslovaks came from there (over 120 people), the Ukrainian executed are remarkably different at first glance: instead of Moscow's elite and members of the intelligentsia, it was clearly simple farmers and workers who were mostly among the victims in Ukraine, while according to the class principles of the communist doctrine, they should have been the masters of their country. They were killed by a monstrous social system they naively believed to provide a fair place to live to them.

Already a brief analysis of the structure of the executed people showed that nearly a third of them (200 people) came from the territory of former Czechoslovakia, mainly from the

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31 *Velykyj teror na Ukrajini. "Kurkulskaja operacija" 1937–1938 rr.* Častyna II, KOKIN Sergij – JUNGE, Mark (Ed.), Kiev 2010, 31; MOZOCHIN, Oleg B.: *Pravo na represssii. Vněsuděbnyje polnomočija organov gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti. Statističeskije svěděnija o dějatělnosti VČK-OGPU-NKVD-MGB SSSR (1918–1953)*, 2-e izd, Moscow 2011, 191–192.

Czech lands; for example, there were eighteen from Prague. The actual number of natives of the "old country" may be even higher, as we do not know the birthplace of fifty-four other persons. The political terror fell heavily on the whole of Czech colonies, especially on Volhynia. According to place of birth, forty-two Czech natives from Czech Kroshnia, twelve from Vilshanka, twelve from Mykolaivka, twelve from Antonivka, ten from Vysoké. And it did not involve only Volhynia, for example, seventeen Czech victims came from Čechohrad in Zaporizhzhya. The actual number of victims from those communities will be even higher, as there also lived Czechs who were born elsewhere. Only five people came from Slovakia, but not all of them subscribed to Slovak nationality. By nationality, there were in addition to the prevailing Czechs also at least sixteen Germans among the victims, mostly from the border regions of the Czech lands, seven Ukrainians, four Poles and two Hungarians.

According to the place of execution, victims shot in Zhytomyr prevail and there were at least 176; followed by Kiev as administrative centre of the country, where sixty-eight were shot. Many victims were also in the larger cities and industrial centres, for example. Sixty-five people in Dnipropetrovsk (along with Dniprodzerzhynsk), thirty-nine people in Kharkiv, thirty-seven people in Kamyanets-Podilskyi, thirty-three people in Donetsk, twenty-eight persons in Vinnytsya, twenty-six in Simferopol in the Crimea, sixteen people in Luhansk regions, fourteen people in Odessa, etc. The other sixty-one Czechs originally from Ukraine were shot in other places of the Soviet Union. Among the executed, there were ten women. An overview of the time of execution shows the importance of the period of the Great Purge in the history of political repression. Leaving aside the bloody origins of the Soviet State, for which we do not have enough sources, we can conclude that in the 1920s and in the first half of the 1930s, there only were individuals among the executed Czechs and in some years we found absolutely no executions. A turning point occurred in the years of the Great Purge 1937–1938, when a total of 533 people, i.e. 89% of all executed, were shot dead. In 1939, only five persons were shot, in 1940, a total of forty-five people (most of them were Polish prisoners from the region of Silesian Cieszyn who were shot during the Katyn massacre), and in 1941 a total of sixty-three people, mostly political prisoners, who the authorities refused to evacuate from prisons in Ukraine before the German attack.[32]

Examples of Repressive Action Against the Czech Minority

To select at least a few examples of repressive operations, aimed at the Czech minority at the time of the Great Purge is by no means an easy task, as each of the needlessly lost lives would surely deserved dignified remembrance. In addition, we know only basic information about the fate of most of the victims, while for the account of the context, more extensive archival study is needed.

This fully applied to the victims from the Kiev Oblast, especially from Kiev itself, which from the mid-1930s constituted the centre of the entire country, which was especially reflected in the specificity of political repression. An extraordinarily active oblast "troika" of the NKVD ordered the shooting of at least twelve and a half thousand people within sixteen months, and another more than seven thousand victims were debited to the Central "dvoika", the Commission of the NKVD and the Prosecutor of the USSR. The dead were buried secretly

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32 Data on the number and structure of the victims see BORÁK, *Zatajené popravy*, 259–260.

at the Lukyanivka cemetery but since spring 1937, the very probably greatest burial site of victims of political repression in Ukraine was established in the woods near the village of Bykivnia in the eastern outskirts of Kiev. So far, the numbers of victims that were buried in mass graves are still contested, however, about thirty thousand of the victims have already been identified by name. There is also at least fifty-four of the Czechs from Kiev and surrounding communities. After the war, four investigative commissions operated in Bykivnia, however the first three were tasked to prove that the dead were killed by the German occupiers during the war, as the Soviet authorities maintained to the world about crimes in Katyn, or in Vinnytsya. Even though the Soviet regime managed to remove most of the evidence from the graves, the truth about the actual perpetrators of the crime was finally proven after its fall and a National Historical Memorial to the victims of totalitarianism was built on the site in the years 1937–1941. The high stone walls that cut through the woods around the Memorial also bear the names of the murdered Czechs.[33]

The most famous centre of Czech colonization in eastern Podolia was the village Mykolaivka in the Koziatyn district, situated not far from the centre of the Vinnytsya Oblast. The case of the shooting of ten local Czechs has already been described by Ukrainian historians who mean that we have material to build on.[34] The Czechs proved to be good farmers and craftsmen and they soon belonged to the affluent residents who the new regime began to regard as enemies. The forced collectivization meant "dekulakization", i.e. seizure of property and displacement, for them too, and the first twelve Czech families were sent to Siberia. "Offenses" from the times of collectivization could later trigger new state repression when events of the Great Purge were in order. For example the farmer Alois Černouz, regarded by many residents as a conscientious bailiff, finally entered the cooperative but was not satisfied with the organisation of work or the earnings, he regretfully remembered the old times and was friendly with the kulaks and in time of the famine, he secretly hand-ground grain on quern-stones, which is why he was expelled from the cooperative in 1933 and earned his living as a labourer. The UNKVD "troika" of the Vinnytsia Oblast reviewed his past as counter-revolutionary and in October 1937, they sent him to eight years in the Gulag in the Magadan Oblast where he died after two months.[35]

At that time, Mykolaivka already had its first Czech who was executed due to political reasons. His case in a way foreshadowed the subsequent tragic events. He was a local native who after many years returned home from the Gulag, unfortunately just at the time when such returnees, ex-kulaks and anti-Soviet elements were to become the target of the first of the mass campaigns of the Great Purge. Jan Štolc was a graduate of the agricultural school and earned his living as a farmer in the Lenina collective. He was the son of a kulak and he also had relatives in Czechoslovakia which meant that it was easy to send him to the Gulag for seven years as a spy. In February 1937 he was conditionally released, but remained free for only a few months. The new indictment alleged: "Because he was

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33 BORÁK, *Zatajené popravy*, 159–168.

34 For example SERHIY Kalytko, L.: Hirka dolja podilskych čechiv, in: *Reabilitovani istorijeju. Vinnycka oblast*, 1, Vinnycja 2006, 831–838; VASYLEV, Valerij J.: Pryčyny ta mechanizmy zdijsnennja masovych polityčnych represij na terytoriji Vinnyckoji oblasti v 20–30 rr, in: *Polityčni represiji na Podilli*, 9–23; LANOVYK, Larysa J.: *Pradidiv rozčyščeni džerela*, Vinnycja 2004, 21–22.

35 SERHIY, 835–836.

dissatisfied with the Socialist establishment he started to conduct counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet campaigning of insurgent and diversionary nature, he expressed sorrow for the shot Trotskyists Kameniev et al., slandered the Spanish Revolution, discredited the collectives, and he also formed groups of kulak ements around himself." He categorically refused to plead guilty, nevertheless, based on the decision of the UNKVD "troika" of Vinnytsya Oblast, he was shot dead in August 1937.[36]

More executions of citizens of Mykolaivka occurred at the time when mass repressive operation of the NKVD were nearing their end but it was necessary to fulfil the increased limits on persons to be shot, as the Vinnytsya Oblast administration of the NKVD had asked for them. This led to a paradoxical situation: while the executions were waning in Moscow in October 1938 (the last Czechoslovak citizen was shot dead on 10 September 1938), they were still in full swing in Vinnytsya. This made ten Czechs from Mykolaivka pay the fatal price. Just as the case of Jan Štolc served the Vinnytsya Oblast leadership of the NKVD at the very beginning of the purge activities (they discussed it at the second meeting of the Oblast troika), so too it became good inspiration for the authorities of the NKVD a year later when the purge was slowly waning. They only needed to collect those "kulak elements from the village" and to match them with suitable roles in the rebel organization. It was not too difficult: for example, Štolc's brother Joseph was also a returnee from the Gulag. All Czech activities, from the oldest of the first world war, when the local Czechs supported the Czechoslovak Legion in Ukraine and held collections to support them, to those from the 1920s, when there were Czech organisations – the Association of Cultural Czech Landlords (1924–1928), which secured foreign technology for the colonists, or the Czech Cooperative (in the years 1928–1930) which sold farm machinery, mostly from Czechoslovakia, could be appropriately used as evidence of counter-revolution or espionage. Also, communications with the known organizer of Czech activities, Antonín Vodseďálek, teacher of Czech literature at the Pedagogical Institute in Zhytomyr and to the authorities of the NKVD, a major resident of the spy network, were mentioned. Thus it was easy to fabricate a Czech spy agency and it was just as easy to make up a guerrilla organization as well which in the case of a war was to blow up the steam depot on the railway station Kozjatyn. Vladimir Va irovský was selected as the boss of the whole organization and a collective investigation file was opened on all of the ten accused.[37] In the end, however, the charges of spying for the Czechoslovak intelligence were changed hastily to espionage for Germany. This was because the UNKVD "troika" of Vinnytsya only had a meeting later, in early October 1938, when the Soviet Union was posing as the protector of Czechoslovakia against German aggression against Czechoslovakia and the investigators found it more appropriate to charge the Czechs of working for Germany. Once they had forced them to change testimony, they shot them as agents of German intelligence.[38]

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36 LANOVYK, 22.

37 SERHIY, 835–837; Deržavnyj archiv Vinnyckoji oblasti [The State Archive of the Vinnytsya Oblast, hereinafter referred to as DAVO], f. P-6023, op. 5, spr. 135852.

38 LOŠYCKYJ, O.: "Laboratorija". Novi dokumenty i svidčennja pro masovi represiji 1937–1938 rokiv na Vinnyčyni, in: *Z archiviv VUČK-GPU-NKVD-KGB*, 1998, 1/2, 213–214. The testimony of A. J. Levinzon from August 11, 1939.

The most repressive action against the Czechs in Ukraine took place in Zhytomyr where on a single day, 28 September 1938, eighty alleged conspirators were shot dead, including seventy-eight Czechs. The event has been discussed several times by the Ukrainian historians[39] and it has recently been elaborated in Czech.[40] It can serve us as an example to characterize the repression of the Great Purge which many other Czechs in Ukraine were subject to whose fate unfortunately cannot be remembered in this cursory overview.

The Zhytomyr case was connected with the tampering of evidence on the subversive activities of the wide-ranging "Czech military-insurgent espionage organization". The investigation was led by the 3rd Department of State Security of the NKVD for the Zhytomyr Oblast, the arrests took place from February to August 1938 not only in Zhytomyr and the surrounding area, mainly in the Czech Kroshna, but also in the Czech centres in the Zhytomyr Oblast districts Andrushivsk, Korostyshivsk, Chernyakhovsk, Malynsk and Chervonoarmysk Chervonoarmiysk.[41] Looking at the social structure of those arrested, it is evident that representatives of Czech intelligence are almost missing among them as they had been subjected to political repression among the first ones at the beginning of the Great Purge. The accused included forty-two collective farm workers, twelve workers of different businesses, five locksmiths, three accountants, three joiners, two drivers, a postman, a shoemaker, a carpenter, a teacher and several staff of various institutions. The action was drawn up on 26 July 1938 with the proposal that it be referred to "discussion by the NKVD USSR within command no. 00485". The document was signed by the chief of service of the unit of III. dpt. of the UGB UNKVD, Sergeant of State Security Maňko and consent was also given by the chief of the III. dpt. UGB UNKVD Lieutenant of State Security Fedorov.[42]

All charges were eventually included in the collective investigation file which was due to its sheer size divided into seven volumes.[43] The final dossier of the action took on the form of a slim booklet and is reminiscent of the "master" action in Kharkov process with the intelligence service of "the Czech General Staff" from 1931. The new Czech treasonous organization was devised under the name of "Czech cooperative", loosely translated as "the Czech nationalist insurgent association". The origins of this organization went back

39 ŠEVČUK, 223–237; LUCKIJ, Jurij: Česki spravy (1930–1937 rr.), in: *Z archiviv VUČK-GPU-NKVD-KGB*, 1999, 1/2 (10–11), 156–168; LUCKIJ, Jurij – LUTAJ, Majja: Polityčni represiji ščodo českoho naselenija Žytomyrščyny (1920–1950-i rr.), in: *Chronika-2000, Ukrajinskyj kulturologičnyj almanac*, 8, 29–30, Ukrajina–Čechija, 2, Kiev 1999, 139–145; LUTAJ, Majja: *Čechy na Žytomyrščyni. Istorija i sohodennja*, Žytomyr 2008; Trahični storinky istoriji Žytomyrščyny 1917–1980-ch rokiv, in: *Reabilitovani istorijeju. Žytomyrska* oblast, 1, Žytomyr 2006, 38–39; KOPIJČENKO, Larysa A.: Represiji sered českoho naselennja Žytomyrščyny, in: *Reabilitovani istorijeju. Žytomyrska* oblast, 2, Žytomyr 2008, 7–18.

40 BORÁK, Mečislav: Popravy jako součást politických represí v SSSR a dosud zjištěné oběti z řad Čechů a československých občanů [Executions as Part of Political Repression in the USSR and the Currently Known Victims from Among the Czechs and the Czechoslovak Citizens], in: *Perzekuce československých občanů v Sovětském svazu (1918–1956). Část I. – Vězni a popravení* [*Persecution of Czechoslovak Citizens in the Soviet Union (1918-1956). Part I – Prisoners and Executed*], BORÁK, Mečislav (Ed.), Opava 2007, 176–177; BORÁK, *Zatajené popravy*, 83–148.

41 LUTAJ, Trahični storinky istoriji, 39; LUCKIJ – LUTAJ, 139–145.

42 ŠEVČUK, 232; LUTAJ, 19.

43 Deržavnyj archiv Žytomyrskoji oblasti [The State Archive of the Zhytomyr Oblast, hereinafter referred to as DAŽO], f. 5013, op. 2, spr. 7060-P, t. 1-7 (2917–2923).

to 1919 when two Czech prisoners of war came to Volhynia from the Volga region and founded a Sokol gymnastic organization. Under its guise, they then conducted "counter-revolutionary nationalist organizational activity" in the Czech population of Volhynia. In the second half of the twenties, this sabotage activity was allegedly organized by local personalities of the Czech minority, the commander of the Zhytomyr firing division Jaroslav Štrombach and the principal of the Czech school Antonín Vodseďálek who allegedly founded the "Czech military-rebel company" in the individual colonies in the Oblast, in businesses and in Czech schools, which were facaded as "branches" of the Sokol movement. From this network then stemmed a separate Czech military-rebel organization with the code name "Czech cooperative". Fabricating this fictional organization, the investigators apparently remembered the case of the organizers of the "Cooperative" from 1928 and were inspired by the "master" Czech process from 1931. Although they had pulled out from it its former protagonists as the founders and initiators of the new organization, they could not take advantage of them in present, as Štrombach had been executed in 1931 and Vodseďálek was serving a Gulag sentence on Solovetsky Islands. Thus, they fabricated a new leadership to the organization, in time of the Great Purge which consisted of the carpenter Stěpán Toman from Czech Kroshnya, the chief accountant and planner of the Zhytomyr brewery Josef Jandura, and the inspector of Zhytomyr city financial office, Václav Holan, a renowned orchardist.[44]

All three members of the leadership of the fictional conspiracy organization promptly refused any accusation of anti-Soviet activities as there was nothing to confess. According to the protocols in their investigation files, each of them was interrogated only twice but in fact, they were forced to confess until they confirmed the investigators' construction. Jandura resisted about a month long, Holan fifty-three days and Toman even eighty days. He repeated over and over: "I do not belong to any counter-revolutionary organization and I have never performed any activity against the USSR in favour of any foreign country." However, even he eventually succumbed and like the others, he admitted to anti-Soviet activity.[45] Not long after the repression of the Great Purge, it became clear that the investigators in Zhytomyr commonly used illegal methods of interrogation to force confessions from the accused. The interrogation protocols were often made in advance, the conclusions of the accusations were copied from a template, and the accused were forced to sign by all sorts of threats and extortion, including the use of gross physical violence and cruel torture which were in completely regular occurrence at the time of the Great Purge.[46]

The investigators also adopted from past cases main methods of subversion of the accused, i.e. their relations with Czechoslovakia and the espionage residence at the Czechoslovak Consulate in Kiev. For example, resident Josef Vlasák was coming to Ukraine through the travel agency *Intourist* in the years 1936–1937 to develop Czech counter-revolutionary activity, and F. Jandura was in connection with the Secretary of the Czech Consulate in Kiev

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44 DAŽO, Ibidem, t. 4 (2920), Obvinitělnoje zaključenije po dělu češskoj vojenno-povstančeskoj organizacii. Zhytomyr, UGB-UNKVD po Žitomirskoj oblasti 1938 [62 vol.], p. 1–3; KOPIJČENKO, 18; LUTAJ, Trahični storinky istoriji, 38; BORÁK, *Zatajené popravy*, 111–123.

45 KOPIJČENKO, 14.

46 BORÁK, *Zatajené popravy*, 85.

from whom he received orders "for practical counter-revolutionary activities". Although these were not specified anywhere, the dossier assumed that the companies created were responsible for the "grouping of Czech rebel cadres, their preparation for armed rebellion at the time of intervention on the part of Germany, and the performance of intelligence work on the territory of the USSR for the interest of the Czechoslovak intelligence". Not much concrete evidence was needed for the out-of-court "troika" trials; the final summary of the case fabricated and produced directly in the Zhytomyr Oblast Administration Office of the NKVD was completely sufficient: "The investigation of this case detected and destroyed four rebel suites and twelve 'branches'."[47]

The file also contains the list of the eighty accused whose guilt was usually characterized in the form of a few lines of typical phrases of the period. The absurdity of some of the accusations was obvious at first glance, but enough to earn a death sentence. For example, Antonín Borůvka "carried out activities aimed at the destruction of the horses of the kolkhoz", František Bureš was undermining the kolkhoz's work ethic and he "intentionally left a large amount of the kolkhoz's potatoes to rot", Vladimir Fortelka, "as the book-keeper of the kolkhoz kept the books negligently and reduced the payments to work units, causing dissatisfaction among the kolkhozists", Alexandr Hřeblík spread gossip about war among the villagers and "cultivated the kolkhoz land poorly", Antonín Kocián "showed emigration tendency and more than once tried to obtain Czechoslovak citizenship with a subsequent permit of departure abroad", Franti ek Novotný "used the work of a mail clerk for counter-revolutionary purposes, often deliberately confusing mail deliveries and holding them back for a long time; he also left people standing in the queue for long times, and there were even cases where he sent the received mail back."[48]

The accused did not have a chance to escape the death penalty. The quest for the fulfilment of the specified limit of sentences in the "first category", i.e. the people intended to be shot dead, led the Zhytomyr Oblast NKVD "troika" in the time from April to May 1938 when headed by chief Grigory Viatkin not to give a single sentence of imprisonment in the Gulag and all of the 1,999 convicts were shot dead.[49] For the next few months, meetings of the Oblast NKVD "troika" were not held at all and new cases were not forwarded to other institutions as the investigators apparently understood that the documents gathered by the prosecution probably would not stand in the out-of-court proceedings of the "dvoika" or of the Military College of the Supreme Court. In mid-September 1938, an order came from the Moscow NKVD headquarters, pre-approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party ordering to finish the yet undecided cases of the counter-revolutionary nationalist "contingents" using "special troikas". Such a "troika" was founded in Zhytomyr, consisting of the Chief of NKVD Oblast Administration Viatkin, the Oblast Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Maxim A. Didenko and the Zhytomyr Oblast Prosecutor Vasil D. Rosputko. Over just a month and a half of its existence, this "special troika" had 4,165 people shot dead with only thirty-eight of the sentenced being sent to the Gulag. "Czech cooperative" was discussed already at its third

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47   KOPIJČENKO, 4.

48   BORÁK, *Zatajené popravy*, 114–119.

49   LUTAJ, Trahični storinky istoriji, 31.

session on 22 September 1938 when 408 people were sentenced and no other sentence than the death penalty was issued.[50]

The sentence was enforced, i.e. all of the eighty convicts were shot dead, on 28 September 1938 – by an extraordinary accident exactly on the feast day of St. Wenceslas, the Czech patron saint, to whose memory the Catholic Church in Czech Kroshna was consecrated. Similarly mixed emotions arise also from the strange timing of this largest mass execution of Czechs in the Soviet Union in the days when negotiations on the fate of Czechoslovakia, whom the Soviet Union offered its assistance, were in preparation in Munich. At that time, however, no one knew about this crime and even the relatives of victims discovered the truth after many decades, mostly in the 1990s.

Security staff were bound by strict secrecy and the families of victims received from the authorities the stereotypical answers that their loved ones were taken for ten years in labour camps and do not have the right to correspondence. Some families, however, did not intend to accept the disappearance of their loved ones and filed complaints about the course of the criminal proceedings, believing that they can achieve their release from the Gulag. One of the first complaints was by the family of Vladimír Pilař, assigned to the prosecutor of the Investigation Department of the Zhytomyr Oblast Prosecutor's Office Bychkov. In the conclusions of his investigation on 1 August, 1940, he stated that he had studied the materials on the activities of the Czech military-rebel spy organization "Czech cooperative" and concluded that it was detected and disposed of in accordance with the law as the guilt of the convicts had been demonstrated sufficiently.[51]

However, it had already been known for over a year at that time that the case of the "Czech cooperative" and dozens of others have been fabricated from start to finish by investigators and some of them had even been executed. The Chief of the NKVD Oblast Administration Viatkin, who bore primary responsibility for the extraordinary extent of last phase of the Great Purge in Zhytomyr in September and October 1938 was relieved of his duties even a few days before the issuance of an official order to stop their mass repressive activities. Ironically, he was arrested not for abuse of power and falsification of thousands of investigation files, but for alleged counter-revolutionary activities, which he allegedly carried out as a member of a "right-wing Trotskyist" organization. He later testified that the protocols of "troika" trials were in many cases formulated after the sentence had been carried out and that the cases were not addressed at the meetings. Thus, cases routinely occurred where people whose guilt had not been established by the "troika" were shot dead, and their names were only added to the protocols subsequently. In February 1939, Viatkin was sentenced to death and executed. His colleagues – the party's secretary Didenko and the prosecutor Rosputko – escaped only with penalties of eight and four years in the Gulag, respectively.[52]

Investigations from the years 1939–1940 proved that the abuse of official powers and "missteps" were not only taken by the Oblast chiefs Yakushev and Viatkin but also by many of their collaborators. For example, Mikhail J. Fedorov, Chief of 3rd State Security

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50 Ibidem, 35.

51 DAŽO, f. 5013, op. 2, spr. 7060-P, t. 4 (2920), p. 63–70.

52 RAFALSKA, 153–155.

Department of the UNKVD administration in Zhytomyr was arresting suspects in the framework of the nationalist operations completely without evidence, based on fictitious charges only. He required of his subordinates to obtain at least five confessions a day which could only be enforced by beatings. He also retroactively let the "troika" confirm death sentences of people beaten to death during interrogation. His deputy Danylo I. Maňko was setting up false accusations with fabricated details of treasonous activities, ordered beatings and torture during interrogation, as the rapporteur of the "troika" meetings, he championed the recognition of completely fabricated group cases and formulated the "troika" statements. Matvei E. Lesnov-Izrailev, Chief of 4th State Security Department of the UNKVD administration also led the interrogations by illegal methods, signing the charges without the knowledge of the files and forwarding them to the "troika", so several persons who had not been charged at all were shot dead. Danylo J. Maluka, Chief of Division at the 4th Department of UGB UNKVD, heavily beat the interrogated on a regular basis and forced his subordinates to do the same. Mitrofan S. Liulkov, one of the commanders of the Oblast administration, also took part in the beatings and torture of the interrogated on a regular basis. Nikolai A. Zub, Chief of the 1st Special Department of the UNKVD wrote the protocols of the meetings of the "troika", changing transcriptions of names and other information which allowed for additional entries of those beaten to death. The first four of these commanders were sentenced to death by the Military Tribunal of the NKVD Troops of the Kiev Military District in 1940 and executed, the last two were sentences to imprisonment in the Gulag.[53]

The results of the investigation were kept strictly secret for many years and the families of victims could only seek justice after the partial easing of political circumstances in the USSR the second half of the 1950s. In September 1957, the case of the Czech cooperative was re-examined as well. [54] The conclusions of this long revision were congruent with the facts established already in 1939. They stated for example: "The Germans, Poles, Czechs, and persons of other nationalities were subjected to arrests without any existing facts about their criminal activities. [...] For every person, a fictional report was compiled which stated that the person concerned is a member of the Polish, Czech, German or other anti-Soviet organization and carries out counter-revolutionary activities. On the basis of such fictitious reports, the prosecutor consented with the arrest. [...] The management of the NKVD Administration and the Department argued that, if the arrested German, Czech, Latvian or Polish, they need to answer as to belonging to the counter-revolutionary underground." The Chief of the Oblast Administration claimed in meetings that workers, whose arrestees do not provide testimony leading to a confession, arouse suspicion themselves. This is why fictional interrogation protocols were made and false confessions were forced by means of promises and threats, beatings and cruel torture.[55]

The new investigation was closed by filing a protest of the military prosecutor to the Military Tribunal of the Carpathian Military District which at its meeting of 30 June, 1958 annulled the decisions of the Zhytomyr Oblast UNKVD "troika" and set the proceedings aside for

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53   DAŽO, f. 5013, op. 2, spr. 7060-P, t. 5 (2921). Materialy proverki po dělu № 15948. Obzornaja spravka po arch.-sl. dělu № 18842.

54   Ibidem, Letter of Col. Bogomaza of 9 July 1957.

55   Ibidem, Matěrialy proverki po dělu № 15948.

the lack of facts of cases.[56] Now, the authorities were able to answer the questions of the victims' relatives about the fate of their loved ones, stating that they all have already been rehabilitated which had a significant impact on restoring the social status of the victims' families. At the same time for the first time, they acknowledged their death. Indeed, it would be difficult to justify why they had not come back from the Gulag camps when the ten years of the alleged penalty had long since passed. A strict ban on any mention of death sentences and executions, however, continued to apply, so that the authorities of the KGB, the successor of the former NKVD, kept on falsifying documents. The aim was to convince the victim's relatives that their loved ones were actually sent to labour camps, where, however, they unfortunately died of normal diseases after a few years. As registrar offices were also under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, forging death certificates and false entries into the registry was relatively easy, even if there were hundreds of thousands of cases all over the whole country. It was only in the 1960s that communicating the true dates of death was allowed, but not the true cause. The truth about executions first began to be imparted in the late 1980s under Gorbachev's "perestroika", that is up to half a century after they had taken place. Information about the place of death was not learned by the victims' relatives until the 1990s, while in many cases, the place of burial of their bodies remains unknown to this day. Only the systematic, long-term lying by the authorities can explain why many of the relatives of the victims had fallen for lies and believe to this day that their loved ones died during the war or shortly after somewhere in a Siberian Gulag and have no idea that their remains have, in fact, been buried already in the late 1930s in the outskirts of the very city they lived in.[57]

By finding the specific names of the victims of repression and the circumstances of their deaths, the hitherto research has only taken the first important step. The lists of victims are not yet final, the publication of new lists has due to the eventful political landscape of late been delayed, so that even some of the major cities (e.g. Kiev and Kharkov) still do not have such overview. This, of course, even more significantly concerns other parts of Ukraine as well. Therefore, we may reasonably assume that once the lists of victims of political repression are updated, the number of Czechs executed by in the time of the Great Purge is likely to increase, perhaps even by a hundred other names. But even as regards those already identified, we are still left with the task of substantially supplementing their life stories, pulling the details about their lost struggles for life out of the archives, and sometimes even naming the criminals who partook in their death. The Ukrainian archives' friendly approach and their door set ajar, especially those of the state security archives, could provide good incentive for young researchers from the Czech Republic who would like to take on such a challenge.

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56 Ibidem, Opredělenije № Ož-638.

57 BORÁK, *Zatajené popravy*, 126–127.

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"Politics of History" as a Threat to the Internal Peace in Ukraine[1]

prof. Dieter SEGERT

Abstract

This article examines the role of the historical narratives and of the "politics of history" in the domestic politics of Ukraine. It compares the role of emotions within nationalistic and socialist ideological discourses about history. It gives an overview on different elements of national and regional identity in the country. It enquires mainly differences in self-identification, practical language use, pluralistic religious orientations, and media use. Some of the heterogeneities emerged in the past during industrialization of Soviet Ukraine. It suggests that differentiation is not objectively given but produced and exploited by political contestation for power. A main field of political polarization consists in the politics of history. It debates the outcomes of the laws on decommunization and the responsibility both of intellectuals and politicians for the nationalization politics. At the end the article stresses the possible alternative outcomes of history politics on the stability of the Ukraine as a nation state.

Keywords

post-socialism and nationalism, ethnic fragmentation of Ukraine, politics of history, decommunization

"Politics of history" plays a prominent role within the whole post-socialist Eastern Europe. Ukraine is only one example for that. But the latter is a country in which the debates on history have an especially high impact on recent politics. The author of this article is interested in to better understand why different interpretations of Soviet history play a central role within the Ukrainian politics after 2014. What is going on with the identity differences in political contestation? And he looks for alternative solutions: Is there also a way out of the fierce struggle about historic narratives? The paper is based mainly on discussion from the East European area studies literature in Germany and Austria and own analyses of recent politics in Ukraine.[2]

On the Link between Communist and Nationalist Ideologies

The interesting political science question consists in why historical debates have played such a central role throughout Eastern Europe in the post-socialist development after 1989: A lively historical-political debate was a characteristic feature of almost every post-socialist development. The various political camps have each advanced pronounced positions on the history of the country. In this regard, the assessment of the state socialist period plays a central role. In many cases, such as in Bulgaria, the opposing positions in this dispute were almost identical with the two major political camps of that time: on the one hand, with the political successors of the Communist state party, on the other hand, with the "anti-Communist" opposition.[3] In other cases, as in Croatia, a nationalist reinterpretation of the history of the country, especially of the history since the Second World War, has become the legitimizing basis of the political authority.[4]

This shaping of the public discourse by historical-political topics is, firstly, a legacy of the previous political order. In state socialism, the authority of the ruling communists was mainly legitimized by an ideology.[5] The core of this ideology was the interpretation of its own history as part of a world-changing movement of the working class. The communism as the great goal was interpreted as an irresistible result of the laws of history. However, the politics has to intervene into the course of history by suppressing other ways of its interpretation. That was the apology of censorship in the former society. Because the communist interpretation of history was regarded as a worthy truth, it could not be allowed to question it. In this respect, the post-socialist debate about history is possible to interpret as a justified attempt to overturn that one truth.

on its way to Europe. Interim results of the Orange Revolution, BESTERS-DILGER, Juliane (Ed.), Frankfurt a. M. 2009) and by intense study of media reports from Ukraine since 2013. He used as well opinion polls by research institutes in Ukraine. To his latest publication on the issue see his interviews and online publications in English and German, (SEGERT, Dieter: *It is not possible to integrate Ukraine against Russia into Europe,* Interview with Natalia Laas, online: http://historians.in.ua/index.php/intervyu/1223-dieter-segert-it-is-not-possible-to-integrate-ukraine-against-russia-into-europe (Downloaded 15 July 2014.); SEGERT, Dieter: Bittere Schokolade – Kann der Staatszerfall der Ukraine noch aufgehalten werden? [bitter chocolate – Is it possible to stop still the decay of Ukraine as a state?], in: *UA-Analysen* 133, 2014, the German Agency for Civic Education) as well as two publications at EASTBLOG since 2016: *EASTBLOG: Blog of the East European Studies Group at the University Vienna*, online: http://eastblog.univie.ac.at/.).

3 MEZNIK, Michael: Nostalgie und Amnesie und die geschichtliche Auseinandersetzung im Postsozialismus [Nostalgia, amnesia, and the historic debate during post-Socialism], in: *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa*, PÄNKE, Julian et al. (Ed.), Berlin 2007, 31–38.

4 RADONIC, Ljiljana: *Krieg um die Erinnerung – Kroatische Vergangenheitspolitik zwischen Revisionismus und europäischen Standards* [*Struggle for memory – Croatian politics of memory between revisionism and European benchmark*], Frankfurt a. M. 2010.

5 The state socialist power relations were not only characterized by a dual antagonistic relationship between the ruling elite and population, as presented in the totalitarian model, but it was tripartite: elite, sub-elite (service class) and population. Just for the broad service class, the ideological legitimation of the system was important. See e.g. BRIE, Michael: Staatssozialistische Länder Europas im Vergleich. Alternative Herrschaftsstrategien und divergente Typen [European State socialist countries in comparison. Alternative strategies of power holding and divergent types], in: *Einheit als Privileg: Vergleichende Perspektiven auf die Transformation Ostdeutschlands*, Frankfurt a. M, Campus 1996, 39–104; SEGERT, Dieter: Intelligenz und Macht – Der Beitrag der intellektuellen Dienstklasse zu Stabilität und Wandel in der DDR [Intelligentsia and power – Contribution of the intellectual service class to stability and change in GDR], in: *Ordnung und Wandel als Herausforderungen für Staat und Gesellschaft*, Opladen 2009, 129–147.

However, the protagonists of such an anti-communist struggle led it partly also with an ideological fervor, which reminded of those former communist propaganda. It has to be assumed therefore that in this debate was more than a reasonable criticism of an one-sidedness of the former rulers. It was additionally a result of the emerging *nationalistic interpretation of politics*. The core of ethnic-nationalistic ideology consists in the delineation of the own community against all others. Every form of this kind of nationalism in history was characterized by an enthusiastic exaggeration of its own nation, the celebration of its uniqueness and of the superiority over other nations. Due to the ideological vacuum after the decay of communist ideology there was an overall rise of nationalist identity in the countries of the region. Especially widespread was nationalism in the former multiethnic federal states like Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Great emotionality characterizes both communist and nationalistic discourses. The followers of these movements usually regard the criticism of one's own cause as "treason". Intellectuals, philosophers, writers, journalists, priests and historians, were the main carrier of these discourses.[6] Their fantasies and narratives were the fuel of many conflicts in the past and in the present. The intellectuals deepen by their narratives still the political dangers caused by these discourses. This dispute about the "Self and the Others" is particularly intense, because even at the beginning of a national awakening movement, the identity of the community is uncertain and controversial. This was also the case in Ukraine after its national independence.

One, Two or Still More Ukraines?

The basic problem in the area of the polity is that there can be no democracy without a clear national identity.[7] The membership of a political community, of the state population in the context of a clearly defined territory, is a basic condition for the possibility of political competition in accordance with clearly defined rules. Only when all members of a national community feel that they clearly belong to this community, they can develop the necessary loyalty to it.

On closer examination of the situation in Ukraine and the identities existing there, in particular in the journalistic discourse, the image of the "two Ukraines" becomes striking.[8] However, whether there are two or more different communities is unclear and will be the topic of the further examinations. The ethnic self-definition, language use, pluralistic religious orientations, and media use are the main points of the following analyze of the homogeneity of Ukraine.

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6 Concerning the emergence of nationalism, see i.e. the nation theory of Miroslav Hroch (HROCH, Miroslav: *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas: Eine vergl. Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen [Pioneers of national movements among the small people of Europe: A comparison of the layer of the patriotic groups]*, Praha 1968.) What concerns communism you can find many intellectuals as carrier of communist utopia even in the period of the "classic socialism" (a term of Janos Kornai, i.e. in time of Stalin).

7 RUSTOW, Dankward: Transitions to Democracy. Toward a Dynamic Model, in: *Comparative Politics* 1, 1960, 1–2, 337–360. Rustow stresses the "national unity as the sole background condition".

8 RIABCHUK, Mykola: Ukraine: One State, Two Countries?, in: *Eurozine*, 2002, online: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2002-09-16-riabchuk-en.html (Downloaded 6 May 2016).

The data commonly used for the ethnic composition of Ukraine are from the census of 2001. According to this census, 17.3 percent of the respondents classified themselves as Russians and 77.8 percent as Ukrainians. [9] This self-assessment concerning the own ethnic identity is an approach that was already the practice in the Soviet Union.[10] Every adult had to assign to a particular nationality. This self-assignment was not checked by any external examination. The self-description was not identical to the maternal or paternal lineage, which of course may differ from each other.

One other criterion for ethnic classification could of course be the daily use of a certain language. This increases the number of "Russian Ukrainians" – measured by the number of people who state Russian as their mother tongue. In 2001, 34 percent reported Russian and 64 percent Ukrainian as their common everyday language. From survey data, we know also that there is a group using both Ukrainian and Russian at home. Over time, there were changes in the practical use of language: in 1994 37 percent of respondents stated that they would use Russian only, 33 percent Ukrainian only and 29 percent would use both languages are available.[11] In 2005, the ratios then were were 35, 40 and just over 20 percent.[12]

The language is, unlike the term "mother tongue" suggests, not only passed in the family, but also spread and secured through the institution of the school. In this regard, there had been contradictory trends in Soviet Ukraine: in the 1920s, the Ukrainian language became more widespread under the policy of "korenizatsiya", i.e. the "rootage" of the Soviet power within the indigenous population. The politics of "korenizasiya" has included both the support for the use of native language (Ukrainian) and the selection of native people for the political elite of the Soviet Ukraine (this has applied less or not at all to the territory of Western Ukraine, which at that time belonged to Poland and Romania). At a later period, in the years after 1945, the Soviet authorities promoted Russian language and culture in whole Soviet Ukraine. There was a growing proportion of students attending Russian-speaking schools. According to Kappeler, the Ukrainian language lost ground especially in the universities. Additionally, due to the industrialization and urbanization the share of the Russian-speaking population in the cities increased.[13]

After 1991, the Ukrainian became the only state language. The schools promoted it too. While in 1991 the proportion of schools in which Ukrainian and others in which Russian was taught was about equal, these figures changed until 2005 to 78 percent Ukrainian- and 21 percent Russian-speaking schools.[14]

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9 *Ukraine-Analysen* 19/2007/, p. 12 ff. Ukraine-Analysen will be abbreviated later on in the paper as "UA-Analysen".

10 ARMBORST, Kerstin. *Ablösung von der Sowjetunion: Die Emigrationsbewegungen der Juden und Deutschen vor 1987 [Dissolution from the Soviet Union: emigrations of Jews and Germans].* Muenster 2001, 19.

11 The rest then were users of other languages such as Hungarian or Romanian.

12 A survey from 2008 by the Razumkov Centre shows the situation as follows: 44 percent speak Ukrainian, 26 percent Russian and 29 percent both languages. (UA-Analysen 106, 11) In 2014 the data shows the following ratio of language use: 43:31:25 percent (UA-Analysen 152, 15).

13 KAPPELER, Andreas: *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine [Short history of Ukraine],* Munich 2009, 190 et sqq., 230 et sqq., 238, 240.

14 The trend in the recent years is going into the same direction. See as well JANMAAT, Jan. Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Ukraine. Educational policy and the response of the Russian-speaking population, Utrecht-Amsterdam, Royal Dutch Geographical Society, Germen, 2000.

Another question is whether these figures give a real picture of language practices. Brubaker has stressed that "many of those who report their native language as Ukrainian prefer to speak Russian in everyday life".[15] Even the nationalizing state would be more interested in demonstrating "the steady success of its language policies" than "capturing the actual figures in linguistic behavior".[16]

In this development, there are large regional differences additionally. While in the west, in the L'viv region, Ukrainian was taught in 99 percent cent of schools, in Odessa it was only in 65 percent, in Dnipropetrovsk 78 percent, in Donetsk 29 percent, and in the Crimea 5 percent. In Chernivtsi and Transcarpathia, the share of Ukrainian was lower than in Western Ukraine (about 80 percent), the share of Russian as high as in "Galicia", while other languages were taught to a larger percentage.[17]

To a third point, the church membership of different groups of the population. In Ukraine general, it did not play the same prominent role as it did in the disintegration process of Yugoslavia. Ethnic differentiation and church membership are transverse to each other. There are some regional priorities of the various Orthodox churches of Ukraine. The Unitarian (Greek Catholic) Church, together with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church has most of their supporters in Western Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) together with its breakaway faction the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) has their most followers in the Center and the East of Ukraine.[18] Yet, despite the dispute among themselves, these churches are still less opposed to each other than were the Croatian Catholic Church or the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Yugoslav disintegration process. However, as emphasized by Kappeler, the church differentiation is a "disintegrating element" of the Ukrainian nation-building process. The attempts to unite these churches were unsuccessful so far.[19] Moreover, in the recent crisis the churches supported different sides. Nevertheless, church membership does not seem to reinforce ethnic differences within the country.[20]

To a last point, the use of media. There are Ukrainian and Russian media, of which TV stations that broadcast countrywide are of particular importance. In view of the propaganda offensive of the Russian TV and partial military confrontation in Donbass[21], it is revealing to look at the

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15 BRUBAKER, Rogers: Nationalizing states revisited: projects and processes of nationalization in post-Soviet states, in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34, 2011, 11, 1801.

16 Ibidem, quoting DAVE, Bhavna: *Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language, and Power*, New York 2007.

17 *UA Analysen* 19, 2007, 15.

18 There is survey data from April 2014 on the membership of the various churches in different parts of the country (UA-analysis 137, 23). In the centre, 45 percent of the respondents regard themselves as belonging to the Orthodox churches of the Kiev or Moscow Patriarchate; in the south the share is 24 percent and in the west 37 percent. In the west, 2 percent, which is the highest share of all regions, state that they belong to the Autocephalous Orthodox Church. There was no question on the membership of the Unitarian Church.

19 KAPPELER, *Kleine Geschichte…*, 273.

20 Whether this situation is changing recently is not clear. At least, there are some recent complaints from the side of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) about violence against and occupation of church buildings by nationalistic groups in Western Ukraine. See *NÖK: Nachrichtendienst Östliche Kirchen*. no. 11/16, 2016, 17 March 2016, Part B, Universität Münster (Germany), NÖK noek@uni-muenster.de.

21 I use the Russian form of the geographical term because it is in German media most often used, in Ukrainian it would be "Donbas".

results of a survey from December 2014 on the use of media by the Ukrainian population. On the question if Russian TV channels are watched at all, 5 percent in the west responded "regularly", 20 percent "from time to time", but 75 percent "not at all". In the center, the figures were only slightly different. In the south the number of those watching on a regular basis Russian TV was 9 percent and of the irregular viewer 24 percent. In the East (without Donbass) the respective figures were 9 and 33 percent, In Donbass alone 24 and 58 percent.[22] Regarding confidence in the Russian television there was even more pronounced difference between the regions: while in the west there were only 8 percent who had at least partial confidence, in Donbass there were 20.5 percent who had full confidence and 66.6 percent who had at least partial confidence. In other regions, the shares, taken together, were as follows: in the center 15 percent, in the south 29 percent, and in the East (Donbass not included) 61 percent.[23]

The mentioned data from different areas show clearly that the identities of the Ukrainian population vary across different regions of the country. This diversity, however, do not substantiate a "bifurcation" of the country. The image of the "two Ukraines" is obviously an oversimplification of the existing diversity of identities. In addition, they are not only produced by differences in culture. One reason for the disparities stems from economic and social developments in the Soviet era. The industrialization and urbanization of the Soviet Union was associated with population movements across the borders of the Soviet republics. There was an influx of people to the hotspots of industrialization from rural regions of Ukraine but there were also huge number of them coming from outside.

In particular, this applies to the Eastern areas of the country, where new factories or mines were founded. In addition, there were marriages, which were concluded not only within the ethnic groups. Unfortunately, the standard works of historians (such as those of A. Kappeler[24]) do not contain accurate data on these marriages or demographic currents caused by Soviet industrialization. However, it can be assumed that these processes led to important shifts in the ethnic composition of the population of Ukraine. Overall, it is likely that in the industrialization areas the proportion of Russians and other non-ethnic Ukrainians increased and – probably – therefore intense kinship ties with people in other Soviet republics (nowadays: in other nation-states) developed. It is likely that such social ties have been further strengthened by the workers' migration from Ukraine to Russia after 1991. The recovery of economy of Ukraine started much later than in Russia.

In order to conclude this paragraph: the conflictive identities of Ukrainians in different parts

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22 See the survey *Mass media and the confidence in Ukrainian and Russian Mass Media* (ЗМІ та довіра до українських і російських ЗМІ), KIIS, online: http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=425&page=2 (Downloaded 20 February 2015), especially the table 4. Yet in the summer 2015, the picture seemed to have clearly changed. A poll of "Media sapiens" from that time had the following results concerning use of Russian TV (or, to be more precisely, it was asked for the use of news information from Russian channels): There was no clear difference between the regions. In the West 2 percent indicated that they saw it every day, 11 percent several times a week, in the East it was 3 vs. 9 percent. The validity of the both polls is not yet clear for me.

23 See the survey *Mass media and the confidence in Ukrainian and Russian Mass Media* (ЗМІ та довіра до українських і російських ЗМІ), KIIS, online: http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=425&page=2 (Downloaded 16 February 2015), especially the tables 4 and 14.

24 KAPPELER, Andreas: *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* [*Russia as multiethnic empire. Formation, change, decay*], Munich 2008.

of the country emerged at different times and by very different reasons. Nevertheless, these differences are not objectively given. Their rise or decline depends on political mobilization mainly.

National Identities Shaped by Political Mobilization

Ethnic differences are open to political mobilization. The democratic contestation comprises lot of opportunities for its reinforcement: Parties have played the ethnic card in the elections, especially since the early 2000s.

"The regionally based pluralism can be also exploited for electoral strategy reasons. This became increasingly apparent since the early 2000s and led to a polarization of the political landscape, as values and identities were utilized by the political parties in order to legitimize their particular interests."[25]

Parties, which in Ukraine are often not much more than only clientelistic networks and form around regional oligarchs, had mobilized voters especially according to their local or regional affiliation. The parties were devices for the formation of super-regional divisions. The "Party of Regions" – which was based on the "Donetsk clan", had obtained a strong base in the Eastern and Southern parts of the country, the "Orange camp" ("Our Ukraine" and BJUT) had been the strongest force in the West and in the Center. In the election campaigns, cultural issues such as language or historic interpretations partly played a prominent role. The politics of memory - the play with historic narratives- will be subject of later discussion. At this chapter, I will discuss the language politics of the parties.

One of the key issues of that ethnic and cultural mobilization since 2010 was the claim raised by the "Party of Regions" and the KPU for the recognition of Russian as a second state language. This claim was already raised earlier, namely by Kuchma in the first presidential campaign in 1994. However, in the fifteen years afterwards it has played no important role. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in August 2012, a language law was adopted which recognized and promoted Russian alongside seventeen other regional and minority languages as a regional language.[26]

The language question played again an inglorious role in the first weeks after the fall of the Yanukovych government in late February 2014, when the right-wing party "Svoboda" introduced a motion in parliament for the repeal of the law from 2012. Although this decision, due to pressure from EU politicians, was not signed at that time by the incumbent president and thus not enforced, it apparently still caused political damage in a situation of uncertainty of the population in the East and South of the country.[27]

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25 STYKOW, Petra: Innenpolitische Gründe der Ukraine Krise, Gleichzeitige Demokratisierung und Staatsbildung als Überforderung [Domestic reasons for the crisis of Ukraine. Simultaneous processes of democratization and state building as excessive demand, in: *Osteuropa* 64, 2014, 5–6, 48.

26 On the respective law, see the article written by Guttke and Rank in Ukraine-Analysen 106, 2012, 11–15. Russian language can be used officially at provincial, district and local level, where the proportion of the Russian-speaking population reaches 10 percent, according to official census data. However, the law did not make the Russian language a second state language as it was promised originally by the PR in its election campaign.

27 And it was misused by Russian propaganda, mainly in the case of the annexation of Crimea in March. In the present the language question is not a main concern for Ukrainian citizens irrespective of their regional affiliation. A poll conducted by the KIIS from July 2016 shows that only in the opinion of one percent of all polled the lan-

A main reason for the caused political damage was the general political uncertainty after the ouster of Yanukovych. The next problematic step was the building of the transitional government on 27 February. Instead of building a government of national reconciliation with representatives from all camps, a transitional government emerged exclusively built by political groups and parties from the West and the Centre of Ukraine. The occupation of public buildings in the East of the country in the days after it was partly a reaction of this exclusion.

Unlike in the post-Yugoslav disintegration process the ethnic tensions in Ukraine did not lead to armed conflict until early 2014. The crisis of the state in winter 2013/14, however, turned into open violence, which was significantly fueled by the Yanukovych government in January and February. After the escape and dismissal of Yanukovych, a period of instability followed. The ruling party "Party of Regions", which in 2012 still had 30 percent of the votes and together with independent candidates held a majority of seats in the parliament, collapsed almost completely in the first weeks of 2014.

After the Maidan in Kiev and the supporting protest movement against Yanukovych especially in the West and in the Center, an anti-Maidan-movement emerged in the East and the South. It led to the occupation of administrative buildings. The initiative for the occupation-movement came probably from political and economic forces of the Eastern Ukraine, who wanted to get a hold on the new government in Kyiv. Among them were the oligarchs from this region like Akhmetov. The old network of the ousted president (Yanukovych) certainly played a role too. When the Crimea seceded after a referendum and with Russian support from the Ukraine, the new government deployed troops against the protests in the east and launched a so-called "anti-terrorist operation" (ATO).[28] Supported by Russian interference in various ways, it came to an armed conflict, which focused especially on the Donbass (Donetsk and Luhansk areas). Whether it is a civil war or Russian occupation was much disputed in the media. In my opinion, it was a mix of both phenomena.

Since then, the ethno-nationalist mobilization has gained a new dynamic. Although the conflict could not be described as an open civil war, there is still a mobilization of allegiance of various population groups to different cultural and political identities, which has the potential for such a civil war.

Russia's intervention is not the only cause of the crisis. The intervention was successfully mainly due to the existence of internal dividing lines within the population and the elites of Ukraine.

"Politics of History" and the Power of Intellectual Fantasies

This dispute on historical narratives is particularly intense in insecure nations, because at the beginning of a national awakening movement, the community identity is uncertain and controversial. This was also the case in Ukraine after its national independence in 1991. To recap again: While in the referendum in March 1991 75 percent of the population still

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guage question is a major concern. See online: http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=news&id=641&page=7 (Downloaded 21 March 2017).

28 It is in my opinion surely not an appropriate name for an action aimed to re-unite the country. The former president (Yanukovych) has named the last armed action against the protesters at Euro-Maidan as well "ATO".

voted in favor of remaining in a renewed federation, at the end of the same year, in a second referendum 90 percent voted for an independent Ukraine.

The two main issues of the "politics of history" since then were the Second World War, and the Soviet history and its symbols. However, these issues are intermingled with each other too. The Second World War was for various reasons an ideal arena for such a historical debate: the late socialist Soviet Union under Brezhnev has commemorated it as the "Great Patriotic War", thus making it a core element of their ideological legitimation of power. Its rituals and commemorations were present throughout Soviet everyday life.[29]

For the population the Second World War was also the arena for the development of Ukraine in its present boundaries (apart from the Crimea). It was not until then that the Western Ukraine (including the areas of Chernivtsi and Transcarpathia) was becoming a part of the country. In particular, in the three areas of "Eastern Galicia" there had been a strong resistance movement against the integration into the Soviet Union. It has led deep traces in social memory of this part of the country. During the liberalization of perestroika, the Rukh movement revived the historical memory. Intellectuals produced its narratives and emotional symbols in many ways.

The new political class of independent Ukraine tried, similar to Tuđman in Croatia, to reconcile the two antagonistic historical narratives of the late Soviet and of national movement in the Western Ukraine. The presidents of the new state have set different focal points. A step towards reconciliation was to award the fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army the official status of war veterans in 1993 by president Kravchuk. Yet the reassessment of the OUN and UPA as "new 'positive heroes' and avant-garde of the Ukrainian (sacrificial) nation" remained controversial.[30] The attempt to keep quiet about the anti-Semitism and nationalistically motivated violence by the UPA against non-ethnic Ukrainians has proved especially controversial.

President Kuchma was the next agent of the debate after Leonid Kravchuk. He continued in the attempt to incorporate different elements of Ukrainian national identity, including the Cossack myth as well as a "modified Ukrainian national myth of the Great Patriotic War".[31] Under President Yushchenko, the focus of historical politics shifted to an open confrontation with the Soviet history. For this purpose, he initiated the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory.[32] An important project was the interpretation of the famine in the early 1930s as an ethnically motivated crime, the so-called "Holodomor". In the very term of "Holodomor", there is an onomatopoeic reminder of the "Holocaust". This was a conscious move. The aim was to transfer the pan-European consensus of a strict condemnation of the German crimes against European Jews to the politically induced famine of 1932–33 in the Soviet Union.[33]

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29 JILGE, Wilfried: Nationalukrainischer Befreiungskampf. Die Umwertung des Zweiten Weltkriegs in der Ukraine [Nationalist Ukrainian struggle for liberation. Reassessment of WWII in Ukraine], in: *Osteuropa* 58, 2008, 6, 167–186.

30 Ibidem, 170.

31 Ibidem, 173.

32 MYESHKOV, Dmytro: Politics of history in Ukraine since the change of government in the spring of 2014, in: *Civic Education and Democratisation in the Eastern Partnership Countries*, SEGERT, Dieter (Ed.), Bonn 2016, 144.

33 In the early 1930s, about three to three and a half million people died in the Soviet Ukraine on the conse

On the initiative of Yushchenko, a law in 2006 classified that famine as genocide against the Ukrainian people and its denial as a criminal act. The previous debate in parliament was controversial. The "Party of Regions" did not deny the responsibility of the Soviet leadership for the famine, but rejected the genocide thesis, because that, in their view, would split the country.

Notwithstanding of this objection it cannot be ignored that all parties engaged in this debate. Both the "Orange" and the "Blue"[34] camp represented power-political goals in this respect. The "Party of Regions" intended to weaken the public support for the president. O. Turchynov as representative of the Orange camp denounced those members of parliament who opposed the genocide thesis as acting against the "'true' patriotism".[35] Maybe Yushchenko as an intellectual believed in the possibility of a "state-sponsored nation-building".[36] Yet his next step has cast serious problems for it. The president declared some prominent members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as official "Heroes of Ukraine": The first was, Roman Shukhevych in 2007, followed by Stefan Bandera in 2010.[37] The aim of these actions was to characterize the OUN and UPA as a national, anti-totalitarian freedom movement and to exculpate them from the charge of anti-Jewish and anti-Polish policy. This move contributed significantly to political polarization within the country.[38]

This move can better be understood within a broader anti-Soviet "politics of history". The strategic goal of the presidential play with history was to present the Soviet period of Ukraine "as a period of time, which is foreign to the 'true' national history and which is thus separate from the own history".[39] This aimed to a cultural separation from Russia.

Other words: Yushchenko's policy was a step towards growing ethnic nationalism. It tries to close the ranks and to produce a common identity by referring to the external other. Especially young nation states that have emerged by splitting from a previous single state try to demarcate themselves from the previously dominant state: Czechoslovakia did it via Austria, Norway via Sweden, and Finland via Russia.

However, the broader population in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine did not meet this cultural separation from Russia with enthusiasm. The symbols of the fight for Ukrainian independence after 1918 and in the time between the wars - Bandera and the UPA /OUN – were regarded as allies of the German aggressor. Even though that this evaluation has produced by Soviet propaganda, it works. Just the fact that important parts of population believed in this assessment is important. If the unity of the nation is considered as target of this policy, it has to be said that this goal was not achieved. Rather the opposite was the

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quences of the forced collectivization and industrialization policy of the Soviet leadership. (JILGE, Wilfried: Geschichtspolitik in der Ukraine (am Beispiel des Holodomor) [Politics of memory in Ukraine /at the example of Holodomor/], in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 57, 2007, 8–9, 1.)

34 "Our Ukraine" and "Fatherland" at one side, the "Party of Regions" on the other.

35 The president and his camp intend to serve the unification of the nation. Jilge argued that the commemoration would actually have accomplished this task. (JILGE, Wilfried: Geschichtspolitik in der Ukraine …, 3.). The development of Ukraine since then, however, casts in my opinion doubt on his interpretation.

36 Ibidem.

37 Both titles were revoked again by court rulings under the presidency of V. Yanukovych in 2011.

38 LIEBICH, Andre – MYSHLOVSKA, Oksana: Bandera. Memoralization and commoration, in: *Nationalities Papers* 42, 2014, 5, 750–770.

39 JILGE, Nationalukrainischer…, 183.

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case: the existing differences in the perceptions of Ukraine's history were further increased. The "Party of the Regions" and its President Yanukovych tried to utilize the controversial reactions to the politics of history of the Orange camp for securing their own power base. The withdrawal of the hero titles that were awarded to the representatives of Ukrainian Independence Army was a step in this direction. Another was the introduction of Russian as a second official regional language by a law in 2012.

The next turn of historical politics came with the second Maidan protest movement (the so-called "Euromaidan") from fall 2013 onwards. Jilge evaluated it more positively.[40] The aim on the respective politics of Maidan activists would have been a political mobilization through the commemoration of the Zaporozhe Cossack tradition and the national poet Shevchenko. The respective activities wanted to update both traditions as a "source of an authentic national self-consciousness", and to demonstrate "that the Ukrainians have a separate history and that they are a vibrant nation that no longer wants to be determined by others".[41]

A second argument of Jilge was that the traditions of the UPA /OUN would not have been dominant on the second Maidan. His central argument is that the slogan used by the UPA: "Slava Ukraina! Herojam Slava!" (Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!) would have been removed from its historical connotations. Protesters at the Maidan would use the slogan neutral.

However, in my view, this interpretation has serious deficiencies.[42] For the political impact of historical symbols, it is not only important how the immediate actors understood it. The effect on the audience of this action is also important, and this is far greater when conveyed through television.

Concerning these slogans, the wider audience in Ukraine regards it different. The population in the west perceives it differently than those in the East and South. Whether the perception of such UPA slogans as "fascist" by large sections of the population in the East and South was result of Soviet and Russian propaganda does not matter in this regard. Only the effect is politically important. For the Ukrainian situation of a society that is divided in the evaluation of the contemporary history of their own country the promotion of the traditions of a part of the population against the perceived traditions of another part, is certainly problematic.[43]

In a survey of the Ukrainian "Fund of Democratic Initiatives" by the end of 2014/beginning

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40 JILGE, Wilfried: Geschichtspolitik auf dem Majdan. Politische Emanzipation und nationale Selbstvergewisserung [Politics of memory at Maidan. Political emancipation and national process of coming to terms with itself], in: *Osteuropa* 64, 5–6, 2014, 239–257.

41 Ibidem, 253.

42 Given the Russian propaganda that denounced the entire second Maidan and the government that appointed after the fall of V. Yanukovych as a "fascist putsch", I could understand this effort though. From the perspective of the impact of politics and political symbols, however, it is one-sided and wrong. Apart from this political aspect, also other observers perceived the activities of the West Ukrainian nationalists differently than Jilge did (see RYABCHUK, Anastasiya: Right Revolution? Hopes and Perils of the Euromaidan Protests in Ukraine, in: *Debatte. Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe* 22, 2014, 1, 132).

43 In addition, the previous attempt of historical-political exculpation of the right-wing traditions of the Western Ukrainian UPA/OUN is problematic not only from a Russian propaganda perspective. The rejection of symbols of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army has also good reasons for itself from the perspective of the much-vaunted European values.

of 2015 on the topic "What unites and what separates the Ukrainians" these differences in the perception of historical events become visible. "In relation to the establishment of the OUN in 1929 and the UPA in 1942 the situation is very much different [namely highly differentiated by regions, D.S.]. There is a positive assessment of the OUN and the UPA in the 'orange' regions of Ukraine (Volhynia, Galicia, Transcarpathia, Bukovina, Kiev, Center, Podolia, Polesia), while a negative assessment prevails in the regions of the Southeast (Donbass, Zaporozhe, the regions of the Black Sea, and the area Kharkiv and Poltava)."[44] President Poroshenko plays no neutral role in this current historical-political controversy. His decision to declare the 14 October, which is also the founding day of the UPA[45], Ukrainian army holiday ("Day of Defender of the Fatherland"), may have an equally problematic effect for overcoming the historical-political division. Thus, he replaced the "Day of the founding of the Soviet Army", which in many of the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, was formerly celebrated on 28 February as a day of their own army. This kind of "politics of history" has further divided Ukraine, and it will not be easy after the end of the military struggle in the East of the country to overcome the divisions created by history politics.

The next turn came with the laws on decommunization in April 2015, and the following decisions of the parliament in February and May 2016. In February 2016, the "parliament approved the scrapping of 175 names of towns, villages, and districts across the country and replaced them with non-Soviet alternatives".[46] There was a lot of criticism by European institutions and by Western scholars.[47] The most dangerous damage to the political stability of the state though stems from the fact that the decision of the parliament intervened into the daily life of groups of citizens without asking them on their opinion. As Baumgartner wrote:

"But the decommunization plan is fiercely opposed by many Ukrainians – particularly those in the southern and eastern parts of the country, many of them ethnic Russians – who believe the country and its politicians should spend their time on more important issues

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44 Online: http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/publications/press-relizy/sho-obednue-ta-rozednue-ukrainciv.htm (Downloaded 25 February 2015; own translation from Russian – D.S.) The overall assessment of the second "Maidan" in 2015 is very different in the various regions of Ukraine: While 90 per cent of respondents in Western Ukraine supported the protests on the Maidan and elsewhere against the government, in the South there were only 20 per cent and in the East only close to one-third. On this argument see also the report *Umfragen: Zwei Monate Proteste [opinion poll: 2 month of protest]*, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Dossier Ukraine, 2, online: http://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/ukraine/178019/umfragen-zwei-monate-proteste-in-der-ukraine (Downloaded 5 February 2015). Similar different were the assessments of the "ATO" in different parts of the Ukraine; the opinion that it is part of a "civil war" was strong in the East (38 percent), weak in the West (14 percent) – see: *Attitude of population to media, propaganda and media-reforms during the conflict time,* Media Sapiens, online: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/in_english/survey_attitude_of_population_to_media_propaganda_and_mediareforms_during_the_conflict_time/ (Downloaded 16 February 2016).

45 It is however, also traditionally celebrated as the Day of the Cossacks. The demand to declare 14 October the Day of the Army was a long-standing demand of Western Ukrainian nationalists.

46 BAUMGARTNER, Pete: *Ukraine's Decommunization Gets Boost As 175 Towns, Villages Renamed, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, online: http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-decommunization-boost-175-towns-renamed/27532794.html (Downloaded 4 February 2016).

47 See, among others, the *Open letter from experts and scholars on Ukraine* with the appeal to president Poroshenko not to sign the laws on decommunization, online: http://krytyka.com/en/articles/open-letter-scholars-and-experts-ukraine-re-so-called-anti-communist-law (Downloaded 26 May 2016).

than replacing communist toponyms or who don't want to erase everything associated with the Soviet era."

Especially due to the fact that the regional and local identities play an important role for the identity building of the citizens of Ukraine, the centralized renaming of their home towns without asking the respective population on their opinion is not a decision that foster the reconciliation of different regional identities. About necessary changes in the "politics of history" and especially on the decommunization laws the Ukrainian historian A. Portnov pointed out: "Ukraine should come up with a special symbolic policy for the territories. [...] some change should occur. I do not think that the overall change in the Soviet street names were the best solution." [48]

Conclusion

To sum up, intellectuals are inventing the narratives that are the content of a "politics of history". Politicians, historians, journalists and artists are leading minorities. They are the key players in this field. However, the "politics of history" is not just a playground of cultural and political elites. It leaves its traces on a majority of civil society by means of mass media or via the school as an institution. The invented historical narratives are able to influence the behavior of large sections of the population too. A certain consensus on the interpretation of central historical events is a prerequisite for a stable legitimacy of the common state. In this respect, in the field of "politics of history" difficult tasks arise for the further transformation of Ukraine, which need to be tackled. Alternative outcomes are possible: either to deepen the divergent interpretations of the recent history or to foster consent on it. Especially the politicians are able to support or to hinder this process by their decisions.

The Ukraine as a nation state is still fragile. There are different and overlapping regional identities. If nation is result of cultural construction than intellectuals are in charge to foster reconciliation. They should be more cautious by using their narratives and nationalistic fantasies. The aim of healing the wounds that were inflicted to each other by the struggle for power since February 2014 would request more listening to each other. The re-integration of Donbass after a future end of the military struggle is not possible without being open to different identities of this part of population.

No doubt, each serious narrative about history of one or another side has its good reason. However, it is not a good idea for the political class of Ukraine to facilitate only the narrative of one part of the population about their history at the expense of the historic narrative of others.

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48   Compare the interview of the Ukrainian historian A. Portnov for the Polish NGO *Krytyka Poliyczna: "Jak Ukraina może wrócić na Donbas?"* (12 February, 2016), online: http://m.krytykapolityczna.pl/artykuly/ukraina/20160211/portnow-jak-ukraina-moze-wrocic-na-donbas (Downloaded 15 February 2016). He answered for the question what should change in politics of history, especially concerning decommunization laws: "Ukraine should come up with a special symbolic policy for the territories. It is difficult to determine the details, but some change should occur. I do not think that the overall change in the Soviet street names were the best solution."

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(Re)conceptualization of Memory in Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity

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Abstract

In Ukraine, having arrived at a critical stage of its history, three areas can be highlighted at the level of legislation during the struggle for the way forward since the end of 2013: the language issue, the constitutional process, and the efforts to eliminate the Soviet legacy. The subject of our analysis is the four laws belonging to the 2015 legislative package on decommunization, with an outlook to the broader context, as well. The four laws in question decide about who are heroes and who are enemies in history; what Ukraine's relationship is with World War II, as well as with the Communist and Nazi regimes. The laws point out firmly and excluding any further debate the primacy of the country's independence over all else, and the protection of the ideal of independence by any means concerning both the past and the present. The laws prescribe impeachment as a sanction for denying their contents. This story – hot memory influenced by politics – will be summarized for the period of 2015–2016.

Keywords

Ukraine, "decommunization package", national memory, identity crises, democratic values

Jan Assmann's impactful concept of memory developed in the 1990s breaks up the unitary categories of history and memory, and offers a nuanced typology of the typical uses of the past today. Regarding the latter, Assmann distinguishes between 'hot' and 'cold' memory. Hot memory directly shapes our present lives. In turn, if the past is transferred to the region of cold memory, it will loose its daily relevance, that is, it will gently be transformed into a cultural representation and problem.[1]

The 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013–2014 'Euromaidan'[2] (in official Ukrainian political narrative: Revolution of Dignity) in Ukraine are a kind of culmination of the post-communist transition having taken place in Eastern European countries peacefully, where social activism turned into revolution, somewhat belatedly compared to other states of

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1 ASSMAN, Jan: *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination*, 2011, 50.

2 Euromaydan, EuroMaidan = European Square.

the region. Social movements leading to the revolutions have emerged in a society of transition, seeking its own ethnic-cultural identity. In the background of the protests the country's macro-regional divisions and the different foreign policy orientations of the populations of the individual regions played a significant role. Main forces behind the revolutions were the pursuit of the way, the lack of leaven connecting Ukrainian society, the search for identity and the commitment to democratic values.[3] In our study we mainly seek to answer the question how adequate the answers of everyday politics have been to these social movements.

In Ukraine, having arrived at a critical stage of its history, three areas can be highlighted at the level of legislation during the struggle for the way forward since the end of 2013:[4] the language issue,[5] the constitutional process (in connection with the responsibility following from the second agreement of Minsk),[6] and the efforts to eliminate the Soviet legacy. The latter has been targeted by the so-called 'decommunization package' approved by the Ukrainian Parliament on 9 April 2015, and signed by the President on 15 May. The most important basis of reference for the legislative package is Article 11 of the Constitution (1996) which obliges the state to promote the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness. The professional background institution is the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINM) which was established in 2014 by eliminating an academic research institute[7] founded in 2006, and reorganizing it as a government agency under the same name.[8] According to the respective government resolution, the new UINM is directly subordinate to the Ukrainian government (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine), with the supervision of the Ministry of Culture. It is responsible for the implementation of the state policy on the revitalization and preservation of the national memory of the Ukrainian people.[9]

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3 REZNIK, Oleksandr: From the Orange Revolution to the Revolution of Dignity: Dynamics of the Protest Actions in Ukraine, in: *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 4, 2016, 750–765; KHMELKO, Irina – PEREGUDA, Yevgen: An Anatomy of Mass Protests: The Orange Revolution and Euromaydan Compared, in: *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 2014, online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.04.013 (Downloaded 1 February, 2017).

4 See on details: HURI Projects of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, online: http://www.huri.harvard.edu/projects.html (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

5 CSERNICSKÓ, István – FEDINEC, Csilla: Four Language Laws of Ukraine, in: *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 23, 2016, 560–582; CSERNICSKÓ, István – FERENC, Viktória: Transitions in the language policy of Ukraine (1989–2014), in: *Sociolinguistic Transition in Former Eastern Bloc Countries: Two Decades after the Regime Change*, SLOBODA, M. – LAIHONEN, P. – ZABRODSKAJA, A. (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main 2016, 349–377; CSERNICSKÓ, István: Language policy in Ukraine: The burdens of the past and the possibilities of the future, in: *Future Research Directions for Applied Linguistics*, PFENNINGER, S. E. – NAVRACSICS, J. (Eds.), Bristol – Buffalo – Toronto 2017, 120–148.

6 Ukraine and the Minsk II agreement, in: *European Parliament Briefing*, January 2016, online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573951/EPRS_BRI(2016)573951_EN.pdf (Downloaded 1 February 2017); ASH, Timothy: Ukraine's constitutional reform conundrum, in: *Kyiv Post*, January 25 2016, online: https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/timothy-ash-ukraines-constitutional-reform-conundrum-406630.html (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

7 KASYANOV, Georgy: К десятилетию Украинского института национальной памяти (2006–2016) [On the Tenth Anniversary of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (2006–2016]," in: *Historians.in.ua*, 2016, online: http://historians.in.ua/index.php/en/dyskusiya/1755-georgij-kas-yanov-k-desyatiletiyu-ukrainskogo-instituta-natsional-noj-pamyati-2006–2016 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

8 Official Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/index.php?id=1 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

9 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of UkraineSome questions of the Ukrainian institute of national memory,

The (re)formulation of the national memory narrative in Ukraine has been taking place since the early 1990s. The continued coexistence of 'old' and 'new' memory has always been accompanied by conflicts, mainly because political groups in power have constantly attempted to utilize memory. At the level of legislation, the three emblematic stages of policy intervention are the following: converting the Soviet narrative of the victory in World War II into a Ukrainian national narrative; declaring the 'Holodomor' (the great famine in 1932–33) as a genocide of the Ukrainian people; and the legislative package on decommunization. The latter, according to Ukrainian historian Georgy Kasyanov's assessment, may be perceived as a consequence of identity crisis developed in the country and of the failed attempts to combat it.[10]

The subject of our analysis is the four laws belonging to the 2015 legislative package on decommunization, with an outlook to the broader context, as well. The four laws in question decide about who are heroes and who are enemies in history; what Ukraine's relationship is with World War II, as well as with the Communist and Nazi regimes; and deal with the issue of as yet closed archives (basically the disclosure of KGB archives). The laws point out firmly and excluding any further debate the primacy of the country's independence over all else, and the protection of the ideal of independence by any means concerning both the past and the present. The laws prescribe impeachment as a sanction for denying their contents. This story – hot memory influenced by politics – will be summarized for the period of 2015–2016.

Independence or the 'Belarusian Way'

Samuel P. Huntington wrote in the first half of the 1990s: "[…] Ukraine, however, is a cleft country with two distinct cultures. The civilizational fault line between the West and Orthodoxy runs through its heart and has done so for centuries. […] Historically, western Ukrainians have spoken Ukrainian and have been strongly nationalist in their outlook. The people of eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, have been overwhelmingly Orthodox and have in large part spoken Russian."[11] Then he continues: "As a result of this division, the relations between Ukraine and Russia could develop in one of three ways. […] armed conflict […] Ukraine could split along its fault line into two separate entities, the eastern of which would merge with Russia […] Ukraine will remain united, remain cleft, remain independent, and generally cooperate closely with Russia."[12] According to Pachlovska, the question is whether Ukraine should integrate or reintegrate into Europe. The Catholic part of the Slavs is less problematic from this perspective: during their history their belonging to Europe has never been questioned. In turn, Orthodox Slavs have constantly been busy trying to prove their radical difference from the rest of the European world.[13]

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12 November 2014, No. 684, online: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/684-2014-%D0%BF (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

10 KASYANOV, Georgy: Историческая политика и «мемориальные» законы в Украине: начало XXI в. [Historical policy and the «memorial» laws in Ukraine: the beginning of the 21st century], in: *Историческая Экспертиза [Istoričeskaja Ekspertiza]*, 2, 2016, 28–57.

11 HUNTINGTON, Samuel, P: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York 1996, 165–166.

12 Ibidem, 167–168.

13 PACHLOVSKA, Oxana: Finis Europae: Contemporary Ukraine's Conflicting Inheritances from the Humanistic

The revival of the Greek Catholic Church banned during Soviet times has not been so successful as to date that a 'Greek Catholic Western Ukraine' would exist. However, from another aspect, there are no doubt historical-socializational differences between the various regions of Ukraine.[14] The reference for the historical roots of the simplistic model of Eastern and Western identities is not correct either. After all, the fault line regularly emerging in Ukrainian election maps does not cover the former Austro-Hungarian territories or those of the Russian Empire. In the western part of Ukraine, Galicia and Volhynia, free of Habsburg influence, display the same pattern, while Bukovina and Transcarpathia show different ones. Galicia's and Volhynia's identical conception of nationalism was formed during a later period, under the Polish supremacy between the two World Wars.

In particular, Polish authoritarianism intensifying in the 1930s opened a wide space for Ukrainian nationalism, which did not reject extreme means of anarchism and political extremism, either. In contrast, in the Soviet territories, particularly in the 1920s, Ukraine and Belarus were showcase areas where illiteracy had been eradicated via the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages, thus averting nationalist movements. This was the period of 'korenizatsiya' (nativization or indigenization): the promotion of the mother tongue (Ukrainian and Belarusian) in order to bring up a regional Soviet elite. When the shift occurred towards the 'united Soviet people', that is, an ideology based on Russian identity and language, after the emigration of a large part of hardcore nationalists during World War II, the potential of resistance against Soviet ideology faded away, it had to be re-produced.[15]

After the breakup of the Soviet Union it has become clear that in the line of the former republics, now independent states, the biggest question mark is the relationship between the heirs of Kievan Rus: Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. In Huntington's words: "In 1995 Belarus was, in effect, part of Russia in all but name."[16] 1995 is the year of a referendum due to which, amongst other things, Russian became a second state language, and the country took the road of economic integration with Russia. According to the data of the 2009 census, 83.7% of the population identify themselves as ethnic Belarusians, although the Belarusian language is spoken by proportionately fewer people than Russian in Ukraine. 5,058,400 people out of a population of 9,503,800 have Belarusian as their mother tongue, but only 2,227,200 persons use it as their primary language in their daily communication; furthermore, as a second language it is only spoken by slightly more than one million people.[17]

«West» and the Byzantine «East» (A Triptych), in: *Contemporary Ukraine on the Cultural Map of Europe*, ZALESKA ONYSHKEVYCH, L. M. – REWAKOWICZ, M. G. (Eds.), Armonk – New York – London 2009, 40–68.

14 KARÁCSONYI, Dávid – KOCSIS, Károly – KOVÁLY, Katalin – MOLNÁR, József – PÓTI, László: East–West dichotomy and political conflict in Ukraine – Was Huntington right?, in: *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin,* 2, 2014, 99–134.

15 MILLER, Alexei: Дуализм идентичностей на Украине [Dualism identities in Ukraine], in: *Отечественные записки [Otěčestvennye zapiski],* 1, 2007, online: http://www.strana-oz.ru/2007/1/dualizm-identichnostey-na-ukraine#_ftn1 (Downloaded 1 February 2017); MIHEIEVA, Oxana: Не все так просто з тими українцями... [Not so Simple with Ukrainians…], in: *Отечественные записки [Otěčestvennye zapiski],* 1, 2007, online: http://www.strana-oz.ru/2007/1/ne-vse-tak-prosto-z-timi-ukrayincyami (Downloaded 1 February 2017); RIABCHUK, Mykola: *Die reale und die imaginierte Ukraine* , Berlin 2005.

16 HUNTINGTON, 164.

17 National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, online: http://web.archive.org/web/20100918005813/http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/main.html (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

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For Ukraine, the slogan 'return to Europe' has an additional meaning – the return of Ukrainian nation-builders to the norms, the compensation of historic injustice, or a healing process of a pathological development. The statement expressed in Riabchuk's 2009 study[18] has lost nothing of its validity.

In the 1860s the four Gospels were translated into Ukrainian, however, political will prevented them from being published because the Ukrainian-language Gospels could have proven the existence of an independent Ukrainian language. The consequences of that would have been incalculable: the voice of separatists demanding autonomy could have been strengthened. The 1863 circular of Pyotr Valuev, Minister of Interior of Imperial Russia, banned the publication of religious texts and books in Ukrainian, however, this prohibition did not apply to literature. Alexander II's Ems Edict of 1876, in contrast, contained a complete ban.[19] The famous half sentence of the Valuev Circular, pursuant to which 'no separate Little Russian language ever existed, exists, or could exist' is frequently referred to even today. In response, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko declared in one his 2015 autumn speeches – 152 years after the promulgation of the Valuev Circular: "Our answer is this: «It existed, it exists and will exist!»"[20]

In early 2017, when this study is being written, the fault line can rather be drawn along the language question: in Ukraine patriotism and unpatriotism are separately measured by sociologists among Russian and Ukrainian speakers,[21] and a belief seems to emerge very clearly that political and public actors alike are trying to grasp the possibility of national cohesion along the destructive and constructive effects of language on national consciousness.

A number of nationally oriented politicians and intellectuals have traditionally spoken about two Ukraines. Half of the country is seen in its mentality and language as Ukrainian, the other half as 'Creole'.[22] The latter are perceived as forcibly Russified Ukrainians who shall be 'reoriented' to the Ukrainian language and nation. Many advocates of this logic divide the country's population into moral categories based on ethnolinguistic grounds.[23] Ethnic Ukrainians who speak Russian are often qualified as orphans, traitors or janissaries who had forgotten their homeland and family backgrounds.[24] The linguistic assimilation

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18 RIABCHUK, Mykola: Cultural Fault Lines and Political Divisions: The Legacy of History in Contemporary Ukraine, in: *Contemporary Ukraine on the Cultural Map of Europe*, ZALESKA ONYSHKEVYCH, L. M. – REWAKOWICZ, M. G. (Eds.), Armonk – New York – London 2009, 23.

19 Details: MILLER, Alexei: The Ukrainian Question. The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the 19th Century, in: *Central European University Press*, Budapest – New York 2003.

20 Speech of the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko during to commemorate the victims of the Holodomor, Kyiv, 28 November 2015, online: http://www.president.gov.ua/news/vistup-prezidenta-na-ceremoniyi-vshanu-vannya-pamyati-zhertv-36377 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

21 Ідентичність громадян України в нових умовах: стан, тенденції, регіональні особливості [The identity of the citizens of Ukraine under the new conditions: status, trends, regional differences], Kyiv 2016, online: http://www.uceps.org/upload/Identi-2016.pdf (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

22 RIABCHUK, Mykola: *Дві України: Реальні межі, віртуальні війни [Two Ukraines: real boundaries, virtual wars]*, Kyiv 2003; ZURZHENKO, Tatiana: Миф о двух Украинах [Myth about two Ukraines], in: *Перекрестки [Perekrestki]*, 3–4, 2005, 16.

23 MASENKO, Larysa: *(У)мовна (У)країна [Conditional Ukraine/Linguistic country]*, Kyiv, 2007, 57.

24 KULYK, Volodymyr: The Politics of Ethnicity on Post-Soviet Ukraine: Beyond Brubaker, in: *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 1–2, 2001, 197–221; PAVLENKO, Aneta: Language rights versus speakers' rights: on the applicability of

of Russian-speaking Ukrainians – as Shumlianskyi[25] points out – is regarded as a moral crime. Hnatkevych, for instance, has accused with 'degenerating the Ukrainian nation' those Ukrainians who speak Russian with their children at home, who were 'infected' by the 'disease' of Russification, and are not looking for a 'cure'.[26]

Ukrainian intelligentsia clearly rejects the Belarusian way, but has not managed to find its own yet. Masenko for example believes that Belarus said 'yes' to Russian and became completely Russified; Latvia said a definite 'no' and began developing its own national language; Ukraine, however, has constantly replied 'I do not know' to the challenge.[27] The Russian language therefore was a complicit in genocide committed against the Ukrainians in the eyes of one part of society, whereas a victim of state-building in the eyes of the other part.[28]

Who is a Hero?

If a Ukrainian historical personality were to be named, at least one name would certainly pop up in everyone's mind, in the minds of non-Ukrainians as well: the name of Stepan Bandera. This is so despite that we do not even know of a thorough biography of his, most of the literature related to him is indirect. He was a short, thin man, struggling with rheumatism since his childhood, occasionally he was able to walk only with a stick. He was born an Austrian subject in a Ruthenian Greek Catholic village of few hundred inhabitants. In the 1920–30s he was an activist in Galicia pertaining to Poland at the time. However, during World War II, when radical banderists and the paramilitary Ukrainian Insurgent Army were involved in incidents still causing controversy, he was in jail most of the time, or just watching the events from a distance. His impact is, however, unquestionable. Today, dozens of Bandera statues stand across Ukraine, but only west and north-west from Kiev. Transcarpathia is an exception: here not a single memorial has been erected to honor him. The conflicting situation inherent in the fact that collective memory – including the perception of Bandera himself – is dissimilar in different parts of the country, and that some of its components are irreconcilable, has been realized by great politics, too. They have tried to address the problem by two prominent answers. Viktor Yushchenko, who became president thanks to the 'Orange Revolution', tried to create common memory by putting the Holodomor of the early 1930s into the focus of attention. In 2010, Yushchenko declared Bandera the hero of Ukraine, that is, he elevated him into the official pantheon of

Western language rights approaches in Eastern European contexts, in: *Language Policy*, 10, 2011, 37–58.

25 SHUMLIANSKYI, Stanislav: Conflicting abstractions: language groups in language politics in Ukraine, in: *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 201, 2010, 142.

26 HNATKEVYCH, Yurij: *Чи злетить птах у синє небо? Нариси про русифікованих і русифікаторів та гірку долю української мови в незалежній Україні [Does a bird fly into the blue sky? Essays on Russified and Russifiers and the plight of the Ukrainian language in independent Ukraine]*, Kyiv 1999, 11.

27 MASENKO, Larisa – HOROBETS, Olena: Офіційна двомовність не об'єднує країну, а сприяє її розпаду [Official bilingualism does not unite the country but contribute to its fragmentation], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/06/larysa-masenko-ofitsijna-dvomovnist-ne-ob-jednuje-krajinu-a-spryyaje-jiji-rozpadu/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

28 BOWRING, Bill: The Russian Language in Ukraine: Complicit in Genocide, or Victim of State-building?, in: *The Russian Language Outside the Nation*, RYAZANOVA-CLARCE, L. (Ed.), Edinburgh 2014, 56–78.

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national heroes without a national consensus. People have reacted to this step sensitively not only domestically but also abroad. However, in the same year, the court – on the bases of individual petitions and with a reference to the fact that Bandera was never a Ukrainian citizen, thus cannot be Ukraine's hero either – annulled the presidential decree. The decision was approved by the appellate court and the Supreme Court as well. So actually nothing has changed beyond rousing the tempers all over again; both decisions satisfied only half of the country – each time a different half.

Accordingly, the Institute of National Memory rejects that Bandera would have a cult in Ukraine. On 16 January 2017, the Institute published a post of Volodymyr Viatrovych on its official Facebook page. In this post, the Institute's director posed a rhetorical question, 'Is there a Bandera cult in Ukraine?', then he replied: during the decommunization more than fifty thousand streets and squares were renamed in the country, of which merely thirty-four received Stepan Bandera's name as a new one, and only four new monuments were erected in his honor.[29]

According to official Ukrainian historiography, in the period of World War II the Ukrainian territories – due to their geopolitical position – were in the epicenter of the eastern theater of war. During World War II, call-ups were continuous: about 10% of the Ukrainian population, millions of people, served in the Soviet army. In addition, in the resistance movement organized by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists as well as in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army founded in 1942 by the Organization, a minimum of one hundred thousand people took part in the battle in which the Soviets were considered enemies. Along the opposite, in fact mutually exclusive interpretation of these two facts, a struggle of political forces for shaping the politics of memory – at both the national and the regional level – has been witnessed over the past two decades. However, the interpretation of the issue has caused tensions in the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, as well.

In Ukraine the nationalization of memory is related to the re-interpretation of the Soviet narrative of the 'Great Patriotic War', to the re-evaluation of basic events, actors and historical consequences, during the development of new national identities and a national 'memory culture'. Nationalization does not imply 'de-Sovietization' of memory in every case, if by that we mean purposefully taking stock of the past. Rather, it can be observed that local power tore down the 'archaic' Soviet symbols – for pragmatic reasons, possibly unnoticed –, partially replaced them with national and religious symbols, or integrated them into the new historical narrative. However, the 'common victory' continues to carry important symbolic meaning, and in the Ukrainian-Russian relations it serves to legitimize projects related to post-Soviet reintegration and the 'strategic partnership' between the two countries.[30]

To date, perhaps the only consensual situation is ensured by the 1993 law on the status and social protection of war veterans under which everyone is considered a veteran who took up arms until 1944, thus members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as well. On this

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29 Online: https://www.facebook.com/uinp.gov.ua/posts/747068775447759?__mref=message_bubble (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

30 ZHURZHENKO, Tatiana: «Чужа війна» чи «спільна Перемога»? Націоналізація пам'яті про Другу світову війну на україно-російському прикордонні [«Common Victory» or «Not Our War»? The Nationalization of World War II Remembrance in the Ukrainian-Russian Borderlands], in: *Україна Модерна [Ukrayina Modĕrna]*, 18, 2011, 100–101.

situation was built Act No. 314-VIII of 2015 'On the Legal Status and Honoring the Memory of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the Twentieth Century'.[31] The law distinguishes between individual and collective participation in the battles of independence, it recognizes as legitimate the Ukrainian People's Republic – having reigned in certain periods of the first half of the 20th century –, the Ukrainian State (Hetmanate), the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, the East Lemko Republic, the Hutsul Republic and Carpathian Ukraine including the territory of Transcarpathia, as well as all civil institutions and military organizations of these state formations, including the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Carpathian Sich National Defense Organization protecting the independence of Carpathian Ukraine.

Whose Victory?

Today in Russia 9 May, that is, 'Victory Day' is one of the biggest state holidays. In the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 9 May was not a central issue in internal political settlements. In turn, in 1995, the 50th anniversary was celebrated in Moscow in full splendor, with a procession at Red Square and a military parade on the mountain of Homage, where the Victory Park had just been completed by the time of the jubilee.[32] From then on, Victory Day has been similarly praised every year, since 2008 the military parade has also taken place at Red Square. The two most important requisites of the central celebration are the 'Banner of Victory' and the 'Ribbon of Saint George'. The Banner of Victory is the team flag which was raised on the Reichstag on 1 May 1945, by Alexei Berest, Mikhail Yegorov and Meliton Kantariya. The historic Georgian ribbon had only been handed out by volunteers in Moscow in 2005, yet by next year it became a well-known symbol throughout the country, and even spread abroad. Since 2007, the ribbon has also been worn by government leaders in Russia, on the occasion of, among others, the central ceremony organized at Red Square.

World War II belongs to the contentious issues in both Ukrainian historiography and public opinion to this day, while politics has been constantly involved in memory policy-making.[33] According to official historiography, World War II took place between 22 June 1941, and 28 October 1944 in the territory of present-day Ukraine, although some hold that for Ukraine the war began in March 1939 when Hungary occupied Carpathian Ukraine (i.e., a large part of the territory of today's Transcarpathia).[34]

During the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych – fled-ousted in February 2014 – an attempt was made to incorporate the 'Banner of Victory' among the requisites related to the celebrations. The law of 2000 'On Perpetuation of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of

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31 See Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/laws/law-ukraine-legal-status-and-honoring-memory-fighters-ukraines-independence-twentieth-century (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

32 *Poklonnaya Hill*, online: http://www.poklonnayagora.ru/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

33 PORTNOV, Andrij: Memory Wars in Post-Soviet Ukraine (1991–2010), in: *Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe*, BLACKER, U. – ETKIND, A. – FEDOR, J. (Eds.), New York – Basingstoke 2013, 233.

34 GEBHART, Jan – KUKLÍK, Jan: *Druhá republika 1938–1939. Svár demokracie a totality v politickém, spoločenském a kulturním životě*, Prague 2004; HAI-NYZHNYK, P.: Карпатская Украина в 1939 г. как одна из «разменных монет» Мюнхенского договора [Carpathian Ukraine in 1939 as one of the «small coins» Munich agreement], in: *Западная Белоруссия и Западная Украина в 1939–1941 гг.: люди, события, документы [Western Belarus and Western Ukraine in 1939–1941: people, events, documents]*, St. Petersburg 2011, 25–42.

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1941–1945'[35] was supplemented in 2011 with the following regulation: "the Banner of Victory is the emblem of victory of the Soviet people, army and fleet over fascist Germany in the years of the Great Patriotic War" which must be used at victory ceremonies, and displayed on buildings along with Ukraine's state flag.[36] The law was met with considerable resistance, given that the 'Banner of Victory' is a military team flag, but its symbolism is clear: a red flag with a sickle, a hammer and a five-pointed star. Based on a citizen petition, the modification of the law was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, on the grounds that the Constitution provides an exhaustive definition of state symbols, that is, what the state flag, the state coat of arms and the national anthem are, and also establishes that state symbols are inseparable from state sovereignty in their content.[37]

In 2014 the Ukrainian holiday calendar was changed, along the very logic of dismantling the 'Russian connection'. In his Independence Day speech of 24 August, President Petro Poroshenko declared: "Ukraine will no longer celebrate according to the military-historical calendar of a neighboring country. We will pay tribute to the defenders of our homeland, not to those of a foreign country." [38] By means of a presidential decree,[39] instead of 23 February – which had formerly been the Soviet Army's Day, today it is 'Defender of the Fatherland Day' in Russia – 14 October was to become the 'Day of the Defender of Ukraine' (in the Orthodox church calendar 14 October is the Intercession of the Theotokos – in Church Slavonic: 'Pokrov' – i.e. the day of the Holy Mother of God, as well).[40]

The goal of all this was explained as "to bow before the courage and heroism of the defenders of Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity, the Ukrainian people's military traditions and victories, as well as to strengthen the patriotic spirit of society". This day is also the day of Ukrainian Cossacks, and on this day in 1942 was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army formed. Presumably the intention was to make it a uniformly praisable day. Its acceptance is not indisputable: according to a survey conducted in the fall of 2015, only 41% of the population believe that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army played a positive role in history.[41]

On this was built the second element of the 'decommunization package', i.e. Law of Ukraine No. 315-VIII of 2015 'On Perpetuation of the Victory over Nazism in World War II

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35 Law of Ukraine "On Perpetuation of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945," April 20 2000, No. 1684-III, online: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1684-14 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

36 Law of Ukraine "«On Perpetuation of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945» concerning the order of the official use of the copy of the Victory Flag," April 21 2011, No. 3298-VI, online: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3298-17 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

37 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Juny 16 2011, No. 6-RP, online: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v006p710-11 (Dowloaded 1 February 2017).

38 Speech of the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko on the 23rd anniversary of Ukraine's independence in Kyiv on 24 August 2014, online: http://www.president.gov.ua/news/31066.html (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

39 Decree of the President of Ukraine on celebration of the Day of the Defender of Ukraine, 14 October, 2014, No. 806, online: http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/806/2014 Downloaded 1 February 2017).

40 ZHURZHENKO, Tatiana: A Divided Nation? Reconsidering the Role of Identity Politics in the Ukraine Crisis, in: *Die Friedens-Warte: Journal of International Peace and Organization*, 1–2, 2014, 264.

41 OSNACH, Sergij: Як мова визначає наших героїв і вітчизну. [How do determine language our heroes and homeland], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/12/yak-mova-vyznachaje-nashyh-herojiv-i-vitchyznu/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

of 1939–1945'.[42] The text of the law stipulates that World War II broke out as a result of the agreements between Nazi Germany and the Communist USSR, the two regimes committed crimes against humanity and against mankind, as well as war crimes and genocide in the territory of Ukraine. In order to commemorate all victims of World War II in Ukraine Memorial and Reconciliation Day is celebrated every year on 8 May, whereas 9 May is 'the day of victory over Nazism in World War II' (in short: Victory Day). According to the website of the Institute of National Memory, the symbol of Memorial and Reconciliation Day is the red poppy flower.[43]

A report on the website of the Institute on the opening ceremony of public celebrations organized for the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II says that the poppy is "the symbol of the memory of people who fell in World War II and who are falling in East Ukraine in the fight for freedom and independence."[44] The Institute has also developed a draft law entitled 'National holidays in Ukraine' in which, in the Institute's director's own words, "the focus has clearly been transferred from 9 May to 8 May".[45] The establishment of new national holidays can best be described by Hobsbawm's concept 'Inventing Traditions'. 'Invented tradition' refers to practices with symbolic and ideological functions that will gradually replace old, denied traditions, deemed to oblivion.[46] For today's Ukraine, the enemy at the end of World War I, in World War II as well as today is the 'Moscow Horde'.[47]

The establishment of new holidays suggests that Ukrainian memory policy wishes to participate in the World War II victories, at the same time it rejects the Ukrainian part of liability for any crimes committed by the Soviet army. The Ukrainian hybrid war, the outbreak of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in April 2014 has encouraged the remembrance of the Western neighbors, too: citizens of the neighboring countries were reminded by Ukrainians of 1956 and 1968 on the road to the Hungarian as well as the Slovakian border, respectively.[48] Let us note that in both conflicts it was not the 'Russian' but the Soviet army who took part, which is not simply a difference in rhetorics. For Ukraine one of the biggest challenges in this area is that in the meantime Russia undoubtedly tries to monopolize

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42 See Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/laws/law-ukraine-perpetuation-victory-over-nazism-world-war-ii-1939-1945 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

43 See Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/page/ukrainska-druga-svitova (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

44 See Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/news/u-kievi-startuvav-proekt-maki-pam-yati (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

45 Институт нацпамяти хочет декоммунизировать 9 мая [Institute of National Remembrance wants decommunisation of May 9], in: *Korrespondent.net*, January 27, 2017, online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3806693-ynstytut-natspamiaty-khochet-dekommunyzyrovat-9-maia (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

46 HOBSBAWM, Eric: Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in: *The Invention of Tradition*, HOBSBAWM, E. – RANGER, R. (Eds.), Cambridge 1984, 1–14.

47 Petro Poroshenko issued an appeal for the Day of remembrance of the Battle of Kruty, online: http://www.president.gov.ua/news/zvernennya-do-ukrayinskogo-narodu-u-zvyazku-z-dnem-pamyati-g-39798 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

48 PIPASH, Volodymyr: На виїзді з Закарпаття з›явилися білборди, що апелюють до історичної пам›яті сусідів України [Away from Transcarpathia appeared billboards that appeal to the historical memory of neighboring states of Ukraine], in: *Zakarpattya online*, July 22, 2015, online: http://zakarpattya.net.ua/News/142858-Na-vyizdi-z-Zakarpattia-ziavylysia-bilbordy-shcho-apeliuiut-do-istorychnoi-pamiati-susidiv-Ukrainy (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

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the symbolic capital of the victory over Nazi Germany, and simultaneously frames the Ukrainian leadership having come to power in 2014 as the heir of 'Ukrainian nationalism and fascism'.[49]

The Archive Belongs to Everyone
The text of Law No. 316-VIII of 2015 'On access to Archives of Repressive Agencies of Totalitarian Communist Regime of 1917–1991'[50] was composed by Ukraine's Ministry of Culture and the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. One of its key rules is that the scope of the law on the protection of personal data does not extend to information available through this law. The concealment of personal data contained in the files may be requested from the archives only by the victims or their relatives. Access to the files is free and unrestricted, photos or copies can be made using own devices, or requested from the archive for a fee. Documents are available upon a written application and identity verification.

The Sectoral State Archive of Ukrainian Institute has stepped up as the central actor of document management, where all the relevant documents from the period of 1917–1991 are required to be placed, within a period of two years. In addition, the Law makes it the duty of the state to acquire materials available in foreign archives.

According to critics of the law, herding files to a single archive does not only facilitate access but also upsets the current system of archives. Classification into the category of 'repressive bodies' is not clear; thus the selection of documents is arbitrary. The definition of 'victim' is quite vague; common criminals, murderers, robbers may also be included. Disclosing names of staff members of the institutions concerned are indiscriminate, not separated by categories – for example, those in connection with informers, as well as those who detected common criminals are included into the same category –, thus the audience is not able to distinguish either. The establishment of the new central archive was decided by the government, not the parliament. Instead of moving documents from one archive to the other, a modern solution could have been or could be digitizing and making available the digitized material via modern facilities.[51]

Lenin for the Last Time?

In the absence of a uniform memory policy not only the erection of new monuments is a dissonant process, but the breakdown of old Soviet monuments, too.

After the disintegration of USSR, the most certain sign of the regime change taking place in the public space was the bringing down of Lenin statues around the period of the turn of the state in the framework of a wide variety of rituals: in public, in the presence of a large crowd, secretly, during the night, simply and without frills, without crowd celebrations, etc. In the schools there were no Lenin rooms any longer, no paintings of Lenin hung in

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49 ZHURZHENKO, *A Divided Nation?*, 264–265.

50 See Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/laws/law-ukraine-access-archives-repressive-agencies-totalitarian-communist-regime-1917-1991 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

51 BERKOVSKYJ, V.: Дуже відкритий архів [Too open archive], in: *Критика [Kritika]*, 2015, online: http://krytyka.com/ua/solutions/opinions/duzhe-vidkrytyy-arkhiv (Downloaded 1 February, 2017).

the offices of public institutions anymore (though the custom of hanging portraits of the reigning state leaders in the 'office' has not been faded away).

In the period of 1990–1993 nearly two thousand Lenin statues were got rid of in Western Ukraine. Over the next decade (between 1994 and 2004) the central part of the country excelled in clearing Lenin monuments away: about six hundred were demolished. After the 2004 Orange Revolution, until Yanukovych came to power (2005–2010), pulling down statues of the proletariat leader continued once again in the central regions of Ukraine: another six hundred disappeared. Then, a peaceful period ensued in this respect. According to a 2012 survey, the main streets of most Ukrainian settlements still bore Lenin's name, and thousands of Lenin statues were standing in public places. On 8 December 2013, however, now under the aegis of the Revolution of Dignity, the crowd defying the Yanukovych regime knocked down the Lenin statue of the capital, Kiev. The revolutionary period between November 2013 and February 2014 swept away more than five hundred Lenin statues in the central, southern and eastern parts of Ukraine. This was the period mentioned as Leninfall (in Ukrainian 'Leninopad', 'Leninoval' or 'vozhdepad').[52] According to the summary of the Institute of National Memory, in 2016 a total of 2,389 Soviet monuments were got rid of in Ukraine, among which the number of disappeared Lenin statues was 1,320.[53]

The 2013–14 series of events has not only led to the self-liquidation of the Party of the Regions having occupied a strong position since a number of cycles, but also to the ban of the Communist Party. On 26 August 1991, two days after Ukraine's proclamation of independence the party had already been temporarily suspended by way of regulation, but in 1993 it was reorganized, and virtually until the early parliamentary elections of 2014 it was the only Ukrainian party whose representatives occupied seats in the Supreme Council in each cycle. In July 2014 the faction of the Communist Party was disbanded in the Ukrainian parliament by means of a procedural process, and at the same time, based on a prosecution submission, legal proceedings began against the party, which managed to participate in the 2014 autumn elections, but did not reach the 5% parliamentary threshold. The party charged by supporting separatism and terrorism soon got banned by the court's decision.

Before the end of the case, Law No. 317-VIII. of 2015 had been born "On the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols".[54] The law does not generally prohibit the items indicated in its title, but gives more accurate conceptual and contentwise definitions. The list of objects belonging to the subject matter includes the (Soviet) Communist Party, the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) regimes, and the Soviet state security organs. Within this, symbols of the 'communist totalitarian regime' contain the flags, coats of arms and other state symbols of all the former socialist countries, including the USSR, its former republics (the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, too); the hymns of the Soviet Union and its republics; any flag, emblem

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52 Online: https://ukr.media/leninopad/ and http://leninstatues.ru/leninopad (Downloaded 3 February 2017).

53 See Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/sites/default/files/userupload/decomun-2016.jpg (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

54 See Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/laws/law-ukraine-condemnation-communist-and-national-socialist-nazi-regimes-and-prohibition-propagan (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

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or attribute which displays the sickle, the plow, the hammer and the five-pointed star in any constellation resembling the Soviet period; monuments and inscriptions commemorating persons involved in illicit events or the events themselves; the very designation of the Communist Party; furthermore, municipalities and public places are prohibited from bearing these names. In December 2015 the Venice Commission expressed its concern that the law could impede freedom of expression, deprive political parties from the possibility of participating in the elections, and entail unlawful prosecutions.[55]

The subpage of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory 'FAQ. What you need to know about decommunization'[56] tries to expand the framework of interpretation of these laws. To the question whether the law actually prohibits the Communist and Nazi ideologies and symbols, the following answer is provided: "Neither the ideology, nor the symbols can be banned as it is not possible to ban the past. It was what it was. The law condemns the inhumane totalitarian regimes which have grown out of these ideologies, and prohibits the propagation of their symbols. Propaganda of the ideologies and symbols of Communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes dishonors the memory of millions of victims of Communism and Nazism, thus it is forbidden." To the question whether it is possible to keep the old name of a village or street if it falls within the scope of the law the answer is clear: "No, it is not possible." If the local government refuses to rename, it is considered as sabotage. However, veterans may continue to wear their Soviet awards, and it is not allowed to tamper with the Soviet symbols of military graves. Interestingly, it is not necessary to introduce the name change of a settlement or public space in identity documents or official papers relating to immovable property, etc., those remain valid all the same.

In October 2015 the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory published a list of 520 names of those people after whom institutions or public spaces cannot be named in Ukraine.[57] The list contains persons with a 'Soviet' and/or 'communist' past, mainly Soviets or foreigners having lived in the Soviet Union, including not only party and government functionaries, but 'ordinary people' as well, such as engineer Vasyl Bazhanov, 'one of the pioneers of Soviet coal mining'. The list includes names of those individuals only who the Ukrainian settlements and public places resemble in any way. For example, Lenin, Nadezhda Krupskaya ('Lenin's wife'), Engels, and Marx are on the list, but Stalin is not since nothing is named after him in Ukraine anymore. Among the more than five hundred names a few foreigners can be found, including representatives of the Comintern, founders of Communist parties in some countries, or, for example, the only non-functionary, French symbolist poet Henri Barbusse. The list does not include a single writer or poet but him. There appears, however, the name of a 14-year-old child, Vit'a Gurin, who "was a student of the No. 1 school of Juzovka [Donetsk], killed at Easter of 1929 in the local club because of anti-religious propaganda, and whose name was used for the propagation of communism in Donbass". 70 of the 520 names are linked to the Donbass region.

55 Ukraine law banning Communist and Nazi propaganda has a legitimate aim, but does not comply with European standards, say constitutional law experts of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, Press release – DC190, 2015, online: https://www.google.hu/#q=gumit%C3%B6rv%C3%A9ny (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

56 See Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/news/faq-use-shcho-vi-khotili-diznatisya-pro-deko-munizatsiyu (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

57 See Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/publication/spisok-osib-yaki-pidpadayut-pid-za-kon-pro-dekomunizatsiyu (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

According to the Institute of National Memory, three percent of the country's settlements had to be renamed. The summary made at the end of 2016 mentions a total of 32 cities and 955 towns and villages renamed, furthermore, 51,493 streets and squares got new names.[58] Some of these are located in Crimea, de facto belonging to Russia, and in the area controlled by East Ukrainian dissidents. Several guides have been published to inform mayors, bureaucrats and the public opinion about how to rename public spaces and institutions. The Institute of National Memory has even released infographics for those interested.[59]

Not all of the settlements have been silently buying into the renaming experiment. In this regard, the fuss around changing the name of Dnipropetrovsk city is instructive. The original name of the village founded in the 18th century was Katerynoslav, it was named after the Dnieper River and Soviet-Ukrainian politician Grigory Petrovsky in 1926. Petrovsky is also included in the list of those historic personalities after whom nothing can be named in Ukraine. During the selection process of the new name of the county seat located along Ukraine's largest river, many proposals were put forth, but without a doubt the most original ideas were those of the city government[60] and opposition MP Oleksandr Vilkul.[61] According to Vilkul's proposal also presented to the parliament as a draft law,[62] the new name of *Dnipropetrovsk* after the name change should be *Dnipropetrovsk* (sic!). The essence of the proposal is that the name of the county seat is to keep the reference to the Dnieper River (in Ukrainian: Dnipro), but the Soviet-Ukrainian politician is to be replaced with Apostle (Saint) Peter (in Ukrainian: Petro). This means that while the name of the city would remain *Dnipropetrovsk*, its etymology would be amended: instead of *Dnipro + Petrovsky*, *Dnipro + Apostle (Saint) Petro* would be the eponymous.

According to the official website of the Kiev parliament, a bill under No. 3854 was registered on 1 February 2016, which is to alter the names of districts and settlements.[63] The law was adopted on 4 February by Parliament.[64] Until the beginning of May 2016, more than a hundred settlements received new/old names in Ukraine.[65] President Petro Poroshenko has

58 See Website UINM, online: http://www.memory.gov.ua/sites/default/files/userupload/decomun-2016.jpg (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

59 Online: http://fs152.www.ex.ua/get/172344833/infographic_names_new-page-001.jpg (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

60 Депутати змінили «інтимологію», щоб зберегти назву Дніпропетровську [Members of City Council have changed the «intimologi» to keep the name of Dnipropetrovsk], in: *Українська правда [Ukrayins'ka pravda]*, 29 December 2015, online: http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/12/29/7094054/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

61 Вілкул пропонує перейменувати Дніпропетровськ у Дніпропетровськ [Viluk provides renamed Dnipropetrovsk to Dnipropetrovsk], in: *Українська правда [Ukrayins'ka pravda]*, February 4 2016, online: http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/02/4/7097863/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

62 Draft decree of the Verkhovna Rada, 3 February 2016, No. 4001, online: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=58036 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

63 Draft decree of the Verkhovna Rada, 4 February 2016, No. 984-VIII, online: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=57991 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

64 Plenary session of the Verkhovna Rada, 4 February 2016, online: http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/news/Plenarni_zasidannya/124779.html (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

65 «Декомунізовані» Дніпродзержинськ і ще кілька міст отримали нові імена [The «decommunized» Dniprodzherzhynsk and a few cities have new names], in: *Zakarpattya.net*, 19 May 2016, online: http://zakarpattya.net.ua/News/156133-Dekomunizovani-Dniprodzerzhynsk-i-shche-kilka-mist-otrymaly-novi-imena (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

declared that the completion of decommunization is a national security interest.[66] In any case, pursuant to a parliamentary decree adopted after a long debate on 19 May 2016, Dnipropetrovsk was renamed as Dnipro.[67]

Not only cities but small rural settlements as well are not necessarily enthusiastic about decommunization. For example, the local self-government of the Western Ukrainian village Zhovtneva has denied the name change. According to their justification, the village was not named after the 1917 coup in Petrograd, but after the local, typically yellowish clay soil.[68] However, in 2016 Zhovtneva 'fell', a parliamentary decree[69] gave a new name to the village of little more than seven hundred inhabitants: *Zaberezh*. Other towns oppose forced name change by reinstating their old names amended by the parliament. This is what two villages in the central part of Ukraine did, for instance.[70]

A national Internet news portal Korrespondent.net in its article titled 'Little fantasy: how is decommunization taking place?'[71] has drawn the attention to a few interesting events. The report reveals, for example, that even the popular sparkling wine *Sovetskoye Shampanskoye* (Soviet Champagne)[72] could not keep its original name, the manufacturer has chosen the designation *Sovetovskoye Shampanskoye* (Sovietov Champagne) instead.[73]

The press also considers among the oddities of the wave of renaming that Hennadiy Moskal, governor of the westernmost province, Transcarpathia, in one of his decrees renamed the main street of a small village from Lenin to Lennon Street, after the murdered

66 Порошенко: Декоммунизация должна быть завершена [Poroshenko: Decommunization must be completed], in: *Korrespondent.net*, 15 May 2016, online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3682845-poroshenko-dekom-munyzatsyia-dolzhna-byt-zavershena (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

67 Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On renaming of the city of Dnipropetrovsk in the Dnipropetrovsk region", 19 May 2016, No. 1375-19, online: http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1375-19 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

68 Még mindig sok a szovjet rendszerhez köthető utcanév Kárpátalján [There are still many street names associated with the Soviet regime in Transcarpathia], in: *Kárpátalja.ma*, 29 November 2015, online: http://www.kar-patalja.ma/karpatalja/kozelet/meg-mindig-sok-a-szovjet-rendszerhez-kotheto-utcanev-karpataljan/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017). The village was originally referring to the 1917 Great October Socialist Revolution got its name; жовтень the Ukrainian word for October. The Ukrainian жовтий is yellow.

69 Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On renaming of some settlements of Transcarpathian, Odesa and Chernihiv regions", 14 July 2016, No. 1467-VIII, online: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1467-19 (Downloaded 1 February, 2017).

70 На Черкащине декоммунизированным селам вернули старые названия [On Cherkas region for the decommunized villages returned to the old name], in: *Korrespondent.net*, 12 October 2016, online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3756858-na-cherkaschyne-dekommunyzyrovannym-selam-vernuly-starye-nazvanyia (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

71 Мало фантазии. Как проходит декоммунизация [Little fantasy. How to doing Decommunization], in: *Korrespondent.net*, 4 February 2016, online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3624948-brak-fantazyy-kak-prokho-dyt-dekommunyzatsyia (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

72 Sovetskoye Shampanskoye (Soviet Champagne) – generic brand of sparkling wine produced in the Soviet Union and its successor states (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova).

73 Ukrainians say farewell to «Soviet champagne» as decommunization law takes hold, in: *The Guardian*, 4 January 2016, online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/04/ukrainians-say-farewell-to-soviet-cham-pagne-as-decommunisation-law-takes-hold (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

star of the Beatles.[74] Most commentators also had a large smile when it was reported[75] that a settlement in Donetsk province, *Novohorodske* (Новогородське, where нове = new, городське = civic, urban) was to be renamed as Нью-Йорк, i.e, *New York*, and even a bill was submitted to Parliament on this issue.[76]

In the territory of today's Ukraine, the first mass renaming of geographical names naturally did not occur as a result of the legislative package on decommunization. The Soviet power transformed place names throughout the Soviet Union according to the communist ideology, and Russified the names of many towns and villages.[77] A place name reform was launched immediately after Ukraine became independent. In the first half of the 1990s a number of towns which had been renamed during the Soviet era took back their old names. Part of the renaming process was getting rid of names associated with Soviet ideology and figures of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For example, Чапаєвка [Chapaevka] village in Vinnitsa county (named after trooper Vasily Chapayev who participated in the battles of the 1917 revolution and the subsequent civil war) successfully reclaimed its pre-1946 name Війтівка [Viitivka] in 1995.[78]

A number of settlements could take back their pre-Soviet names whose non-Slavic population reclaimed a minority-language designation. A town, for example, named Минеральне [Mineral'ne] during the Soviet era, was given its traditional Hungarian name back: *Tiszaásvány*, the Ukrainian version of which became Тисаашвань [Tysaashvan'].[79] The massive wave of transforming place names on an ideological basis, however, is indeed the consequence of decommunization in Ukraine. Changing geographic names and names of public spaces on a massive scale has been an integral part of language policy and planning also affecting names,[80] which aims to transform the mental map and to reconstruct reality. However, the above-mentioned events point out that – although Poroshenko has proudly announced that decommunization 'in Ukraine restored historical justice' – this process has also failed to unite society.[81]

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74 Москаль першим із голів ОДА взявся за декомунізацію [Moscal first of Head of State Administration begins the decommunization], in: *Hennadiy Moskal Official Site*, 2 March 2016, online: http://www.moskal.in.ua/index.php?-categoty=news&news_id=2128 (Downloaded February 1 2017); Москаль переименовал улицу Ленина в Леннона [Moskal renamed Lenin Street in Lennon], in: Українська правда *[Ukrayins'ka pravda]*, 2 March 2016, online: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2016/03/2/7100887/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

75 Поселок на Донбассе хотят переименовать в Нью-Йорк [Settlement in Donbas to be renamed as New York], in: *Korrespondent.net*, 16 December 2016, online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3788774-poselok-na-donbas-se-khotiat-pereymenovat-v-nui-york (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

76 Draft decree of the Verkhovna Rada, 9 December 2016, No. 5517, online: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=60678 (Downloaded 1 February, 2017).

77 RANNUT, Mart: Beyond Linguistic Policy: the Soviet Union versus Estonia, in: *Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination*, SKUTNABB-KANGAS, T. – PHILLIPSON, R. (Eds.), Berlin – New York 1995, 179–208.

78 Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On restoration of individual settlements Tulchyn and Bershad in Vinnytsia Oblast of the former names," 17 May 1995, No. 281/95-PV, online: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/281/95-%D0%BF%D0%B2 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

79 Decree of the Verkhovna Rada URSR, February 22 1991, No. 765-XII, online: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/765-xii (Downloaded 1 February 2017). Details: BEREGSZÁSZI, Anikó: Language Planning issues of Hungarian Place-names in Subcarpathia, in: *Acta Linguistica Hungarica*, 43, 1996, 1–8.

80 WALKOWIAK, Justyna B.: Personal Names in Language Policy and Planning: Who Plans What Names, for Whom and How?, in: *Names and Naming: People, Places, Perceptions and Power*, PUZEY, G. – KOSTANSKI, L. (Eds.), Bristol – Buffalo – Toronto, 2016, 197–212.

81 Online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3754360-poroshenko-hordytsia-masshtabamy-dekommunyzatsyy

Conclusion

Reinterpretation of the empire's history began immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[82] In this process, not just the historical memory of the newly created post-Soviet states has been rewritten. Rewriting history has been accompanied by redefining identity and emotional discussion of language issues closely related to identity.[83] This process is not over in Ukraine even twenty-five years after gaining independence. With regard to decommunization laws, Internet commentators have formed two basic groups: those who think that legislature decided too quickly, without a discussion, and those who opine the debate has been going on for twenty-five years, it was past time to make a decision.[84] The standard professional position has been summarized by Oxana Shevel as follows: in connection with Soviet history it is politics that has decided, on ideological basis, who is good and who is bad, who is 'ours' and who is 'enemy'.[85]

However, in Ukraine, virtually at war since April 2014, the issue of who is with us and who is against us is contentious not only from a historical perspective. The problem is generating controversy even today.

Between the parts of a divided society, President Petro Poroshenko is trying to strike a balance sometimes desperately. According to the President, for instance, 62% of those fighting for Ukraine in the East are Russian-speaking.[86] He also emphasized that "Ukraine is loved in Russian just as much as in Ukrainian".[87] Also, in his speech dated 9 May 2016, he said: "Today the descendants of those who fought under the command of [Rodion] Malinovsky [Marshal of the Soviet Union, military commander in WWII], or [Roman] Shukhevych [military leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army], are now protecting Ukraine together against the aggression of the Russian Federation."[88] A part of politicians and intellectuals positioning themselves on the national wing, however, tend to exclude their fellow citizens of Russian

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82 BLOMMAERT, Jan: *Discourse*, Cambridge 2006, 151.

83 PAVLENKO, Aneta: Multilingualism in Post-Soviet Countries: Language Revival, Language Removal, and Sociolinguistic Theory, in: *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism*, 3–4, 2008, 275–314, doi:10.1080/13670050802271517.

84 KULYK, Volodymyr: [About substandard laws and insensitive critics], in: *Критика [Kritika]*, May 2015, online: http://krytyka.com/ua/solutions/opinions/pro-neyakisni-zakony-ta-nechutlyvykh-krytykiv (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

85 SHEVEL, Oxana: Щоб відповідати європейським стандартам, закони «про декомунізацію» потребують змін [To meet European standards, laws «On decommunization» need to be changed], in: *VoxUkraine*, 7 May 2015, on-line: http://voxukraine.org/2015/05/07/decommunization-laws-ukr/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

86 Порошенко: Большинство воюющих за Украину на Донбассе – русскоязычные [Most fighting for Ukraine at the Donbass – the Russian-speaking], in: *Korrespondent.net*, 31 March 2015, online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3497931-Porosenko-bolshynstvo-vouiuischykh-za-ukraynu-na-donbasse-russkoiazychnye (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

87 Порошенко: На русском языке Украину любят не меньше, чем на украинском [Poroshenko: Ukraine is loved in Russian just as much as in Ukrainian], in: *Українська правда [Ukrayins'ka pravda]*, 23 August 2014, online: http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/08/23/7035607/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

88 От РФ защищают потомки «красных» и УПА – Порошенко [From the Russian Federation to protect the descendants of «red» and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army – Poroshenko], in: *Korrespondent.net*, 9 May 2016, online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3680137-ot-rf-zaschyschauit-potomky-krasnykh-y-upa-poroshenko (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

mother tongue who do not (prefer to) speak Ukrainian from the nation. Ukrainian linguist Yuri Shevchuk, teaching Ukrainian language at Columbia University in the United States, for example, doubts whether Russian native speakers can be good patriots: "The hybrid war in the East has broken out on the front of culture and civilization, as well. Previously, it was quite clear who were devotees and who were enemies of the Ukrainians in the field of language and culture. Now, however, the surprising concept of »new« patriots has appeared, who love Ukraine but do not like the Ukrainian language. This notion has raised serious doubts in me."[89] Shevchuk takes a clear stance against all manifestations of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism: "Linguistic schizophrenia deprives the Ukrainian language from its protecting role in those existential situations when your life is in danger, and based on your language you can distinguish your own from the enemy."[90]

One of the most famous Ukrainian linguists, Larysa Masenko is also eyeing the Russian-speaking part of Ukrainian society with suspicion: "For Russia, victory in the linguistic and cultural war with Ukraine was a prerequisite for the current military intervention, as well as for the occupation of Crimea and part of Donbass. In its plans for the revitalization of the Soviet Empire, the Kremlin counts on the part of Ukraine's population which has been »crystallized« by means of control over the Ukrainian mass media."[91]

Taras Marusya sees a parallel between decommunization and de-Russification: "Decommunization, which is still ongoing, will be incomplete without de-Russification and decolonization" – he claims.[92]

Creating a legal distance from the Russian imperial past and the Soviet historical heritage therefore entails the intention of distancing from the Russian language, identified as the main symbol of the Russifying traditions of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, as well. In Ukraine, decommunization and de-Russification are happening at the same time. We believe that in a strained Ukraine it would be appropriate and wise to acknowledge that historical memory and perception of the language issue may have different interpretations. Policies in which the Ukrainian intelligentsia and political elite have been engaged in this area, are unable to reach a consensus. In addition to internal conflicts, the international situation is not to be overlooked, either. And this is not only about the relationship of Russia to Ukraine. The lower house of Poland's parliament on 11 July 2016, evaluated the

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89 SHEVCHUK, Y. – VLASIUK, Hanna: "Двомовність як хвороба. Професор Колумбійського університету називає українську мовну ситуацію «мовною шизофренією» [Bilingualism as a disease: Columbia University professor eva-luate's Ukraine's language situation as «linguistic schizophrenia»], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/07/dvomovnist-yak-hvoroba-profesor-kolumbijskoho-uni-versytetu-nazyvaje-ukrajinsku-movnu-sytuatsiyu-movnoyu-shyzofrenijeyu/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

90 SHEVCHUK, Yurij – PALAZHIJ, Galyna: Мовна шизофренія – нова, потужна форма русифікації [Language schizophrenia – a new, powerful form of Russification], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/09/yurij-shevchuk-movna-shyzofreniya-nova-potuzhna-forma-rusyfikatsi-ji/#more-1780 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

91 MASENKO, Larysa: Мовознавча солідарність по-українськи [Linguistic solidarity in Ukrainian], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/09/larysa-Maszen-ko-movoznavcha-solidarnist-po-ukrajinsky/#more-1821 (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

92 MARUSYK, Taras: День слов'янської писемності і культури: декомунізація буде неповна без дерусифікації [Day of Slavic Literature and Culture: decommunization will be incomplete without de-Russification], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 2016, online: http://language-policy.info/2016/06/den-slov-yanskoji-pysem-nosti-i-kultury-dekomunizatsiya-bude-nepovna-bez-derusyfikatsiji/ (Downloaded 1 February 2017).

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1943–1945 events of Volhynia against Poland as "a genocide perpetrated by Ukrainian nationalists", and declared 11 July as Remembrance Day.[93] Ukrainian victimization and language policy does not facilitate the establishment of social peace.

21st century Ukraine, which in 1991 inherited the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic along with the burdens of the Soviet past, is now struggling with the divisive demons of the past and the present on her way to Europe. And although one of the symbols of decommunization is a picture where the Nazi swastika and the Communist hammer and sickle are thrown into the trash together,[94] the country will not easily get rid of the shadows of the past for a long time to come.

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94 See Website UNIM. http://www.memory.gov.ua/page/dekomunizatsiya-0 (accessed 1 February 2017).

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Something Missing: Czech Society
and Transcarpathia after 1989

Tomáš ZAHRADNÍČEK

Abstract

The article studies the "afterlife" of the former Subcarpathia, the present-day Transcarpathia, within the Czech society after 1989. The discourse about the region was framed by the understanding of the Czech society of their revolution of 1989 primarily in terms of political and cultural return to the inter-war Masarykian Republic. It maps the different ways the Czech society coped with this deficit in its restoration endeavours in the early 1990s. Within the Czech public discourse uncritical conception of selfless and successful civilising mission in the East still prevails, based on a belief that local population gratefully accepted and now nostalgically longs for such input. For some time after 1989, the theme became one of the key components of Czech debates concerning the past, its neighbours and own identity within the integrating Europe.

Keywords

Subcarpathia, Transcarpathia, cultural restoration, borders, Czechoslovakia

The study explores the "afterlife" of the former Subcarpathia[1], the present-day Transcarpathia, within the Czech society after 1989. The Czechs understood their revolution of 1989 primarily in terms of political and cultural return to the inter-war Masarykian Republic. A number of conditions required for such restoration were missing, most importantly the consent by the Slovaks. A portion of the territory was missing too: the easternmost part of Czechoslovakia – Subcarpathia – was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1945. This study maps the different ways the Czech society coped with this deficit in its restoration endeavours in the early 1990s. Within the Czech public discourse uncritical conception of selfless and successful civilising mission in the East still prevails, based on a belief that local population gratefully accepted and now nostalgically longs for such input. For some time after 1989, the theme became one of the key components of Czech debates concerning the past, its neighbours and own identity within the integrating Europe.

The discussion after 1989 was shaped to a large extent by an article, which appeared ten

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1 The term Subcarpathia is used in the text to translate two Czech terms: *Podkarpatsko* and *Podkarpatská Rus* (Subcarpathian Russia).

years previously in the exile magazine *Svědectví* (Testimony). It was written in New York by Ivo Ducháček, then recently retired lecturer in political science. He returns to the last months of the Second World War when he served in the London Czechoslovak Government in Exile as a Director of the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He published a commented collection of despatches, which he received in London on the break of 1944 and 1945 from an undercover broadcasting station in Subcarpathia. In the dispatches, the Czechoslovak officials in the rear of the Soviet Army described the thorough state-controlled organisation of "spontaneous expressions" of local populace who allegedly called for unification with the Soviet Ukraine. Consequently, at the end of January 1945 Stalin informed Beneš that he had to amend his earlier statement, in which he recognised Czechoslovakia within its pre-Munich borders. The Soviet–Czechoslovak Treaty *de iure* confirming the *de facto* annexation of Transcarpathia was signed in June 1945 and was smoothly ratified by the provisional Czechoslovak Parliament six months later. After his return from London exile, Ivo Ducháček, eyewitness to these events became an important member of the parliament. He commented the ratification of the Treaty, by saying: "The Chairman of the Peoples Party Jan Šrámek approved of the constitutional law on secession of Subcarpathia on quite specific grounds. He told the author: 'It is better for the constitutional law to be adopted now by the un-elected provisional parliament, than if it were to be done by the next, elected legislature. The whole thing is null and void, because the unelected, nominated National Assembly has no right to change the Constitution.'"[2] Ducháček did not comment the opinion of the Deputy Prime Minister of the post-war government. Yet, it is possible that Ducháček, who spent his long career life on the threshold between journalism, diplomacy, academia and intelligence, was well aware of what he was doing when he wrote, what he did.

Society of Friends of Subcarpathia

After the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe the Czech press dwelled for months about the past, to a hitherto and since unheard of extent. Free public discourse in the Czech Lands had ended in 1938. Since then substantial developments occurred that required discussion. The weekly *Reportér* published an article entitled Subcarpathian Question Marks. It drew from extensive knowledge of the subject and concluded with a rhetoric statement suggesting that the annexation of Transcarpathia in 1945 was carried out illegally: "What are we going to do with this heritage of Stalinism?"[3] The attached list of references also contained Ducháček's text from *Svědectví* and other hard-to-obtain exile publications. The article was signed by a pen name Jan Skotarský. It was used by

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2 DUCHÁČEK, Ivo: Jak Rudá armáda mapovala střední Evropu: Těšínsko a Podkarpatsko, in: *Svědectví*, 1981, 63, 541–581, quote on the page 575. The argument about invalidity of the annexation of Subcarpathia by the Soviet Union appeared repeatedly in the debates of part of the post-war political exile. The Government in Exile, the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, issued a special declaration about this issue. But it had no impact because of the general weakness of the Czech and Slovak exile institutions. Moreover, they failed to integrate the exile Subcarpathian associations, which since the late 1940s in Western Europe and especially Northern America operated independently. See RAŠKA, Francis D.: *Fighting Communism from Afar: The Council of Free Czechoslovakia*, Boulder 2008.

3 SKOTARSKÝ, Jan: Podkarpatské otazníky, in: *Reportér*, 1990, 5, 13, 18–22, quote from p. 22.

the young Vladimír Kuštek who was then junior official of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was linked to the issue through personal ties. From then on, without official authorisation, he kept launching his own initiatives until his diplomatic appointment on behalf of Slovakia.[4]

The author of the second text was well known. The article Freedom is Indivisible published in the weekly *Tvorba* was written by Jaromír Hořec, an established cultural figure. Man with multifaceted interests was continuously present in public life as poet, editor, journalist, author of lyrics and historical studies since 1945. In his article he argues that the secession of the region to the Soviet Union is to be considered void: "In any future negotiations about the new identity of Central Europe, Subcarpathia needs to be considered part of Czechoslovakia, whose borders should return to the state of the period 1918–1937." He supported his argument by saying that Czechoslovakia had a moral duty towards its former citizens whom it had transferred to Soviet Ukraine. An argument emerged suggesting that Czechoslovakia should get involved in Transcarpathia in order to support the national movement of Ruthenians. According to Hořec, the people of Transcarpathia were Ruthenians who underwent Sovietisation and Ukrainisation after 1945. The Ruthenian national movement fared best in the inter-war Czechoslovakia, which was to be the case in the future as well. "The right to freedom does not belong only to the outspoken nations and those who can struggle for their freedom, but also to those who live within totalitarian dictatorship, were prosecuted and intimidated in the past to such an extent that they were practically silenced. The freedom of Central Europe belongs to all the nations who lived here for centuries and created cultural heritage of permanent value. It is not only for some nations. It is indivisible," wrote Hořec.[5]

The article came as a wakeup call.[6] Preparation committee was promptly set up around Hořec and at the end of October 1990, the first general assembly of the new Society of Friends of Subcarpathia with over two hundred people met in the Prague-based cinema Kyjev.[7] It adopted a founding declaration that referred to the interwar Czechoslovakia as an "island of freedom and democracy". In another part it refers to it as the country "dedicated to the thoughts of humanistic democracy", which became common home to three nations – the Czechs, Slovaks and Subcarpathian Ruthenians. According to the declaration, the people of Subcarpathia were still "loyal to the democratic legacy of the Czechoslovak Republic". The goal of the new Society was to "lend a friendly hand" and "assist them in returning to Europe." There was only a single specific demand addressed to Czechoslovak authorities: "We ask that the Ruthenian nationality should be officially

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recognised in our Republic and listed in the census forms in the next general census."[8] This request concerned primarily the region at the Slovak – Polish – Ukrainian border in Eastern Slovakia, with a community of approximately forty-thousand, which, in the late 1940s, the Czechoslovak authorities declared to be Ukrainian as a whole.[9]

From the outset the new Society aimed to fulfil two different roles. It became a minority organisation of Ruthenians and, at the same, it united the Czechs which were interested in the region and supported the Ruthenian movement. Most of them, including Jaromír Hořec, the leading figure of the Society were descendants of Czech officials based in in the eastern province during the two inter-war decades.[10]

The general assembly of the Society elected Alexandr Veličko as its Chairman. He was a former officer in the Czechoslovak Army, who became well-known for walking into Soviet Embassy after the 1968 Soviet-led invasion, to return military decorations earned for courage during the Second World War. The nature of the Society as a Ruthenian minority organisation was enhanced by the presence of delegates from the newly founded Ruthenian organisations in Eastern Slovakia and from Transcarpathia. In the following year, the local group was joined by Ruthenian societies in Northern America, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. In March 1991 the first world congress of Ruthenians was in the city of Medzilaborce in Eastern Slovakia. In common declaration, the congress called for "self-determination and dignified life of our nation, densely populating the East-Carpathian region, as well as living in diaspora world-wide." It called upon the governments of the countries with a portion of population identifying as Ruthenians to recognise the sovereignty (*svébytnost*) of Ruthenia and enable its free development. The congress addressed particularly the Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine that had not yet recognised the Ruthenians as an independent nation and considered them to be Ukrainians. The declaration envisioned further development of the Ruthenian movement in open-ended way: "The Ruthenian nation, too, wants to pursue its own path and decide independently about its own fate within the family of free nations in the international community."[11]

8 Prohlášení Společnosti přátel Podkarpatské Rusi. In: *Podkarpatská Rus*, 1/[1990?], without date, unpaginated.

9 For the demographic development see the samizdat (illegally self-published) 1980s polemics, HÜBEL, Milan: *Češi, Slováci a jejich sousedé. Úvahy, studie a polemiky z let 1979-1989,* Prague 1990, 133–135. In the 1991 Census nearly half of this East-Slovak community identified with Ruthenian nationality and this option became even more popular in the future on the expense of the Ukrainian identity. See Kdo žije v ČSFR, in: *Rudé právo*, 1992, 24 November, 3.

10 As a matter of fact, this strange symbiosis renewed the state of affairs of the 1930s. After years of confused attempts at drafting a nationality policy in Subcarpathia, in the 1930s the Czechoslovak state started to support more systematically the Ruthenian movement, which in the interwar years had been one of the three competing national movements in the region. For the government in Prague, this was a choice of lesser evil. The Great Russian orientation (according to this concept, there were no Ruthenians nor Ukrainians, but only Russians using Russian western dialect) gradually weakened, though due to the support of influential Russophile part of Czech elite and efforts of the Russian exile it remained a viable alternative approximately two decades longer than on the other side of the Carpathian Mountains in the Polish Galicia. In the 1930s the Czech public saw the growing Ukrainian movement as a threat because of its politically dangerous patrons: the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Given the choice, the support of Ruthenian autonomy seemed the best option. There was an additional benefit for the Czech society, which in the overwhelming majority had no personal experience with Subcarpathia that it could imagine its own state as a democratic oasis of three peaceful nations without external links, threatened by aggressors from all sides. The activists of the newly established Society took this concept for granted and embarked in their declaration of autumn 1990 upon a mission to return it back to the public life.

11 Prohlášení I. Světového kongresu Rusínů, Medzilaborce, in: *Podkarpatská Rus*, 1991, 2, 24 March, 3.

Since the autumn of 1990, the argumentation of the Society was spreading in the Czech public sphere in dozens of articles in the influential nation-wide press. It also started to penetrate political speeches of opposition politicians of various political streams. This was helped by the context of Czech politics that focused on the Czech–Slovak talks about the new shape of the common state and the new treaty with the unified Germany, the themes that explored in detail political, ethnic and legal development in the previous eight decades. The debates were further fuelled by the news about the looming disintegration of the Soviet Union and by Czech public sympathies for the effort in the Baltic states to gain independence. The issue reached the Czech parliament for the first time in November 1990. Member of Parliament Pavel Balcárek from the Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Party for Moravia and Silesia (Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii–Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko) used the Ruthenian issue as one of the supporting arguments for his demand for transformation of the federation of Czech and Slovak Republics into confederation. He argued that such constitutional arrangement would facilitate unification with Transcarathia in the future: "The proposed confederative arrangement of the Republic ... will be – as I and the others believe – even more pressing in the coming year, should there arise problems for our common state resulting, for instance, from the demands that arose in Eastern Europe, i.e. demands of the people of Subcarpathia for re-unification with our common Republic, from which this country was never separated *de iure*."[12] The quote demonstrates how quickly the idea spread within the Czech public that, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the people of Transcarpathia would call for unification with Czechoslovakia.[13]

In addition to the Moravian autonomists, it was the non-parliamentary Coalition for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa) that systematically exploited the issue. Its founder and leader Miroslav Sládek systematically gathered all the demands, which the governments had been unable to respond to and brought them to an extreme. The issue of Transcarpathia appeared in his repertoire early on and became a permanent feature in his agenda. As early as in September 1990 Sládek made the first of his many trips to Transcarpathia and he raised the Czechoslovak flag at the Mukachevo castle.[14] He took part in the foundation of sister political party in Transcarpathia and submitted an appeal to the International Tribunal in the Hague. The way Miroslav Sládek spoke about the past of Subcarpathia, did not differ at all from the notions of Jaromír Hořec and other activists from his association, except that Sládek harsly criticised the government for its in action in this issue.[15]

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12   Česká národní rada [Czech National Council] 1990–1992, the 9th session, 29 November 1990, online: http://www.psp.cz/eknih.

13   A portion of Moravian and Bohemian public dreamed about a federal state composed of federal lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia – ideally also with Subcarpathian Russia. The concept proved utterly unacceptable to Slovakia as it would thus have degraded it from at least formal co-ruler within the federation into a region of lesser significance.

14   See study of Petr Roubal in: GJURIČOVÁ, Adéla – KOPEČEK, Michal – ROUBAL, Petr – SUK, Jiří – ZAHRADNÍČEK, Tomáš: *Rozděleni minulostí. Vytváření politických identit v České republice po roce 1989*, Prague 2011, 338.

15   SLÁDEK, Miroslav: Návrat do Evropy. Podkarpatská Rus, in: *Republika*, 4 February 1991: "The relation of the Ruthenians to the neighbouring nations is given by the bitter experience of the national oppression, which now culminates in the effort to remake the Ruthenians into Ukrainians and wipe out their language as well. The local

After the Moscow Coup

The Ruthenian issue reached the main stream of Czech politics in the summer and autumn of 1991 in connection with the Moscow Coup and the subsequent process of Ukrainian break up from the Soviet Union. The split of the ruling Civic Forum (Občanské fórum) into two parties – the Civic Movement (Občanské hnutí, CM) and Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, CDP), and their mutual rivalry also played an important role. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Jiří Dienstbier, the leader of the Civic Movement, came increasingly under pressure from the Civic Democratic Party of Václav Klaus, which was joined by majority of the former Civic Forum members of the Federal Assembly. Jaroslav Suchánek, MP from CDP gave a speech in the heated debate at Foreign Committee of the Federal Assembly that was held immediately after the return of Mikhail Gorbachev from house arrest. Suchánek presented a list of nine demands outlining how Czechoslovakia should respond to the new situation. The third demand suggested that Czechoslovakia should express its commitment that "regardless of which state Transcarpathian Russia (*sic*) decides to join, our doors are open to it."[16]

The most extensive debate on the issue in the Federal Assembly took place on 5 December 1991 during the discussion about foreign policy report presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The belief in of utter success of the Ukrainian independence referendum was so strong, that the issue of Transcarpathia became the second most often mentioned concrete issue concerning Czechoslovak foreign policy, right after the Czechoslovak – German Treaty. The urgency of the matter was further stressed by a short article published the same day, in which a representative of the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians from Uzhgorod estimated that "if a referendum in Transcarpathia about joining Czechoslovakia was to take place, 60% of the people would vote in support."[17] Two influential deputies, Josef Lux, the Chairman of the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (Křesťansko demokratická strana - Československá strana lidová) and Karol Stomme from Civic Democratic Party, tabled parliamentary resolution binding the government to act on the issue of Transcarpathia before it recognised the independent Ukraine.[18] The Parliament did not adopt these proposals, but the discussion caused that, for several next weeks, Transcarpathia was the focus of Czech political debates. it was discussed twice in the most popular televised political debates, the pressure on the government was stepped up by the press and declarations by various associations, such as the veteran Union of Freedom Fighters or the former government in exile, The Council of Free Czechoslovakia.

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inhabitants, however, have exceptional relationship to Czechs. The older generation remembers the period of the First Republic as the time of the greatest development of Subcarpathia. ... The entire Europe is in turmoil. It is therefore even more striking fact, that the parliament, government and even president of Czechoslovak Republic is not concerned with the fate of Subcarpathia."

16 Klaus požaduje čistky, in: *Rudé právo*, 1991, 24 August, 1. At the time the Civic Democratic Party didn't yet have its own set foreign policy concept and the MPs who identified with the party, were free to subject it to criticism, something that was not binding for the future. After the disintegration of Czechoslovakia Mr Suchánek, MP was appointed the Czech Ambassador in Australia.

17 Postoj Ukrajiny ke svazové smlouvě, in: *Rudé právo,* 1991, 5 December, 15.

18 Federální shromáždění České a Slovenské Federativní Republiky [Federal Assembly of The Czech and Slovak Federative Republic] 1990–1992, the 19th session, 5 December 1991, online: http://www.psp.cz/eknih.

Foreign Minister Dienstbier and his supporters defended their positions. The official reply stated that borders in Europe couldn't be changed. It was only possible to limit their significance and negotiate different forms of cross-border cooperation. In his later memoirs, Dienstbier recalled that he had considered the entire issue to be *de facto* a part of the Czech debate about the past that concerned far more Prague and Czech sentiments than Transcarpathia and the will of its peoples. He commented on his reservations: "I wanted to point that that, so far the attachment was only supported by an active group in Prague that presented the issue on daily basis."[19] The government spokesmen and the friendly press called these calls amateurish, unrealistic and irresponsible and manage to maintain their line till the election in June 1992.

The election meant a disaster for Dienstbier's Civic Movement: despite the hundred of ministers and deputies, sympathies among the media and the support by President Václav Havel it did not manage to cross the five percent threshold to enter the parliament.[20] The election winners were Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Lands and Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutí za demokratické Slovensko) led by Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia, which meant that the destiny of Czechoslovakia was doomed. At the same time, there was a shift in the CDP foreign policy agenda. The former spokesperson resigned and the new policy, represented by the future long-term Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, was presented. The policy that was in line with majority public opinion, understood the split with Slovakia as a permanent retreat of Czech political interests from the East.

The political change coincided with a shift in the Czech media. Responding to the debate, all key press sent, for the first time, in the summer of 1992 their reporters to Transcarpathia to cover its state after nearly half a century of Soviet rule. The result, if we can sum up the general tone of some twenty reports in the main Czech newspapers and journals, must have greatly disappointed enthusiastic supporters of the re-engagement in the East. "When we came to Subcarpathia, our goal was clear. We wanted to find those who speak Czech, find out how many of them they are and how they remember Czechoslovakia," a journalist of the daily *Prostor* described the typical motivation of the Czech press.[21] Yet the series of his reports, published in June 1992 eventually spoke about something altogether different. They were about the troubles at the border, misuse of power by the officials, alcoholism, poverty, chaos and ethnic indifference of majority of citizens. Czech journalists were seeking strong Ruthenian national awakening and generally shared nostalgia for the interwar Czechoslovakia, to have to honestly admit that they found none of that. Every one of them met an old man, who learned Czech at school or in the army and said a few nice words about his youth and former Czechoslovakia or sang Czech anthem, but that was all. The journalists did not find any significant traces of Ruthenian national movement that would confirm the claims of local intellectuals that the country had been Ukrainised only superficially. Czech readers had to accept that any idea of re-unification was unrealistic and that it was merely backed in Transcarpathia by a handful of writers and intellectuals without any wider appeal to local public. Through the summer and autumn of 1992 the

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19 DIENSTBIER, Jiří: *Od snění k realitě. Vzpomínky z let 1989–1999,* Praha 1999, 281.

20 According to the internal documents of the Society of Friends of Subcarpathia, Jiří Dienstbier approached the Society several months after his election defeat and proposed a cooperation with its non-parliamentary party.

21 VOJTÍŠEK, Stanislav: Jasinské elegie aneb Strach má dlouhé nohy, in: *Prostor*, 1992, 17 June, 12.

Transcarpathian issue disappeared from Czech politics as quickly as it appeared in 1990. The Czechs were partly frustrated that they could not kept Slovakia. Yet, at the same time, they were pleased that the split was proceeding swiftly and without any major difficulties, what contrasted with the breakup of the other East European multinational states.

Finally, let 's look at further development of the questions that this issue opened up in Czech public after 1989. The Ruthenian movement in Transcarpathia failed. In the 2001 census (the first where local population could identify its ethnicity) only ten thousand out of 1.5 million citizens identified as Ruthenians of the region; the overwhelming majority opted for Ukrainian ethnicity. On the Slovak border, a reversed process took place and majority of the local minority considered themselves Ruthenians, not Ukrainians. So far, there has not been any interest in research into the region and its history during the interwar Czechoslovakia. A translation from Slovak of the monograph by Prešov-based historian Peter Švorc published in 2007 is the first study in Czech to critically explore the Czech administration, document the actual difficulties and note the frustration of the contemporary residents in the region, is.[22]

The theme virtually disappeared from political life. Except that the Coalition for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia led by Miroslav Sládek maintained the unification with Transcarpathia in their agenda.[23] Referring to the example of the United States and Alaska, the it argued that there didn't have to be physical proximity with the former province for the two to be united. The positive attitude on the part of the Czech public to Transcarpathia did not disappear: it is manifested every summer, when Transcarpathia becomes highly popular Czech tourist destination. Such sentimental tourism represents a substantial part of local economy in some remote mountain villages, made famous by Czech interwar writers. Within the context of the current revival of ethno-religious sentiments in Central and Eastern Europe, largely fuelled by Russian geopolitical revisionism, sentimental historic memory is but one of many manifestations of these developments that that deserve further study.

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22 ŠVORC, Peter: *Zakletá zem: Podkarpatská Rus 1918–1946*, Prague 2007. The book first appeared in Slovakia in 1997.

23 The party was in the Czech parliament between 1992 and 1998.

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Language Policy and National Feeling in Context Ukraine's Euromaidan, 2014–2016

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Abstract

Ukraine is the best example of "nationalizing" nationalism. During its twenty-five year old existence the language question – in addition to historical approach and ethnical identity – has belonged to the unclosed questions of personal and group identity, and represents one of the central themes of political struggle. Official Ukrainian language policy permanently wants to promote the use of Ukrainian or Russian by overshadowing one or the other. Measures regulating language use have never been consequently applied, which fact in itself is enough to represent a permanent subject for political campaigns. Political powers unable to solve actual economic and social problems wanted to distract attention by this means. That is why the politicized language question could contribute to the political crisis and the outbreak of the armed conflict at the end of 2013 and at the beginning of 2014 in a politically unstable country facing economic breakdown. The present paper examines the role of the language question in the Ukrainian crisis in the period of 2014–2016.

Keywords

Ukraine, Euromaidan, crisis, national identity, language policy

The word "crisis" is used to define situations, when the life (or functioning) of an individual, a community, a company or a state is threatened by a serious turmoil or difficult situation which decisively influences the present as well as the future.[1] In the brief history of Ukraine which gained its independence 25 years ago in 1991, the country had to face numerous crises. Constitutional, political, economical, demographical crises are closely linked to the history of the state. At the turn of 2013–2014 such crisis evolved in Ukraine that it outgrew its borders. Ukraine lost control over more than 11 % of its area (The area of Ukraine is 603,500 km^2; the area of the Crimea is cca. 27 thousand km^2 and armed conflict territory in the Donbass region is cca. 42 thousand km^2.) The annexation of the Crimea, the eastern Ukrainian armed conflict endangers the balance of the world's security policy, now the political and economic sanctions against Russia and the responding opposing sanctions are obstructing the growth of world economy.[2] Some analysts do not only talk about different

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1 Online: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/crisis (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

2 MARIONI, Max: The cost of Russian sanctions on Western economies, in: *BOW Group Research Paper: The Sa-*

crises in the case of Ukraine, but use an overall term: "Ukrainian crisis". Sakwa describes the events in spring 2014 as the amount of two enormous crises, according to him "a common European and a Ukrainian crisis has led to this destructive consequence".[3] Thus the exact definition of the eastern Ukrainian armed conflict still has not happened yet the war is often euphemistically called "Ukrainian crisis" by the analysts.[4]

The ethno-linguistic composition and language orientation of the regions with various historic backgrounds (e.g. Donbas, Crimea, Galicia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia) greatly differed already before Ukraine's independence. The initial euphoria, however, concealed these differences. Having become independent, Ukraine faced a major problem: "What will the new identity be based on?"

The particular characteristics of the geopolitical and geographical position of Ukraine, the variable political, historical, economic, cultural and social development of the regions of its territory inherited from the Soviet Union, the ethnic and linguistic composition of its population, and the fact that the representatives of the titular nations of all neighboring states are among its citizens all turn issues of language into matters of internal and foreign policy as well as of security policy in this country. The military conflict (hybrid war) currently underway is also indicative of this. According to Grin language policy is a systematic, rational and scientific activity which aims at changing the linguistic environment in order to increase well-being.[5] Taking into account this statement, one can be certain that Ukrainian language policy is doomed to failure. Following the demand set by Grin's definition has proven to be very challenging task in the case of Ukraine.

Typology of the Crises

In its brief history Ukraine had to face numerous crises. Constitutional, political, economic, demographical crises are closely linked to the history of the state.

- Economic crisis. When the Soviet Union was near to collapse, it was obvious that – as for economic, military and demographic importance – Ukraine would be the second most significant successor state preceded only by Russia. However, besides Kyrgyzstan Ukraine is the only post-soviet country that has not reached its last GDP as a member of the Soviet Union yet. In 2009 Ukrainian GDP was still not more than 63.3 % of the GDP of 1990, the last full Soviet year.[6] The Ukrainian conflict, that has now been lasting

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nctions on Russia, August 2015, 16–31.; online: http://data.worldbank.org/country/russian-federation?view=chart (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

3   See SAKWA, Richard: *Frontline of Ukraine: Crisis is the Borderlands*, I.B. Tauris 2014.

4   LARUELLE, Marlene:The Ukrainian Crisis and its Impact on Transforming Russian Nationalism Landscape, in: *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*, WILCZEWSKA, Agnieszka P. – SAKWA, Richard (Eds.), E-IR Info 2015, 123–128.; RUTLAND, Peter: An Unnecessary War: The Geopolitical Roots of the Ukraine Crisis, in: *E-International Relations*, 2015, online: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/09/an-unnecessary-war-the-geopolitical-roots-of-the-ukraine-crisis/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017); KISSINGER, Henry: To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at The End, in: *The Washington Post*, 5 March 2014, online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-startat-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

5   GRIN, François: *Language Policy Evaluation and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*, Palgrave Macmillan 2003, 30.

6   SHUL'GA, Nikolaj: *Дрейф на обочину. Двадцать лет общественных изменений в Украине [Drejf na obočinu. Dva-*

for two years (due to the sanctions and opposing sanctions) is obstructing the economic growth that could be barely reconstructed after the 2008 economic crisis, not only in Ukraine but all over the world. Ukrainian GDP significantly reduced in 2014 and 2015, the country lost 21 % of its industrial capacity.[7]

- Constitutional crisis. Through 5 years until 1996 the country functioned based on the scant constitution of Soviet-Ukraine, and the Constitution that was accepted after numerous political struggles has been rewritten several times since then. Up to 2014 the most important modifications reflected the polemics on presidential power. After the second Maidan one of the basic promises of the new ruling power was decentralization – this way trying to solve the Donbass conflict as well.[8] Up to now three international documents were signed to solve the situation: the Minsk 1[9] and the Minsk Memorandum[10] in 2014, and the Minsk 2 Agreement in 2015.[11] The most important issue of the Minsk 2 Agreement was the "constitutional reform" to be performed by the end of 2015, granting decentralization, the representatives of the Donbass separatists should be involved. The draft on the issue of decentralization was made ready, but on August 31, 2015 the crowd protesting against its acceptance in front of the parliament began rioting, which forced the parliament to adjourn the modification of the law without date.[12]

- Political crises. The poor economic state, constitutional problems were the reasons and also consequences of internal political crises. The best verification of these crises is the fact that during the 25-year existence of the state, it had to face the emptying of the institution of the referendum, several early elections (head of state in 1994 and in 2014, parliamentary elections in 1994, 2007 and 2014), and two revolutions (the Orange revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014).[13]

- Demographic crisis. During the 1989 census (still as a member of the Soviet Union) the population of the Ukrainian SSR was 51.45 million people. The highest number was 52.2 million inhabitants in 1993. During the 2001 census which was the first but also the last census of the independent Ukraine this number decreased to 48.24 million, in 2013 it was about 45 million, while in early 2016 the officially estimated number

dcat' let obščestvennych izменěnij v Ukraině], Kiev 2011, 441.

7   Online: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/gdp (Dowloaded 22 April 2017).

8   MARLIN, Marguerite: Concepts of "Decentralization" and "Federalization" in Ukraine: Political Signifiers or Distinct Constitutionalist Approaches for Devolutionary Federalism?, in: _Nationalism and Ethnic Politics_, 22, 2016, 3, 278–299.

9   _Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group_, signed in Minsk, 5 September 2014, online: http://www.osce.org/home/123257 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

10   _Memorandum of 19 September 2014 outlining the parameters for the implementation of commitments of the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014_, online: http://www.osce.org/home/123806 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

11   _UN Security Council resolution 2202_ (2015), 12 February 2015, online: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/ %7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9 %7D/s_res_2202.pdf (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

12   ASH, Timothy: Ukraine's constitutional reform conundrum, in: _KyivPost_, 25 January 2016, online: https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/timothy-ash-ukraines-constitutional-reform-conundrum-406630.html (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

13   See _Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilisation, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine,_ D'ANIERI, Paul (Ed.), 2011; MARPLES, David R: _Ukraine in Conflict. An Analytical Chronicle,_ Bristol 2017.

was a bit above 42 million (Crimean and eastern regions included).[14] The annexed Crimea inhabited by 2.3 million people, and approximately 5 million individuals have been directly affected by the conflict in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions). Nearly 2 million people left the Donbass region, about half of them chose other Ukrainian regions, the others immigrated to other countries.[15] In 2012 1.4 million Ukrainian citizens were living permanently or temporarily in Russia, out of them 1.3 million were employed, which meant 11 % of all employed foreigners. From April 2014 up to March 2015 another 2.5 million newcomers increased their number.[16] With consideration to the war, Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece and Hungary have been assisting their linguistic minorities in relocating. In 2010, long before the eastern Ukrainian armed conflict, according to UN estimates the population of the country will decrease to 35.02 million people.[17]

- Humanitarian crisis. The armed conflict which broke out in 2014 required thousands of lives, many thousands were injured, hundreds of thousands lost their job, their house, asset, and were forced to leave their homes and move abroad or to another region as refugees. The category of the so called Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) became introduced in Ukraine – due to people forced to relocate from the Crimea and the eastern war zone and "inland refugees". In March 2016 the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine recorded cca. 1.8 million IDP-s.[18]

Nation and Language

Kulyk sees the language an important marker of Ukrainian identity which, due to a lack of independent statehood, has been ethnic rather than civic. The contradictory policies of the Soviet regime produced a large discrepancy between ethnocultural identity and language use. In the independent Ukraine this discrepancy persisted, as increased identification with the Ukrainian nation was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in the use of the Ukrainian language.[19]

One of the basic objectives of the emerging pursuit of independence in the Soviet Empire was to make the national languages – giving the names of the republics – state languages. In 1988–1990 the supreme councils (parliaments) of the federal republics passed their language laws, which legally decided their national languages as state languages. Lan-

14 *State Statistics Service of Ukraine*, online: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

15 *Понад два мільйони людей втекли з Донбасу за рік – ООН [Ponad dva mil'joni ljuděj vtěkli z Donbasu za rik – OON]*, 3 May 2015, online: http://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news/26969151.html (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

16 WEIR, Fred: Ukrainian refugees in Russia: Did Moscow fumble a valuable resource?, in: *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1 December 2015, online: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/1201/Ukrainian-refugees-in-Russia-Did-Moscow-fumble-a-valuable-resource (Dowloaded 22 April 2017).

17 CSETE, Örs – PAPP Z., Attila – SETÉNYI, János: Kárpát-medencei magyar oktatás az ezredfordulón, in: *Határon túli magyarság a 21. században*, BITSKEY, Botond (Ed.), Budapest 2010, 126–127.

18 *Ukrinform: Ukraine's Ministry of Social Policy reports nearly 1.8 million internally displaced persons*, 31 May 2016, online: https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/ukrinform-ukraines-ministry-of-social-policy-reports-nearly-18-million-internally-displaced-persons-415034.html (Dowloaded 22 April 2017).

19 KULYK, Volodymyr: Language and identity in Ukraine after Euromaidan, in: *Thesis Eleven*, 136, 2016, 1, 90–106.

guage laws were soon followed by declarations of independence. This way the question of language got the focus of struggle for political independence and national identity.[20] In Ukraine bearing the features of both bilingualism and multilingualism the struggle has still been fierce in the recent twenty-five years.

In Ukraine the number of persons considering themselves Ukrainian nationals (nearly 78 %) is much higher than those who consider the Ukrainian state language their mother tongue/first language (less than 68 %). The number of citizens considering Russian as their mother tongue/first language (nearly 30 %) is much higher than those who consider themselves Russian nationals (17.3 %). Nearly quarter (22.18 %) of the total population consider themselves belonging to national minorities. However, practically every third person (32.47 %) belongs to one or another linguistic minority from a linguistic point of view, as Ukrainian and Russian speakers represent 97.12 % of the total Ukrainian population. National minorities preserving their mother tongues – Bulgarians, Rumanians, Moldovans, Hungarians and the Gagauz – live mainly in blocks, usually in peripheral regions of Ukraine (Transcarpathia, Northern Bukovina, Southern Bessarabia), which were joined to the Soviet Union due to border changes following the second world war. There are altogether four languages – Russian, Crimean Tatar, Rumanian and Hungarian – whose speakers represent more than 10 % of the population of the given region.[21]

Similar to several other soviet republics, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic passed the law on the languages of the Ukrainian SSR – one of the first laws pursuing independence – as early as in October 1989.[22] According to this law Ukrainian is the state language (2nd Article), Ukrainian and Russian are the languages for international communication (4th Article), and the use of minority languages is free choice at offices and in education (3rd, 10th, 11th, 12th, 18th, 19th, 27th, 28th, 29th Articles).

However, negative trends concerning language politics could be seen soon after the successful independence referendum (December 1, 1991) and the international recognition of Ukraine as an independent state. Concerning linguistic rights, the 1992 law on national minorities[23] strengthened the already existing rights to mother tongue education, at the same time the possibility of official language use still depended on the majority of the given national minority inside the given administrative unit (8th Article).

The acceptance of The Ukrainian Constitution in June 1996 did not brought essential changes concerning the codification of linguistic rights – except for the limitation of the

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20 JAVORSKAJA, Galyna: Языковые конфликты и языковые идеологии в Молдове (на материале анализа фокус-групп) [Jazykovye konflikty i jazykovye iděologii v Moldove (na matěriale analiza fokus-grupp)], in: *Studia Linguistika*, 2011, 5, 350–351.

21 Online: http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017); CSERNICS-KÓ, István – FERENC, Viktória: Transitions in the language policy of Ukraine (1989–2014), in: *Sociolinguistic Transition in Former Eastern Bloc Countries: Two Decades after the Regime Change*, SLOBODA Marian – LAIHO-NEN, Petteri – ZABRODSKAJA, Anastassia (Eds.), Frankfurt am Main 2016, 350–353.

22 *Закон Української Радянської Соціалістичної Республіки «Про мови в Українській РСР», № 8312-XI, від 28.10.1989* [*Zakon Ukrayins'koyi Radjans'koyi Socialističnoyi Respubliki «Pro movi v Ukrayins'kij RSR», № 8312-ChI, vid 28.10.1989*], online: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/8312-11 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

23 *Закон України «Про національні меншини в Україні», № 2494-XII, від 25.06.1992* [*Zakon Ukrayini «Pro nacional'ni menšini v Ukrayini», № 2494-ChII, vid 25.06.1992*], online: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2494-12 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

possibilities of Russian: it was no longer defined as the language of international communication – Russian became not more than one of the national minority languages. Those struggling for exclusive Ukrainian monolingualism considered it their victory, while those fighting for the acceptance of Russian as the second official language or a nationally accepted auxiliary language considered it was their defeat.

Ukraine joined the Council of Europe in 1996, but it did not bring about changes concerning the use of mother tongue. The process of the Ukrainian ratification of The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was complicated, the obligations of the standard text prescribe less than language rights already existing in Ukraine, do not support national minorities willing to preserve their existing positions, while their rights may be curtailed with reference to the Charter.[24]

After the millennium several laws and other lower rank measures were passed which had negative influence on non-state-language speakers. The 2001 year amendment of the law on parliamentary elections did no longer include the possibility of making ballots available in minority languages. In this period language use regulations were generally amended in favour of the Ukrainian language in several fields. Previously the prescriptions defining the language of the creation, announcement, application etc. of the documents of the different measures (concerning tax, finance, insurance, medicine, elections, food quality, etc.) fell within the competence of the language law, after 2000 each legal rule ordained the exclusive use of the state language. This trend became even stronger after the Orange revolution. Some examples of linguistic equality and inequality from the period: extra duty was imposed on non-Ukrainian publications; from 2008 only Ukrainian language broadcasters could apply for the operation of radio and TV channels; cinemas were allowed to show only Ukrainian-speaking, synchronized or subtitled films.

Education reform should also be mentioned here, as the possibilities of mother-tongue education became limited. Advanced maturity exams – which meant the entrance examinations to higher education as well – had to be taken at independent regional examination centres, in test-system and only in Ukrainian. In addition the Ukrainian language and literature exam became compulsory, the questions of the tests were compiled according to the education program of Ukrainian language schools.[25]

The politically prejudicial situation of minorities was changed by the new language law – "On the principles of the state language policy" – passed in 2012.[26] The 2012 language law broke off with the declarative framework regulation – traditional in post-soviet regions. Following the spirituality and text of the Language Charter it defined exact rules and cri-

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24 ALEKSEEV, Vladimir: Бегом от Европы? Кто и как противодействует в Украине реализации Европейской хартии региональных языков или языков меньшинств [Begom ot Jevropy? Kto i kak protivodějstvujet v Ukraině realizacii Jevropejskoj chartii regional›nych jazykov ili jazykov men›šinstv], Charkov 2008; CSERNICSKÓ, István: The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages by Ukraine, in: *Acta Academiae Beregsasiensis*, 2013, 2, 127–145.

25 CSERNICSKÓ, István – FERENC, Viktória: Education as an ideal means of achieveing a nation state in Ukraine, in: *Concepts & Consequences of Multilingualism in Europe,* RÓKA, Jolán (Ed.), Budapest 2010, 329–349.

26 Закон України «Про засади державної мовної політики», № 5029-VI, від 03.07.2012 [Zakon Ukrayini «Pro zasadi děržavnoyi movnoyi politiki», № 5029-VI, vid 03.07.2012], online: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17 (Downloaded 22 April 2017); CSERNICSKÓ, István: Language Policy in Ukraine: The Burdens of the Past and the Possibilities of the Future, in: *Future Research Directions for Applied Linguistics,* PFENNINGER, Simone E. – NAVRACSICS, Judit (Eds.), Bristol 2017, 120–148.

teria for the addressees of the rights, the concerned geographical areas, the conditions of the use and mechanism of the standard rules and the duties of the executive powers. The law contains among others the exact and clear definition of the language of national minorities (1st article) and the list of (altogether 18) languages considered regional or minority languages in Ukraine – including Rusyn, which is officially not recognized as an independent language. The listed languages are: Russian, Belarussian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Crimean Tatar, Moldovian, German, Modern Greek, Polish, Roma, Romanian, Slovak, Hungarian, Rusyn, Karaim, Krymchak. According to the law the use of the above regional languages is compulsory or possible in case the number of the speakers of the given language is at least 10 % of the inhabitants in the given administrative unit (7th article, 3rd §).[27]

Expert opinions protesting against the 2012 language law fear the "Byelorussian way." In the neighbouring country (Byelorussia) actually less than 5 % of the population use the Byelorussian language, which threatens not only the language but also the existence of the Byelorussian nation. "Mother-tongueness" and "language use" should be differentiated, in this respect the European Language Charter – when protecting Russian in Ukraine – supports a language used also by persons identifying themselves as Ukrainian – a great number of these people exclusively use Russian. This situation threatens the Ukrainian language and the existence of the Ukrainian nation. The threat is strengthened by the fact that the law was introduced by representatives of Russian cultural circles.[28] Positioning regional languages makes it unnecessary to learn Ukrainian, which is even more possible as a great number of the population do not speak the state language, and the situation is not likely to change under these conditions. We can see the hardly implicite "inverse" standpoint according to which minority languages threaten the state language unless it can perform its basic function.[29]

Language as a Casus Belli

In the late autumn of 2013 – before and after series of political and economic crises – riots broke out in Kyiv that claimed several lives, in March 2014 Russia annexed the Crimea, and the war which is officially called "antiterrorist operation" (ATO) has been lasting since April 2014 at the eastern edges of the country. The Ukrainian-Russian position battle and the unsettled language policy plays a key role in the obstruction of the economic growth of the narrower and wider area, threatening the safety of the whole European continent.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union millions of the members of the Russian com-

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27 CSERNICSKÓ, István – FEDINEC, Csilla: Four Language Laws of Ukraine, in: *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 23, 2016, 4, 560–582.

28 MOSER, Michael: *За теперішніх обставин офіційна «одномовність», як не парадоксально, є важливою передумовою для фактичної багатомовності країни*, 14 червня 2012 *[Za těperišnich obstavin oficijna «odnomovnist'», jak ně paradoksal'no, e važlivoju peredumovoju dlja faktičnoyi bagatomovnosti krayini*, 14 června 2012]*, online: http://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/ukrayinska-mova/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

29 VOROPAJEVA, Tetjana: Мова, ідентичність і толерантність в контексті імплементації Європейської Хартії регіональних мов або мов меншин в Україні [Mova, iděntičnist' i tolerantnist' v kontěksti implementaciyi Evropejs'koyi Chartiyi regional'nich mov abo mov menšin v Ukrayini], in: *Українознавчий альманах* [*Ukrayinoznavčij al'manach*], 9, 2012, 28–36.

munity in Ukraine have suddenly become a minority, de jure subordinate, that earlier in the Soviet empire linguistically and culturally belonged to the privileged group.[30] But de facto, these positive economic, political and cultural positions could be saved after the state change.[31] In this already problematic, tense political situation the fact that the new state organizing ethnic group (Ukrainian) claimed all the treasured positions of the Russian community is the main cause of the conflict.

The conflict between the two dominant ethnic groups broke out because of the functions of the Ukrainian and Russian language. As a result, a paradoxical situation has risen in the language situation and the judgement of the state language policy of the minorities (amongst them the loudest are Russian-speaking) are dissatisfied with their guaranteed language rights, while the majority of the elite is worried about the current status and future of the Ukrainian language.[32] Korostelina sees the struggle between languages and identities as a zero-sum game that makes compromise impossible.[33]

The political elite divided into two parts used the mobilizing force of the language in all of the parliamentary and presidential election campaigns in the history of independent Ukraine. In the country's northern and western parts the population (where mainly Ukrainian-speaking people live) were threatened by the politicians, that if Russian becomes a second state language in Ukraine it would seal the fate of an independent Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation. A significantly Russian-speaking population of the eastern and southern regions, in contrast tried to encourage voters that the status of their language, the Russian will be regularized and that it will not be superseded from everyday life by the ukrainizing political elite.

The activity around the language issue especially increased as the 2012 parliamentary elections were approaching. In 2010, only 2.43 %, and in 2011 less than 1.80 % of the political movements were related to the language situation, in 2012 this proportion rose to 10.45 %.[34]

An indicator of how interested are the politicians in keeping the language problem in the agenda is that in 2011 (when there were no elections in Ukraine) in 46 % of the movements affecting the language issue were involved parties or other political actors; in the two election years (2010 and 2012), however, this ratio was 64 % and 66 %.[35] In 2012, 92 % of the 380 political movements related to the language issue were in defense of the Ukrainian language, against raising the status of Russian language.[36]

The main cause of the language-issue-related demonstrations was the adoption of the new

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30 See HAGENDOORN, Louk – LINSSEN, Hub – TUMANOV, Sergei: *Intergroup Relations in States of the former Soviet Union: The Perception of Russians,* New York 2001.

31 BRUBAKER, Rogers: *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe,* Cambridge 1996, 17.

32 BOWRING, Bill: The Russian Language in Ukraine: Complicit in Genocide, or Victim of State-building?, in: *The Russian Language Outside the Nation,* RYAZANOVA-CLARCE, Lara (Ed.), Edingurgh 2014, 56–78.; KULYK Volodymyr: What is Russian in Ukraine? Pupular Beliefs Regarding the Social Roles of the Language, in: *The Russian Language,* 117–140.

33 KOROSTELINA, Karina V.: Mapping national identity narratives in Ukraine, in: *Nationalities Papers,* 41, 2013, 2, 313.

34 *Протести, перемоги і репресії в Україні: результати моніторингу 2012 р. [Protěsti, peremogi i represiyi v Ukrayini: rezul'tati monitoringu 2012 r.],* IŠČENKO, Volodimir (Ed.), Kiev 2013, 34.

35 Ibidem, 36.

36 Ibidem, 34.

Language Act. After being defeated in the 2004 Orange Revolution, Viktor Yanukovych won the 2010 presidential election, the President and the Party of Regions behind him – according to election promises – he intended to base language policy on the real situation. They wanted to codify the country's de facto bilingualism by raising Russian into a second state language status. The central part of their argument was that violent nationalism threatens linguistic and ethnic rights of the Russian-speaking population, it overshadows the Russian language and culture.[37] However, the right of free use of the Russian language was demanded not only in the southern and eastern regions, but also across the country, also in areas where the proportion of the Russian-speaking population is insignificant. The new power – ignoring the protest actions – began to rewrite the Constitution and the Language Act. They did not have the political power for the amendment of the Constitution: they did not get two-thirds of the votes in the Parliament. However, the 1989 language law from the Soviet times in 2012 has been replaced after scandalous and unworthy parliamentary scenes and political games.[38]

The language law had a number of opponents. The Constitutional Court was repeatedly asked to declare it unconstitutional, organizing several protests in the streets. The language issue was not reassuring. On 21 November 2013, it became apparent that the president of Ukraine – a country heading towards state bankruptcy at the time – was not going to sign the free trade agreement or the association agreement with the European Union in Vilnius. The Ukrainian government opted for the very favourable Russian loan rather than the IMF loan, which would have brought unpopular and strict austerity measures threatening its power.

On 23 November protests for Ukraine's European integration started in Kyiv.[39] The protests organized in the city's main square[40] were peaceful for a while and were called the Revolution of Dignity. On November 30 an unreasonably brutal use of force by the police propelled the lukewarm protests into a national movement. The parliamentary majority backing the president modified several laws on 16 January 2014, in order to limit people's right of assembly. This triggered the protests to escalate to uncontrolled violence which resulted in many casualties (are remembered as "Heaven's Hundred Heroes") as well. The parliament repealed the laws of January 16 on January 28,[41] and on February 22 president Yanukovych fled the country.

A quick realignment occurred in the parliament. Representing different parties than before, the same members of parliament formed a parliamentary majority which repealed the language law on 23 February 2014.[42] Russia immediately announced that it would defend

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37 BOWRING, Bill: The Russian Language, 56–78.

38 See MOSER, Michael: *Language Policy.*

39 ONUCH, Olga: EuroMaidan Protests in Ukraine: Social Media Versus Social Networks, in: *Problems of Post-Communism,* 62, 2015, 1–19.

40 Kyiv's central square is called *майдан Незалежності* (*Independence Square*) in Ukrainian, however, the locals usually refer to it as *Майдан* (Square), and it was called *Maidan* in news broadcasts, which, in turn, gave rise to the most often used name of the movement as *Euromaidan/Євромайдан.*

41 *Закон України «Про визнання такими, що втратили чинність, деяких законів України»,* №732-VII, від 28.01.2014 [*Zakon Ukrayini «Pro viznannja takimi, ščo vtratili činnist', dějakih zakoniv Ukrayini»,* №732-VII, vid 28.01.2014], online: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/732-18 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

42 *Ukraine abolishes law on languages of minorities, including Russian,* 23 February 2014, online: http://rbth. co.uk/news/2014/02/23/ukraine_abolishes_law_on_languages_of_minorities_including_russian_34486.html. The

the Russian speaking minority of Ukraine and protect it from Ukrainian nationalism. On the territory of Crimea, which was transferred in 1954 as the Crimean Autonomous Republic from the Russian Federation to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, military personnel from the Russian army ("little green men") bearing no insignia of their affiliation appeared on the same day.[43]

Russian President Vladimir Putin said the following in his speech during the ceremony regarding the annexation of the Crimea on 18 March 2014, where he called it "mainly Russian-speaking Crimea": "the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities. Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part. […] Our concerns are understandable because we are not simply close neighbours but, as I have said many times already, we are one people. […] Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means. But it should be above all in Ukraine's own interest to ensure that these people's rights and interests are fully protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine's state stability and territorial integrity".[44]

Two and a half years after the beginning of the events of Donbass and the Crimea, the Russian president stated his opinion that due to steps taken by the Ukrainian power, Russia "was forced to defend Russian-speaking population of Donbass".[45] Russia was not the only one that welcomed the abolition of the law with suspect. The Special Rapporteur of UN Stated: "Steps to Abolish the 2012 Law on the Principles of the State Language Policy, although veto, created anxiety amongst some communities, Including ethnic Russians, will hurt minority language rights in fortress."[46]

Temporarily filling the positions of both president and speaker of the parliament, Oleksandr Turchynov assessed the situation and decided, on 27 February not to sign the document that would have repealed the language law of 2012, which thus remained in force. It was too late for a decision, and the attempt of the abolition of the 2012 language law become the pretext of the newest and most serious crisis in Ukraine.

The attempt of the abolition of the language law – when a few hundred meters away from the representatives voting on this in parliament, thousands protested, gunman looked at

text of law, online: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=45291 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

43   FEDINEC, Csilla – HALÁSZ, Iván – TÓTH, Mihály: *A független Ukrajna: Államépítés, alkotmányozás és elsüllyesztett kincsek,* Budapest 2016, 105–108.

44   *Address by President of the Russian Federation*, 18 March 2014, online: Address by President of the Russian FederationAddress by President of the Russian FederationAddress by President of the Russian FederationAddress by President of the Russian Federationhttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 (Downloaded 22 April 2017)

45   Путин: Вынудили защищать русскоязычных на Донбассе [Putin: Vynudili zaščiščatʹ russkojazyčnych na Donbasse], in: *Korrespondent.net*, 12, October 2016, online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3756878-putyn-vynudyly-zaschyschat-russkoiazychnykh-na-donbasse (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

46   *Ukraine: UN Special Rapporteur urges stronger minority rights guarantees to defuse tensions.* Geneva, 16 April 2014, online: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14520 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

each other eye to eye, burned in fires – demonstrates how important and symbolic is the language issue in Ukraine.

There are differences in literature concerning the question. According to Sakwa "the language issue was one of the main causes of the conflict that erupted in the eastern part of the country".[47] Drozda sees: "The present situation in Ukraine is an example of how can a linguistic and cultural war become a precondition and official principle of a real war."[48] At the same time Osnach states: "Wherever we look, the current Russian-Ukrainian war began because of the language. It is an indisputable fact. Russia has just used the language factor as a reason for aggression – by explaining that they need to protect the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine."[49]

The Language Policy and the Recent Crisis

Instead of suddenly abolishing the language law Turchynov made a proposal to develop a new language law. He stated that the draft of the new law to be completed within a short period of time, "taking into account the existing speculations regarding the language issue". Turchynov also added that the new, balanced Language Act "will take into account the eastern and western parts of Ukraine, the interests of all ethnic groups and national minorities".[50] The new language law has still not been born, but this step served to ease the tension, as the statement that prime minister Arseniy Yatseniuk and Turchynov pledged on 18 April 2014, that the highly centralized state power will be decentralized and Russian will get a special status.[51] The parliament on 20 May voted the "Memorandum of Understanding and Peace", in relation to the languages in which says: "In parallel with the status of the Ukrainian language as a state language the Supreme Council of Ukraine guarantees the insurance of the status of Russian language. The government will also guarantee the support for the languages of national minorities in minority areas compactly."[52] However, this came too late. In April 2014 the recent domestic political developments overshadowed the case of the new language law. With the support of the Russian army an armed conflict broke out in East-Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk counties. The euphemistically called "anti-terrorist

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47 SAKWA, *Frontline of Ukraine*, 220.

48 DROZDA, Andrij: Розрубати мовний вузол. Скільки російськомовних українців готові наполягати на російськомовності своїх дітей і внуків? [Rozrubati movnij vuzol. Skil›ki rosijs›komovnich ukrayinciv gotovi napoljagati na rosijs›komovnosti svoyich ditěj i vnukiv?], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 23 November 2014, online: http://language-policy.info/2014/11/rozrubaty-movnyj-vuzol-skilky-rosijskomovnyh-ukrajintsiv-hotovi-napolyahaty-na-rosijskomovnosti-svojih-ditej-i-vnukiv/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

49 OSNACH, Sergij: Мовна складова гібридної війни [Movna skladova gibridnoyi vijni], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 13 June 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/06/serhij-osnach-movna-skladova-hibrydnoji-vijny/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

50 *Голова Верховної Ради України Олександр Турчинов доручив підготувати новий Закон України «Про мову» [Golova Verchovnoyi Radi Ukrayini Oleksandr Turčinov doručiv pidgotuvati novij Zakon Ukrayini «Pro movu»]*, 27 February 2014, online: http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/Povidomlennya/88685.html (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

51 MARUSYK, Taras: Чиїми «молитвами» закон Колесніченка–Ківалова живе й перемагає [Čiyimi «molitvami» zakon Kolesničenka–Kivalova žive j peremagae], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 16 June 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/06/taras-marusyk-chyjimy-molytvamy-zakon-kolesnichenka-kivalova-zhyve-j-peremahaje/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

52 Ibidem.

operation" – besides the country's extremely serious economic situation and unbalanced domestic politic – led to a severe crisis.

The new president continued a conciliatory approach. On 28 June 2014 Petro Poroshenko expressed his hope: "I hope – Poroshenko said in a statement on 28 June 2014 – that in the history of Ukraine the issue of language or culture will never again threaten the national unity", thereby acknowledging that the unsettled language problem is a security risk for the state. Poroshenko in his post-election speech and in his New Year's made speech gestures towards the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. At one point in his speech he switched to Russian. He also stated that one can love Ukraine in Russian as much as in Ukrainian. He added that 62 % who fought for Ukraine in the east is Russian-speaking.[53] The President was the supporter of a movement, which tried to reduce the tension in the country: the "Єдина країна – Единая страна" ("the single country" in Ukrainian and Russian) slogan was depicted on posters, billboards, leaflets, on national television, in the corner of video clips, it also has a dedicated page on the most popular social network site.[54]

This gives reason for nationalist intellectual circles to keep attacking the president.[55] One of the best known Kyiv based linguistics, Larysa Masenko stated the following in an internet portal where language related issues are discussed regularly: "The currently popular slogan '*Єдина країна – Единая страна*' is faulty: it solidifies bilingualism on a country level, that is, it strengthens Russian as a second state language. In other words, it does not unify the country but divides it. By saying '*Единая страна*' in Russian we turn to those living in the east and assert that Ukrainian, which is a special symbol of the unification of the nation, is not obligatory, even for the president, and with this we betray Ukrainians, primarily those living in the east, who are loyal to their language despite the constant pressure from the Russian speaking environment."[56] Shevchuk, a linguist teaching Ukrainian in the United States agrees: "The Ukrainian society has not only become a hostage" to the united and indivisible Russia's "imperial formula '*Єдина країна, Единая страна*' which onfirms the Russification. With its resignation and conformism they take part in destroying their own

53 Решение о лишении русского языка статуса регионального было ошибкой – Порошенко [Rešenije o lišenii russkogo jazyka statusa regional'nogo bylo ošibkoj – Porošenko], in: *Korrespondent.net*, 28, June 2014, online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3385352-reshenye-o-lyshenyy-russkoho-yazyka-statusa-rehyonalno-ho-bylo-oshybkoi-Porosenko (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

54 Єдина Країна | Единая Страна [Edina Krayina | Jedinaja Strana], online: https://vk.com/edina_ukr (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

55 OSNACH, *Мовна складова [Movna skladova]*; SHEVCHUK, Yuri – OLIYNYK, Yevhenia: Російськомовними патріотами маніпулюють – викладач Колумбійського університету [Rosijs'komovnimi manipuljujut' – vikladač Kolumbijs'kogo universitětu], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 20 June 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/06/rosijskomovnymy-patriotamy-manipulyuyut-vykladach-kolumbijskoho-universytetu/; MASENKO, Larysa – HOROBETS, Olena: Офіційна двомовність не об'єднує країну, а сприяє її розпаду [Oficijna dvomovnist› ně ob'ednue krayinu, a sprijae yiyi rozpadu], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 20 June 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/06/larysa-masenko-ofitsijna-dvomovnist-ne-ob-jednuje-krajinu-a-spryyaje-jiji-rozpadu/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

56 MASENKO, Larysa – OREL, Maya: Нам потрібен мовний кордон із Росією. Сучасна мовна політика в Україні очима соціолінгвіста [Nam potriben movnij kordon iz Rosieju. Sučasna movna politika v Ukrayini očima sociolingvista], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 26 December 2014, online: http://language-policy.info/2014/12/nam-potriben-movnyj-kordon-iz-rosijeyu-suchasna-movna-polityka-ukrajini-ochyma-sotsiolinhvista/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

language and culture".[57] Citing a metaphorical parallel between the inhabitants of Gilead and Ephraim of the biblical Book of Judges (112: 56), known for bloody conflicts (see now Shibboleth) and between the Ukrainian war, Shevchuk opposed the Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism for all kinds of manifestations: "The linguistic schizophrenia deprives the protective role from the Ukrainian language in the existential situations when your life is in danger, and based on your language you can distinguish ours from the enemy."[58]

Masenko is suspiciously eyeing the Russian-speaking part of the Ukrainian society: "The victory in the linguistic and cultural war with Ukraine was a prerequisite for Russia in the current military intervention, and the occupation of Donbass and the Crimea. And planning the revitalization of the Soviet empire, the Kremlin is counting on those parts of the Ukrainian population which could be 'crystallized' by the control of the mass media."[59] Many consider that the sacrifice made by Russian native speakers on the front line for Ukraine is not enough. A Ukrainian writer Matsyuk explains in one of the entries in a language policy portal on Russian-speaking people fighting against separatists "somehow we should make them believe, that their Moscow language is their personal sin against Ukraine [...] against the Ukraine, for which, literally, they shed their blood". According to him, the Russian-speaking Ukrainians also have to be convinced that the Russian language in Ukraine does not worth the blood sacrifice. And then he asks the question: [the Russian-speaking Ukrainians] "when will they leave the Russian speech which has only been their mother tongue since the second generation? This will be the redemption of their original sin, which is more expensive for Ukraine than their blood".[60]

The battlefield sacrifice of the Russian-speaking is being reduced by sociological research. For example, a survey published 6 June 2016, points out that among the participants of the ATO 73 % is of Ukrainian mother tongue, 6 % of Russian and 19 % of the Ukrainian-Russian-speaking rate; however, among those informants who are not involved in the ATO, only 55 % is the proportion of native speakers of the Ukrainians, 19 % is Russian-speaking and 23 % is bilingual. So there is a bigger proportion of the Ukrainian-speakers in the ATO than amongst those who are not involved in the fights.[61]

Every year on 9 November the Ukrainian Literacy Day is celebrated. In 2015 on this occasion a one and a half minute video was made where volunteers[62] in eastern Ukraine who

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57 See SHEVCHUK, Yuri: *Movna šizofrenija. Quo vadis, Ukrayino?*, Ivano-Frankivs'k 2015.

58 SHEVCHUK, Yuri – PALAZHYI, Halyna: Мовна шизофренія – нова, потужна форма русифікації [Movna šizofrenija – nova, potužna forma rusifikaciyi], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 19 September 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/09/yurij-shevchuk-movna-shyzofreniya-nova-potuzhna-forma-rusyfikatsiji/#more-1780 (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

59 MASENKO, Larysa: Мовознавча солідарність по-українськи [Movoznavča solidarnist› po-ukrayins›ki], in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 24 September 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/09/larysa-masenko-movoznavcha-solidarnist-po-ukrajinsky/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

60 MATSYUK, Romko: Гріх [Grich], in: *Портал мовної політики* [Portal movnoyi politiki], 12 November 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/roman-matsyuk-hrih/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

61 *Дослідження: українська мова є рідною для 73 % учасників АТО, російська – для 6 % [Doslidžennja: ukrayins'ka mova e ridnoju dlja 73 % učasnikiv ATO, rosijs'ka – dlja 6 %,]*, 7 June 2016, online: http://language-policy.info/2016/06/doslidzhennya-ukrajinska-mova-je-ridnoyu-dlya-73-uchasnykiv-ato-rosijska-dlya-6/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

62 As a result a hybrid war from 2014, the president Ukraine create volunteer units under the program "Territorial Defense". In November 2014 most of the territorial battalions were integrated into Ukraine's Ground forces.

took part in battles, tell their ideas on Ukrainian politics. The words of the volunteers indicate, how the Ukrainian national side sees the role of the Ukrainian and Russian language, objectives and tasks of the wartime language policy. The first interviewee said: "I grew up in a Russian-speaking family. After the Maidan I switched to the use of the Ukrainian language, because I realized that the best resistance against the Russian aggression is if we speak Ukrainian." Another volunteer stated: "enemies [...] openly claim that where the Russian language is, there is the Russian interest". Essence of the message: "If you do not want the Russian soldiers to come and 'liberate' you and your loved ones use the most powerful weapon against them: speak Ukrainian!"[63]

Civil movements are protesting against the missing Ukrainian nationalization. On the 9th of November 2015 a movement in front of the presidential office announced claims to provide special status of the Ukrainian language, the motto was "Ukrainization – resistance against the occupation".[64] "The [...] language law was written on Putin's knee, and had a different purpose. The president keeps talking about the protection of the Ukrainian language, but nothing happens. We are tired of demagoguery. A war is going on here, the Russian propaganda pours from the screen, and no one does anything about it" – said one of the protesters.[65]

Extension of the scope of use of the Ukrainian language, the obstruction of the Russian language is considered by many as a split from the colonial past Soviet era and means freedom and independence. According to Masenko, "the Russian language is the chain that bounds Ukraine to the Communist past".[66]

At the 25th anniversary of the Ukrainian independence scheduled for 24 August 2016 a nationwide campaign of young people was announced, the slogan was: "Be truly independent: speak Ukrainian!"[67]

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the crisis in Ukraine and the language problems are connected by multiple threads. In the only 25-year history, the country has faced various crises. In the

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63 *Військові та волонтери закликають спілкуватися українською – відео [Vijs'kovi ta volontěri zaklikajut' spilkuvatisja ukrayins'koju – viděo]*, 9 November 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/vijskovi-ta-volontery-zaklykayut-spilkuvatysya-ukrajinskoyu-video/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

64 *Що можна зробити у День української писемності та мови [Ščo možna zrobiti u Děn' ukrayins'koyi pisemnosti ta movi]*, 7 November 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/scho-mozhna-zrobyty-u-den-ukrajinsko-ji-pysemnosti-ta-movy/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

65 *На Банковій протестували проти русифікації [Na Bankovij protěstuvali proti rusifikaciyi]*, 9 November 2015, online: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/na-bankovij-protestuvaly-proty-rusyfikatsiji/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

66 MASENKO, Larysa: *Скандал в Охматдиті як дзеркало пострадянської мовної політики [Skandal v Ochmatditi jak dzerkalo postradjans'koyi movnoyi politiki]*, in: *Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki]*, 29 August 2016, online: http://language-policy.info/2016/08/skandal-v-ohmatdyti-yak-dzerkalo-postradyanskoji-movnoji-polityky/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

67 *Мовомарафон-25: до річниці Незалежності українці переходитимуть на українську мову [Movomarafon-25: do ričnici Nězaležnosti ukrayinci perechoditimut' na ukrayins'ku movu]*, 11 August 2016, online: http://language-policy.info/2016/08/movomarafon-25-do-richnytsi-nezalezhnosti-ukrajintsi-perehodytymut-na-ukrajinsku-movu/ (Downloaded 22 April 2017).

domestic political crises the language issue was constantly present: the political elite used the language issue as a mobilizing force for the election mood-enhancing factor to their own use. The language issue could become a division factor instead of a cohesion factor for a nation that is seeking identity after the collapse of the Soviet system.

As a result of the misguided language policy in the tense political situation the language issue became a pretext for military intervention, it has become a casus belli. In the conflict of the increased Russian nationalism and the growing Ukrainian nationalism the language plays a central role. In response to the circumstances of the Ukrainian crisis, the Kyiv government is trying to develop a language policy that reduces social division and tension and towards both sides (native speakers of Ukrainian and Russian speakers). However, the Ukrainian nationalism sees Russian language as the aggressor, as the enemy's language and the spread of the Ukrainian language is connected to the country's independence, winning the war in the east and the independence. Simultaneously, however, the imperial nationalism in Russia, apparently for state-supported shows on the Ukrainian nationalism as a response to the annexation of the Crimea and the military intervention into Ukrainian territory.

Ukraine today is a state that has been in a transitional period since the proclamation of its independence twenty-five years ago: it seeks the leaven, which can be the basis for a new national identity. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian language policy did not contribute to this search and could not come up with valid solutions for the crisis. However aftermath of the Crisis the currently bilingual country can become monolingual gradually.

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
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REVIEWS

Zoltán SZENTE – Fanni MANDÁK
Zsuzsanna FEJES (eds.)

Challenges and Pitfalls in the Recent Hungarian Constitutional Development – Discussing the New Fundamental Law in Hungary

The book has an intended purpose to present the complexity of the development of the Hungarian historical constitutionalizing. The preamble – the National Avowal – has been analyzed as well. Both Italian and Hungarian authors made a commitment to support the efforts to enlighten the Hungarian Fundamental Law which entered into force on 18 April 2011.

Balázs Fekete: The National Avowal: More than a Conventional Preamble to a Constitution
The author has introduced the Preamble of the new Hungarian Constitution (Magyarország Alaptörvénye), the National Avowal. An "invisible constitution" can play an important role and has had a strong influence over the society and the legal education during the last twenty-five years. He correctly pointed out the coherence and the fine relationship to the plane text.

Zsuzsanna Fejes: Identity and Historical Constitution Clause in the Hungarian Fundamental Law and its Effects on Constitutional Interpretation
The author is presenting the Constitutional identity and its effects on Constitutional interpretation. She stressed the role of the Christianity in the continuity and the strong relation between the nation and the Fundamental Law. Nevertheless she emphasized the importance of the Holy Crown and constitutional tradition. The Holy Crown is representing the separation of power. There is the question in focus of discussion whether the National Avowal is legally binding or not? The new Fundamental Law has built on strong pillars and it feeds from the spirit, soul and morality of the nation.

Giuseppe Franco Ferrari: The Controversial Definition of Hungarian Identity: from the Preamble to the Role of the New Constitutional Court
The author highlighted the coherent set of values and the full equivalency of rights of citizens. He means that the pivotal role of the new Hungarian Fundamental Law is more ideologically orientated. The author perfect enlightened this fact because as an Italian scientist he can observe the new Fundamental Law from outside.

András L. Pap: Who are "We are the people"? Biases and preferences
The author underlined the paternalistic state which is represented by the Hungarian Nation and the members of the Hungarian Nation. He thought very important that the "Holy State" has been highlighted in the text and the state recognizes the churches (by state approved). This chapter were emphasized the Christian-conservative normative preferences. The nationalities shall have the right to establish their self-government at both local and national level.

András Téglási: The protection of Fundamental Rights in this jurisprudence of the Constituitonal Court of Hungary after the New Fundamental Law Entered into Force in 2012
The author focused on the jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. His paper enlightens from the Human Rights aspect. The so called "invisible constitution," those constitutional norms and values that are not included *expressis verbis* in the plain text of the Constitution. The other question which investigates the paper very decently the European Court of Human Right's interpretation and its influence considered the precedent law.

Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz: Constitutional Amendments and their Judicial Review: the Case of Hungary
The author concentrates on the controversies and solutions in foreign jurisprudence. She has concluded that in established democracies there was no particularly strong social and political need for the substantial review of constitutional amendments. Accordingly in the case this kind of review exists it can enforce the transparent legislation.

Fanni Mandák: Signs of Presidentialization in Hungarian Government Reforms – Changes after the New Fundamental Law
The author separated two different presidentialization like *de facto* and *de jure*. De facto leaders aspire to increase their power resources and their autonomy. This is a formally system, not personalized.
De jure leaders have political influence in the executive branch and this is with leadership-centred electoral process.
The author analyzes the institutional development in Hungary focused on Prime Minister's Office. The paper offers a clear understanding of the political consensus and the lack of the cooperation between left and right wing in historical aspect.
The recension does not consist all of the essays which are published in the book but it can give an overview about the new Hungarian Fundamental Law and its main principles. There was no aim to present the regulations in details, although it makes sense to draw the recent political apprehension.

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REPORTS

Colloquium "Industrial Workforce and Political Regimes 1938–1948"

Opava, Czech Republic, 25–26 November 2015

The colloquium took place in Opava from 25th to 26th November 2015 and was organized by the Faculty of Public Policies of the Silesian University in Opava which is one of the project executing organisations. This colloquium followed the first workshop which was organized in 2014.

The first day was devoted to the topic of workforce and the system of forced labour from 1939 to 1945. The first speaker was Stanislav Kokoška who focused on the system of the forced labour in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia which represented crucial issue for the functioning of Nazi Germany. In 1939 a ban of strikes was enacted and the worker became a worker of one specific factory, the number of workers was set by a directive and the new phenomenon is a woman working in a factory. In 1942 first labour education camp occurred. Their educational principles were stressed. These camps were designated for women and youth and the most often recourse were due to breaking of the employment contract or when a worker did not come back from holiday.

The next paper was presented by Jiří Pokorný. He dealt with the beginnings of the National Head-office of the Trade Unions of Workers (Národní odborová ústředna zaměstnanecká). It was a big organisation functioning 1939–1945. Antiliberal tendencies may be noticed in the end of 1930s and after the Conference of Munich as a way how to find answers on the breakdown of economy which was felt by normal people, hence it was necessary to saturate a wide spectrum of people. This organisation was an association of socialist head offices and trade unions in bigger corpus. Agrarians, who opposed this organisation, built up their own organisation. The National Head-office of the Trade Unions of Workers defended its independence during the era of the Protectorate, but it formally entered the Národní souručenství. The paper prepared by Dalibor Státník was rather a scientific argumentation on the topic of work´s committees during the Protectorate. He mentioned that analogy with post-war era is very important research question because the position of work´s committees was similar to work´s committees of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH).

The last speaker of the first section was Martin Jemelka who focused on manufacturing towns of the Baťa trust in 1938–1945. Shoes production was on the decrease, since the end of 1930s machinery production was slowly increasing. New plants in Sezimovo Ústí, Otrokovice, Třebíč, Ratíškovice, Napajedla or Zruč nad Sázavou were supposed to be used in machinery industry. Changes in organisation of production, changes in investments and Baťa´s housing estates were connected with it. The increase of economy housing may be observed in this era.

The second part of the colloquium titled "Social Changes and Political Orientation of the Workforces from 1945 to 1948" was opened by Jiří Kocián who dealt with social policies of political parties during 1945–1948 with focus on Czech National Social Party and partly on

Social Democratic Party. Political parties were, of course, interested in social policy before WW2. The National Social Party was interested in crisis events and their possible solutions. After WW2 the above mentioned parties were interested in work´s committees, economic problems and housing. A lot of their proposals were not accepted.

The following speech was held by Jiří Pernes who focused on the Czechoslovak Communist Party and its relationship towards workforce during 1945–1948. Industrial workforce was still the main group which supported the party. After elections in 1946, which were won by the Communist Party, the idea of establishing of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia became actual. The party aspiration was gaining more than 50 % in upcoming elections. In 1947 the Communist Party undertook a campaign and aimed to get more members coming from intelligentsia, peasants, women and also owners of small firms, teachers and white collars. This campaign resulted in massively increased number of party members. This fact led to suspicion in the Soviet Union. The social structure of the party was changing and industrial workforce was less represented.

Ryszard Kaczmarek and Kazimierz Miroszewski discussed several aspects of the Katowice region. He compared social classes in the region with Poland and stated that the main social class were labourers but peasants were dominant in Poland. The problem of strikes represented his second topic. He said that qualified labourers took part in strikes. The group which did not strike were holders of Volksliste, for they were afraid of expulsion. Generally said, strikes were not often in 1945. Different situation was in the next year when people stroke because of lack of the food. In 1948, seventeen strikes happened. Reason for them was the shortage of the food. The third topic was focused on shock-workers. It was easier to find shock-workers among younger labourers because a lot of workers were not able to fulfil the norm. Another fact connected with shock-workers are falsified statistics. Shock-workers profited from their job performance. They were given new flats, more food etc. Ryszard Kaczmarek also mentioned that both leftist parties had 140,000 members in the Katowice region but the Polish Worker´s Party lost members during the antizionism campaign.

Peter Heumos presented the last conference paper of this section. He concentrated his speech on some aspects of protest behaviour of labourers in Czechoslovakia from 1945 to 1968. In the beginning of the post-war era labourers stroke in Škoda plants because their working hours were risen. Then in 1946–1947 protests were caused because of new wage plan and introduction of new job norms. The role of work´s committees in forming of protests was slowly increasing. Since the second half of 1950s the work´s committee was entitled to call a strike and the role of the Communist Party in case of solving conflicts was weakened.

The first conference day finished in Dolní Vítkovice.

The following day was divided into two sections – "Social Situation of Labourers 1945–1948", and "Social Conditions of labourers 1938–1948 –sources and research methods". The first speaker was Dušan Janák who discussed social conflicts and strikes in the Ostrava region in summer 1948. He divided strikes as political phenomenon and specified their differences in 1945–1948. Till 1946/1947 political strikes were prevailing and were organized artificially. We do not know how many strikes happened because the press of Trade Unions was not interested in this topic. Since 1947 directives are debated and 103 strikes occurred

but it was a marginal topic, therefore, only short reports were in newspapers. After the national strike in February 1948 political strikes stopped. The last represent strikes which were connected with the first regime crisis and bad situation of food supply. Janák named strikes in Slezské bavlnářské závody which was a German company during WW2. This strike spread massively during one day. Trade Unions denied this strike and had the role of real government speakers. This strike was suppressed.

The next speaker was Jakub Šlouf who focused on social and political conflicts in the Plzeň region from 1948 to 1953. The key question was currency reform connected with protests in Czechoslovakia. In June 1953, there occurred strike in the V.I. Lenin plant. This strike attempted to weaken the regime which was a new phenomenon.

Zdeněk Jirásek discussed the evolution of workers in textile industry in the Czech lands 1945–1945. The key character of the after-war period was the continuity with the interwar period and the Protectorate. The only different regions were bordering areas which were negatively influenced by the expulsion of Germans and new settlement. A lot of women started to work in the textile industry after WW2. Following conference paper was presented by Alžběta Čornejová. She debated the topic concerning food supply of labourers and the Central Trade Union Council (ÚRO) which played important role in the establishing of rationing. Rations were distributed by the Central Committee of Workers (Ústřední rada pracujících) – mostly grain, shoes, clothes etc. UNRRA also distributed rations. Some of their products were unknown for Czechoslovak people. Nevertheless, some products were lacking – fuel, vehicles, and sanitary goods. Very bad situation was in the Opava region. Bad crops in 1947 caused severe problems in food distribution and black market was booming. This section was completed by Jiří Knapík and his paper on cultural policy in the second half of 1940s. A labourer was not only a blue collar employee, he was considered as an important representative of the nation. Culture should have been free for masses of people after WW2. New collectives of profane culture were set up. These collectives tried to organize attending of cultural events. They also attempted to liquidate the system of season tickets in theatres which caused a crisis of attending cultural events. Trade Unions had a new form of cultural policy which was organized by workshop clubs of Trade Unions, labourers should have become objects of art, labourers judged movies etc.

The first paper of the second section was held by Mečislav Borák who discussed the criterion of family background of workers who became victims of the blood bath in Katyn. Most of them were normal citizens; some of them were soldiers from the Těšín region. Based on personal questionnaires we can find that people had different occupations during interwar period than during the war, e.g. engineers, teachers or policemen. A lot of policemen from the interwar era worked as labourers. Nevertheless, they were shot.

Mečislav Borák was followed by David Hubený who based his paper about labourers on his research in Police Department in Prague. He found that authorities had information about labourers and concentrated on all important events in factories and labour movement. Some examples from the press, information on merging of labour unions, advertising campaigns and strike preventions may be found there.

Second to last presentation was prepared by Richard Przeczek. He discussed the survey which was conducted by Inocenc Arnošt Bláha in Brno in 1947. Bláha collected more than twenty thousand of personal questionnaires from inhabitants in Brno. They had to answer

a broad spectrum of questions related to their family, housing standards or free time. The research project investigates questionnaires which were filled out by students and pupils. Richard Przeczek visualised some project outputs after his theoretical introduction.

The last speaker was Lubomír Hlavienka who presented results of the project which was based on newspapers survey. His team searched for articles in Práce and several newspapers which were printed for industrial sectors. He focused on collected data from these newspapers. These information corresponded to content of the book which is about to be published as output of the project called Industrial Work Force in the Czech Lands 1938–1948.

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